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The radionuclide analysis model developed and validated in this study is the first one 
ever to integrate human judgment throughout the analytical process.  Therefore, besides 
relating the generation, transport, and measurement of anomalous anthropogenic 
radionuclides, this model enables many associated tasks to be achieved that could not be 
performed using existing models.  These tasks include thoroughly characterizing 
radionuclide detection sites, effectively processing qualitative data, and correcting data 
during processing.  The study outlines the model as a highly detailed itemized procedure 
and validates the model through four case studies.  Each case study is able to demonstrate 
a specific novelty of the model, although multiple novel and useful qualities of the model 
can be found in all of the case studies.  Case Study 1 shows the model’s ability to 
perform site characterizations by determining the presence of 50 radionuclides at a site 
where only seven had been identified previously.  In Case Study 2, the model is shown to 
be able to isolate a specific emission location through the effective incorporation of 
 
qualitative data.  Case Study 3 demonstrates the model’s ability to perform complicated 
radionuclide analysis completely independent of computational models.  Through Case 
Study 4, the model is shown to be capable of processing errant data that could not be 
analyzed computationally.  Besides the usefulness of each of the novelties, the model 
offers many practical values, including its ability to normalize analysis amongst 
radionuclide analysts with varied levels of experience -- effectively enabling junior level 
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Chapter I:  INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement 
Purpose 
The purpose of this project is to develop a process model that relates the generation, 
transport, and measurement of anomalous anthropogenic radionuclides.  Given certain 
radiation or radionuclide measurements at a site, and possibly meteorological 
measurements, this model can be used to determine features associated with the source of 
the release, its transport, and the distribution of radionuclides at the detection site.  
Specifically, given the radionuclides and concentrations measured along with the 
prevailing local wind speeds and directions, this model will be able to estimate the 
emission time, duration, cause, source, radionuclides, and concentrations.  Moreover, the 
source and transport estimations along with the measurement data trends at the detection 
site can be used to estimate anomalies, radionuclides that are present but not identified, 
and downwind concentrations.  This model is ideally suited for real-world situations in 
which atmospheric radionuclides released from a site have been subsequently detected 
with radionuclide monitoring equipment.  Even so, the novelties and uses associated with 
this model are broadly applicable and would add value to various types of technical 
analysis.       
 
What Distinguishes This Research as being New? 
The model developed introduces a revolutionary new approach to analyzing complex 
radionuclide monitoring data.  This model is the first one ever to integrate human 
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judgment throughout the analytical process.  As a result, this is the only model that is 
capable of: 
• thoroughly characterizing a site based upon measured quantitative data (Note:  In 
Case Study 1, existing techniques identified only 7 radionuclides; however, this 
model identified 50 radionuclides); 
• analyzing complex radionuclide data without computational models; 
• processing both qualitative and quantitative data with equal effectiveness; and 
• correcting data as it is being processed (Note:  Existing models are only able to 
correct data prior to input or following output; they cannot correct data during 
processing).   
 
1.  This model focuses on site characterization beyond the interpretation of measured 
data. 
Quantitative models merely manipulate and interpret measured data.  These models are 
unable to address specifics that have not been quantifiably measured and are therefore 
unable to achieve site characterization (since measured data represents only a subset of 
the total radionuclide data onsite).  Because the model developed is the first ever that is 
able to systematically incorporate qualitative and other data -- in addition to the measured 
quantitative data -- it is the only model that is capable of achieving full radionuclide site 
characterization.   
 
An associated novelty of this model is that it is the only one that can address why certain 
data measured (or not measured) is not consistent with ground truth.  Computational 
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models are only able to provide insight into measured data consistencies with ground 
truth.  Analysis of inconsistencies requires information beyond the measured data, and is 
therefore beyond the capability of computational models. 
 
2.  This process is the first that enables complex radionuclide monitoring data to be 
analyzed without computational models. 
While computational models can facilitate the analytical processes of this model, they are 
not required in order to generate meaningful, generally accurate results.  No other model 
in existence offers such repeatable results without the incorporation of computational 
models.  (Note:  Computational models yield “generally accurate” results as well, as a 
function of the input data.  Certainly, the results of computational models are likely to be 
more precise, but not necessarily more accurate.  Case Study 1 shows that this model can 
be more accurate than computational models, which offered no solution for the problem 
set in Case Study 1.  Case Study 2 shows that this model can be more precise than 
computational models, which generated a broad area solution (southern Spain) instead of 
a facility-specific (Acerinox Smelting Plant) solution in Case Study 2.)  
 
3.  While computational models rely upon quantitative data as inputs, this model is the 
first to process both quantitative and qualitative data effectively.    
Quantitative models have no way to accurately incorporate human factors, non-
quantitative data media, etc. into their analysis.  At best, this type of information is 
included as a statistical probability -- a number.  While continued use of models utilizing 
this approach over time can generate results that normalize to reasonable approximations, 
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no subset of model runs is guaranteed to accurately account for the multifaceted 
variations of these qualitative data.  The model developed is the first to thoroughly and 
accurately account for qualitative data inputs. 
 
4.  This radionuclide analysis model is the only one that corrects data as it is being 
processed.    
Because existing models cannot incorporate human judgment into their processing, they 
are unable to recognize poor quality or inaccurate data and provide corrections.  These 
models have no reasoning capability and are not designed to incorporate reason -- they 
simply process the quantitative data presented to them.  It is this fact that led to the adage, 
“garbage in, garbage out.”  All data corrections must take place prior to data entry into 
the models or after the processed data has been output because the data cannot be 
corrected during processing.  The model developed, on the other hand, is integrally 
dependent upon human judgment, and therefore is able to recognize and correct data as 
they are being processed. 
 
In What Ways will This Research be Useful? 
1.  The model developed enables analysts of varying expertise and experience levels to 
reach normalized data analysis conclusions.  
One of the principal benefits of this model is that it provides a peer-reviewed, 
standardized radionuclide analysis process from beginning to end.  As a result, when a 
radionuclide detection system registers an anomalous reading -- be it the result of a 
complex radionuclide emission and transport, or a simple malfunction within the 
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processing equipment -- radionuclide analysts of varying knowledge and experience 
levels are able to systematically determine the cause of the reading in a repeatable, 
normalized manner.  By thoroughly defining the analytical process in such a structured 
manner, junior analysts are able to perform senior level analysis, and analysts of all levels 
are able to follow the same comprehensive analytical sequence enabling them to reach 
normalized conclusions regarding the cause of the anomalous reading.  In short, this 
model provides a mechanism for less experienced analysts to perform complicated 
radionuclide emission site characterizations as if they had years of experience.       
 
2.  This model enables definitive conclusions regarding the source of anomalous 
radionuclide detections to be determined.   
Another benefit of the model is that it enables definitive conclusions to be reached 
through analysis.  Typically, radionuclide analysis models are able to provide insight into 
particular anomalous readings by detection equipment; but no existing model is able to 
provide definitively accurate answers.  Because these models are only able to process 
quantitative data and merely interpret the data entered into them, there is no way for the 
defining information, which includes qualitative data, to be incorporated adequately.  
Since the model developed incorporates qualitative data, several aspects related to the 
definitive “ground truth,” which are not quantitative, can be included in the analysis.  
With the incorporation of all “ground truth” information into the analytical process, this 
model is able to trace a measured anomaly to its definitive source with a level of certainty 
that is not achievable with existing models. 
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3.  If computational models are the desired analytical process, then this model can serve 
as a preprocessor of information prior to computational model use.  
Due to the comprehensive, standardized processing of information in the early stages of 
this model, and the level of analysis that can be achieved without computational models, 
if computational models are the desired method for analysis, then this model can 
effectively serve as a preprocessor of data prior to computational model analysis.  The 
early stages of the model enable measured data to be vetted and assumptions that will be 
incorporated into the analysis to be standardized.  This preprocessing can prevent 
analysts from using the same computational model to analyze an anomalous reading and 
reaching varied conclusions that result from differing assumptions that have been 
incorporated.   
 
4.  This model can provide insight into the applicability of computational models in 
various circumstances. 
In addition, because this model can serve to define the inputs and assumptions that will 
be incorporated into computational models, this model provides a systematic method for 
determining which computational models are and are not applicable for analyzing various 
situations.  Therefore, this model can minimize the possibility that a computational model 
will be applied incorrectly to analyze an anomalous detection, resulting in suspect output.     
 
5.  This model can generate reasonable results based upon incomplete or inaccurate data. 
Finally, since this model integrates human judgment into the analytical process, it enables 
reasonable estimates to be derived from incomplete or inaccurate measured quantitative 
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data.  Existing models, which are incapable of adequately incorporating human judgment, 
provide little insight into anomalous radionuclide detection system readings without a 
reasonably complete data set.  The output resulting from inaccurate or incomplete data 
can be quite inaccurate.  However, the incorporation of human judgment, and therefore 
qualitative data, into this model’s analysis enables it to draw from more information than 
the incomplete or inaccurate qualitative data measured, and provide reasonable results 
based upon the broader data analyzed.   
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Literature Review 
This literature review is intended to serve as a knowledge baseline in the areas of 
atmospheric radionuclide emissions, atmospheric radionuclide transport, radionuclide 
collection/detection systems, and models that relate these phenomena.  The purpose of 
this baseline is twofold.  First, when considered in totality, this baseline will describe the 
radionuclide source-receptor models in existence and highlight the fact that none of these 
models incorporate human judgment throughout the analytical process.  Therefore, no 
model is able to effectively process qualitative data, thoroughly characterize emission 
sites, correct for inaccurate or incomplete data during processing.  Second, this baseline 
will provide reference information and characterization data that can be incorporated into 
the model developed in this study.   
 
The structure of this review is relatively straightforward.  First, each of the relevant 
phenomena (i.e., atmospheric radionuclide emissions, atmospheric radionuclide transport, 
and radionuclide collection/detection systems) is investigated.  After the fundamental 
scientific phenomena have been introduced and addressed, relevant models that attempt 
to systematize these processes are investigated.  It is through this final investigation that 
key knowledge voids are highlighted.     
 
I. Atmospheric Radionuclides in the Environment and Their Sources  
 A.  Nuclear Weapons Detonations  
  1. Introduction 
  2. Overt Atmospheric Detonation 
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  3. Evasive Atmospheric Detonation 
  4. Underground Detonation 
  5.  Underwater Detonation 
  6. Using Fission Products to Identify Nuclear Explosions 
  7. Activation Products Indicative of Nuclear Weapons Explosions 
  8. Broader Use of Radionuclides to Characterize Nuclear Explosions  
  9. Fractionation Effects that may Influence Nuclear Detonation  
   Characterization 
 B. Medical Industry Emissions  
  1. Introduction 
  2. Radionuclides Detected by Atmospheric Radionuclide Sensors 
C. Nuclear Reactor Emissions  
1. Reactor Operation 
2. Three Mile Island 
3. Chernobyl 
 D. Reprocessing  
  1. Introduction 
  2. Decladding and Dissolution Phases 
  3. Off-gas Treatment  
  4. Reprocessing Facilities and Data  
 E. Other Processes  
 F. Natural Radionuclides  
  1. Introduction 
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  2. Primordial Radionuclides 
  3. Primordial Radionuclide Daughters  
  4. Induced Radionuclides  
II. Meteorological Influences 
 A. Introduction  
 B. Vertical Temperature Structure of Atmosphere  
 C. Instantaneous and Continuous Source Term Approximations  
 D. Characteristic Effluent Plumes  
  1. Fanning 
  2. Fumigation 
  3. Looping 
  4. Coning 
  5. Lofting 
  6. Caveats 
 E. Atmospheric Diffusion of Radionuclide Emissions 
 F. Diffusion Equations 
  1. Concentration Calculations -- Infinite Medium 
  2. Concentration Calculations -- Finite Medium 
  3. Additional Relationships 
III. Collection/Detection Systems 
 A. Introduction 
 B. Radionuclide Collection Systems 
  1. General Methods for Airborne Sample Collection 
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  2. Airborne Radionuclide Samplers and Monitors 
 C. Radiation Detection Systems  
  1. Gas-filled Detection Systems 
  2. Scintillation Counters 
  3. Other Detectors 
  4. Radionuclide Concentration Calculation 
IV. Relevant Models  
 A. Introduction 
 B. Principal Models Used within U.S. Government 
 C. Other U.S. Models 
 D. Foreign Models 
 E. Meteorological Models 
 
Atmospheric Radionuclides in the Environment and Their Sources 
Nuclear Weapons Detonations 
 Introduction 
Historical studies have thoroughly evaluated radionuclide emissions that are generated by 
nuclear weapon explosions.  The overwhelming majority of these studies are based upon 
nuclear weapons testing data and experience.  The four nuclear weapons testing scenarios 
that have been evaluated in literature include overt atmospheric tests, evasive 
atmospheric tests, underwater tests, and underground tests.  Because each scenario 
incorporates different environments and circumstances, the indicative radionuclides and 
corresponding quantities that are emitted vary according to the specific scenario.  Table 
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1, which summarizes data found in literature, shows the percentage of particulate and 
gaseous radionuclides generated during a detonation that are detectable.  Although there 
is no consistency between the scenario percentages, the detectable radionuclides can be 
categorized into one or more of the following sets:  fissile material constituents, fission 
products, and activation products. 
 
Table 1:  Percentages of Detectable Radionuclides Based upon Nuclear Detonation 
Scenario 
Scenario Detectable Particles Detectable Gases 
Overt Atmospheric Detonation 15 - 100 % 100 % 
Evasive Atmospheric Detonation ~ 0 - 10 % 5 - 15 % 
Underground Detonation 0 - 15 % 1 - 100 % 
Underwater Detonation 0 - 40 % ~ 0 - 100 % 
               
 Overt Atmospheric Detonation 
Because of the quantity, variety, properties, airborne elevation, and atmospheric duration 
of radionuclides emitted during an overt atmospheric nuclear weapons detonation, this 
scenario has shown the greatest opportunity for radionuclide collection.  Based upon the 
literature cited, an overt nuclear detonation is one in which few, if any, measures are 
taken to limit external awareness of the explosion.  The most thoroughly studied overt 
atmospheric nuclear explosions have occurred either at or near the earth’s surface 
(heights of burst ranging from 0 to 100 m).   
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As Table 1 shows, overt atmospheric nuclear explosions are most effectively detected via 
particulate radionuclide detection.  Literature indicates that, on average, over 90% of the 
radionuclides generated in this manner are emitted into the atmosphere and are available 
for detection.  Although in some special cases, upwards of 85% of the particulate 
radionuclides generated are suppressed and not detectable, because of the sheer volume 
of particulate nuclides generated, measuring particles frequently provides more data than 
measuring gases.     
 
Extensive research has been conducted on the radionuclides that are detectable following 
an overt atmospheric nuclear weapons explosion.  Several representative radionuclide 
sets are listed within Table 2.  Differences between the sets are generally the result of 
several factors including how much they are based upon nuclear test data as opposed to 
theoretical calculations, the yield and type of nuclear device detonated, the height of 
burst, the assumed radionuclide sampling parameters, and the atmospheric conditions 
considered.  
 
Of the wide variety of particulate radionuclides that serve as key indicators of an 
atmospheric nuclear weapons detonation (see Table 2), the most referenced was Ba-140.  
Others that were heavily referenced include Zr-95, Ru-103, Mo-99, and I-131.  Ba-140 
has been found to be most favorable because of the fission abundance of the mass 140 
chain, its half-life relative to its precursors, its activity, and its ease of detection using 
gamma-ray spectroscopy.  The 6.22% fission abundance of the mass 140 chain makes it 
the 12th most abundant chain, well within the top 15% of all mass chains generated.  The 
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three precursors of Ba-140, which are I-140, Xe-140, and Cs-140, have half-lives of 0.86 
s, 13.6 s and 1.06 m, respectively.  As a result, after approximately 10 minutes, Ba-140 
exists independently, and because Ba-140 has a half life of 12.75 days, it can be 
detectable for months into the future.  Ba-140 is easily detectable using gamma-ray 
spectroscopy because of the 100% abundant 537.3 keV gamma-ray it emits as it beta 
decays into La-140.        
 
As Table 2 indicates, isotopes of xenon have been identified as the most conducive of the 
gases for radionuclide monitoring.  Although other radionuclide gases are generated 
during an explosion (e.g., isotopes of krypton), these radioisotopes are generated with 
much lower abundances than radioxenons and can be more difficult to measure.  Xe-133 
has been commonly referenced as the gaseous key indicator of an atmospheric nuclear 
weapon detonation because of the fission abundance of the 133 mass chain (6.7%, the 3rd 
most abundant chain) and the distinct 81 keV gamma-ray (38% abundance).  
 
Of the cases in which an overt atmospheric nuclear explosion could result in suppressed 
radionuclide signatures, a stratospheric detonation is most common.  Because of the low 
mixing rates between the stratosphere and the troposphere, radionuclides can remain 
entrained in the stratosphere on the order of months before entering the troposphere in 
detectable quantities.  As a result, Ba-140 is not an ideal indicator for these events since 
its half life would cause it to decay down to trace amounts within this time period.  
According to literature, the longer lived Zr-95 (t1/2 = 62 days) and Ce-144 (t1/2 = 284.6 
days) are more suitable radionuclide indicators for a stratospheric nuclear detonation.  
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However, due to the relatively low activity of these radionuclides and their disbursed 
nature upon reentering the troposphere, detecting measurable quantities can still be 
difficult.  
 
 Evasive Atmospheric Detonation 
The principal ways that nuclear weapons can be detonated in the atmosphere and 
generate minimal detectable radionuclide signatures are to use high strength containment 
chambers and conduct the detonation during heavy rain.  Just as in the case of an overt 
detonation, the principal radionuclides that would likely be detectable are Ba-140 and 
Xe-133, although their measured concentrations would be diminished according to the 
effectiveness of the evasion efforts.  For that matter all of the radionuclides listed in 
Table 2 would have the possibility of being detected following an evasive atmospheric 
detonation, but their likelihood of detection could be reduced to negligible amounts.   
 
Although chambers exist that can fully contain radionuclide particulates generated by 
hydronuclear and low yield nuclear explosions (< 1 kt), for a high yield nuclear 
explosion, a containment chamber will only serve as an impediment to dispersion.  Even 
though chambers are unable to contain a high yield explosion, the heavy metal chamber 
materials suppress the detectable radionuclide signatures by providing additional mass to 
the radionuclide cloud which reduces its dispersion height and increases gravitational 
settling thereby inhibiting long range detection.  The added mass also enables more rapid 
cooling because the hot fission products are able to condense on the cooler chamber 
products that were vaporized during the detonation.  Independent of the nuclear 
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detonation yield and the type of containment chamber used, a percentage of the 
radionuclide gases are released into the atmosphere.   
 
Detonating a nuclear weapon in the atmosphere during a thunderstorm can suppress 
radionuclide signatures by entraining radionuclide particles in the rain water.  Although 
studies agree that rain water can entrain these radionuclides, there is disagreement with 
respect to the level of entrainment.   The studies that postulate rain to be an effective 
radionuclide particle suppressor estimate the effectiveness to be approximately 90%.  
Other studies question the theoretical nature of estimating radionuclide signature 
suppression, given the complexities of particle formation and dispersion, given no 
nuclear test data to support or refute the phenomenon.  Scientists agree that rain is less 
effective at suppressing noble gas signatures than particulates signatures.   
 
 Underground Detonation 
As Table 1 shows, although detectable radionuclide particles are an obvious result of an 
atmospheric nuclear detonation, in some cases, particles can be detected from 
underground and underwater detonations.  Historical U.S. nuclear testing practices have 
shown that it is possible to contain all of the radionuclide particulates generated.  
Similarly, Russian experience indicates that half of their underground nuclear tests 
successfully contained all of the radionuclides generated, both particulates and gases. 
 
Because effective containment practices are well known and necessary equipment is 
internationally accessible, it can be concluded that if radionuclides are allowed to escape 
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from an underground nuclear detonation, then it is the result of careless engineering 
practices or a deliberate decision to allow the release.  Examples of carelessness include 
improper shaft construction, improper geological evaluation, and grossly inaccurate 
explosive yield calculations.  Historically, deliberate radionuclide releases have been 
allowed due to prohibitive costs and domestic resources associated with full containment, 
a lack of concern whether full containment was achieved, and various experiments that 
investigated radionuclide release rates into the atmosphere following an underground 
nuclear explosion. 
 
Generally, vertical shafts have been shown to contain radionuclides much better than 
horizontal shafts.  This is likely because vertical shafts can be drilled to great depths, 
while the amount of overburden available for horizontal shafts is limited to the natural 
overburden in the topographical area.  In addition, the geological response of the ground 
following a vertical shaft nuclear explosion (e.g., the creation of a subsidence crater) is 
also instrumental to suppressing radionuclides underground.     
 
In cases where gases escape the ground and enter the atmosphere, xenon is the only gas 
of consequence.  Experimentation at the Nevada Test Site showed that the total amount 
of xenon released is no greater that the prompt iodine and xenon radionuclide yields.  All 
of the other customary contributors to the total xenon yield become entrenched in 
matrices underground and these matrices do not readily release the xenon once created.  
As a result, the xenon release duration spans on the order of days, corresponding to the 
half lives of the iodine and xenon.         
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 Underwater Detonation 
The opportunities for downwind collection of atmospheric radionuclide debris are least 
likely following an underwater nuclear detonation.  As shown in Table 1, the total 
atmospheric radionuclide release can be near 0% in some cases -- especially for deeply 
submerged explosions.  While the processes governing particulate entrainment in ocean 
water are well understood, the chemistry and physics noble gases dispersion through 
ocean water is more ambiguous.  In general, if evasive techniques are used in conjunction 
with the underwater detonation, then the atmospheric release can be reduced by an 
additional two orders of magnitude. 
 
Of course, relevant experimental data for underwater nuclear explosions was obtained 
though actual nuclear underwater weapons tests.  Naturally, the largest quantity of 
radionuclides (5%) was released during the shallowest detonation (Crossroads Baker -- 
25 m underwater).  Other, deeper underwater (45 - 600 m) detonations released fewer 
radionuclides (~ 0.01 - 1%), and one underwater detonation is not known to have released 
any particulate or gaseous radionuclides into the atmosphere.  The majority of 
radionuclides that escaped the surface were volatiles, radionuclides with 
condensation/evaporation temperatures below 1600K.  Volatiles are known to escape 
because they approach the water surface in a gaseous state.  Data regarding atmospheric 
xenon gas release quantities following an underwater nuclear detonation are poorly 
referenced in literature.    
 
 19
No experimental data exists regarding very shallow or very deeply submerged 
underwater detonations; therefore, theoretical estimations and extrapolations have been 
performed.  The conclusion reached for a slightly submerged nuclear explosion was that 
approximately 40% of the particulate radionuclides and possibly all of the gases would be 
released and detectable.  In cases where the detonation is so deep that it collapses upon 
itself before reaching the water surface, scientists estimate that radionuclide releases 
would be negligible.   
 
In both the experimental and theoretical cases, the entrained radionuclides can remain 
submerged below the water surface indefinitely.  Gamma-rays emitted from 
radionuclides that migrate to shallow depths can be detectable above the water in the 
local vicinity of the detonation for approximately one week.  However, these 
radionuclides will not contribute to any downwind measurements unless they are released 
from the water’s surface.      
 
 Using Fission Products to Identify Nuclear Explosions 
Prototype International Data Center (PIDC) scientists found that nuclear weapon 
detonations could best be identified using two intersecting sets of radionuclides.  The 
first, more comprehensive set was the radionuclide library which consisted of all 
radionuclides that would have a reasonable possibility of detected with gamma-ray 
spectroscopy following a nuclear weapon detonation.  This list is shown in Column A of 
Table 2.  Factors affecting detectability include the nuclear detonation environment, 
radionuclide yield, half-life, decay mode, and decay physics.  The second, limited set 
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consisted of radionuclides that would be most likely detectable by gamma ray 
spectroscopy following a nuclear weapon detonation.  This list of most likely 
radionuclides was established by the international Conference on Disarmament in 
Working Paper CD/NTB/WP.224, published in March 1995.  This list is shown as 
Column B of Table 2.  All of the radionuclides listed are fission products that are of 
relatively high abundance.  Radionuclide sets from Germany, the Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory (PNNL), and the Russian Federation have also been listed.   
 
Table 2:  Radionuclides Used to Identify Nuclear Weapons Detonations 
Radionuclide A.  PIDC 
Library 
B. WP.224 C. Germany D. PNNL E.  RFNC 
Ag-110    X  
Ag-111 X  X X  
Ag-113 X     
As-77 X  X   
Ba-140 X X X X X 
Cd-115 X  X X  
Cd-115m X     
Ce-141 X  X X  
Ce-143 X X X   
Ce-144 X  X X X 
Cs-134 X X X X  
Cs-136 X X X   
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Cs-137 X X X X  
Eu-155 X     
Eu-156 X  X   
Eu-157 X  X   
Gd-159 X     
Ge-77 X     
I-131 X X X X X 
I-132   X X  
I-133 X X X X  
I-135 X  X   
Kr-85m   X   
Kr-88   X   
La-140 X  X X X 
La-141 X  X   
Mo-99 X X X X X 
Nb-95 X X X  X 
Nb-95m X  X   
Nb-96 X     
Nd-147 X  X X  
Pd-109 X  X   
Pd-112 X  X   
Pm-149 X  X   
Pm-150 X     
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Pm-151 X  X   
Pr-145 X     
Rh-105 X  X   
Ru-103 X X X X X 
Ru-105 X  X   
Ru-106 X  X  X 
Sb-125 X     
Sb-126 X  X   
Sb-127 X  X X  
Sb-128 X  X   
Sb-129 X  X   
Sm-153 X  X   
Sm-156 X  X   
Sn-123 X     
Sn-125 X  X   
Sr-91 X  X   
Sr-92 X  X   
Tb-161 X     
Tc-99m X  X   
Te-129m X     
Te-131m X  X   
Te-132 X X X X  
Xe-131m X X X   
 23
Xe-133 X X X  X 
Xe-133m X X X   
Xe-135 X  X  X 
Y-92 X  X   
Y-93 X  X   
Zr-95 X X X X X 
Zr-97 X X X X  
 
Having identified sets of radionuclides useful for determining whether or not a nuclear 
detonation had occurred, PIDC scientists were able to develop criteria for determining 
when a nuclear weapons test had likely NOT occurred.  They concluded that unless two 
of the anthropogenic radionuclides within the library were identified, at least one of 
which being a fission product, then the source of the radionuclides likely was not a 
nuclear weapons test.  Certainly, at least one of the radionuclides was expected to be a 
WP.224 radionuclide, but this was not a criterion.   
 
Once the likely occurrence of the event had been established, independent analysis was 
conducted at multiple laboratories around the world.  One of the principal methods of 
analysis at these laboratories was to analyze certain fission product ratios to further 
characterize the event.  Some of the ratios that are preferred by various international 
laboratories are listed in Table 3.  As the table shows, several sets of ratios can be useful.  
Based on these lists, each laboratory appears to have a differing philosophy regarding the 
use of fission product ratios.  For example, Germany’s list seems quite inclusive, as was 
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the German list of characteristic fission products provided in Table 2.  On the other hand, 
PNNL prefers to avoid radionuclide ratios that incorporate two different elements due to 
distortions that could result from fractionation effects.  Russia’s list seems to incorporate 
only the most telling of the ratios; however, it should be noted that Russia relies on other 
ratios including activation product and fissile material ratios.  Some scientists question 
the effectiveness of ratios that incorporate Nb-95 and Pm-149 (e.g., Nb-95m/Nb-95, Zr-
95/Nb-95, and Pm-151/Pm-149) because the scientists have found that the gamma-rays 
used for quantification can be obscured by other gamma-rays likely to be present in 
spectra.  As of 2001, the final set of certified international laboratory requirements, which 
would include a standardized set of radionuclide ratios for characterization, had not yet 
been established.    
 
Table 3:  Key Fission Product Ratios 
Ratio A. Germany B. PNNL C. RFNC 
Ba-140/La-140 X  X 
Ce-143/Ce-141 X X  
Ce-143-Ce-144  X  
Ce-144/Ce-141 X X  
Cs-137/Cs-136 X   
I-133/I-131 X   
Nb-95m/Nb-95 X   
Pm/151/Pm-149 X   
Ru-106/Ru-103 X   
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Te-131m/Te/132 X   
Xe-133m/Xe-135 X   
Xe-135/Xe-133 X   
Zr-95/Nb-95 X  X 
Zr-97/Zr-95 X X  
 
 Activation Products Indicative of Nuclear Weapons Explosions 
Although fission products are the principal indicators of a nuclear weapons explosion, 
activation products can be equally as informative.  These radionuclides are formed as 
neutrons escape the fissile material and interact with the nuclear weapon structural 
materials and other externals (e.g., soil, earth, etc.).  While the presence of activation 
products alone does not indicate that a nuclear explosion has occurred, when coupled 
with the detection of fission products, the activation products can aid in characterizing the 
explosion.    
 
As in the case with fission product evaluation, the activation product radionuclides that 
are used by various international scientists differ.  The principal radionuclides that are 
universally considered include are Co-60 and Fe-59.  These radionuclides are formed by 
neutron bombardment of the iron, nickel, and cobalt, materials in the weapon.  The 
nuclear reactions are shown in Equation 1.  Cs-134 is also considered to be an 
informative activation product; however, because the 134 mass chain is the most 
abundant of all fission mass chains, Cs-134 is normally listed as a fission product.  The 
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Cs-134 activation reaction is shown in Equation 2.  Other frequently referenced 
activation products are listed in Table 4.   
 
Co-59 (n,γ) Co-60;  Note: natural abundance of Co-59 is 100%    Equation 1a  
Ni-60 (n,p) Co-60;  Note: natural abundance of Ni-60 is 26.2%  Equation 1b  
Fe-58 (n,γ) Fe-59;  Note: natural abundance of Fe-58 is 0.26%, but    
 overwhelming majority of structural materials are iron based  Equation 1c 
 
Cs-133 (n,γ) Cs-134;  Note: natural abundance of Cs-133 is 100%  Equation 2  
 
Table 4:  Activation Products Used to Identify Nuclear Weapons Detonations 
Radionuclide A.  PIDC Library B. Germany C. RFNC 
Ag-110m X X  
Am-241 X   
Br-82   X 
Ce-137 X   
Ce-139 X   
Co-57 X X  
Co-58 X X X 
Co-60 X X X 
Cr-51 X X  
Cs-134 X X  
Eu-152 X   
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Eu-152m X   
Fe-59 X X X 
Hf-181  X  
Hg-203 X   
I-123 X   
I-126   X 
K-42   X 
Mn-54 X X  
Na-22  X X 
Na-24   X 
Np-239 X X X 
Pa-233  X  
Sb-124  X  
Te-123m X X  
U-237 X X  
Zn-65 X X  
 
 Broader Use of Radionuclides to Characterize Nuclear Explosions 
While fission product ratios are most commonly used to determine the fissile material 
composition of a nuclear weapon and identify the date and location of a nuclear weapon 
explosion, several measured activation products and fissile material quantities are used to 
further characterize the detonation.  Ratios involving either Mo-99, Zr-95, or Ce-144, and 
either Pu-239, Pu-240 or U-234 can be used to analyze energy release values due to 
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fission reactions.  While the fission product quantities can be determined by gamma-ray 
spectroscopy, the transuranic quantities can be found by radiochemical or alpha particle 
analysis.  To determine neutron energy distributions and fluence, gamma-ray 
spectroscopy can be used to quantify amounts of Np-239, Fe-59, Co-58, Co-60, Na-22, 
Na-24, K-42, Br-82, or I-126.  Additionally, quantities of H-3 and Np-239 can be used, as 
well as the ratios U-235/U-234, U-234/U-238, Pu-238/Pu-239, Pu-238/Pu-240, Am-
241/Am-239, and Am-241/Am-240, in order to assess the content of the special nuclear 
material used in the weapon.  These values are determined by gamma-ray and 
radiochemical analyses.  If the fissile material in the weapon was known to be plutonium, 
then the Am-241/Pu-241 ratio, which can be evaluated using alpha particle and gamma-
ray spectroscopy, can provide information about the age of the plutonium.  Finally, 
statistically Be-7 measurements have been known to provide insight into the 
sophistication of the nuclear weapon design; however, due to the significant magnitude of 
the Be-7 background around the globe, statistically significant measurements are 
uncommon.  
 
 Fractionation Effects that may Influence Nuclear Detonation Characterization 
As PNNL has noted, using ratios involving differing chemical species can lead to 
inaccurate results due to fractionation effects.  Fractionation is any change from the 
original set of radionuclides that are expected following a nuclear detonation.  For 
instance, radionuclide quantity measurement variations that are the result of normal 
radioactive decay is not considered fractionation.  On the other hand, chemical reactions 
that are partial to a particular radionuclide species and therefore perturb the quantities 
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from what would have been measured if the radionuclides had been in isolation is 
considered fractionation.  Therefore, fractionation effects are caused by interaction of the 
nuclear explosion product radionuclides with their external environment.  Fractionation 
effects can significantly and independently affect the quantities of radionuclides 
measured from a nuclear weapon detonation.  As a result, they can cause meaningful 
inaccuracies in radionuclide ratio measurements.   
 
Several factors can increase fractionation effects.  For example, when condensation 
occurs more rapidly than normal, because a number of more volatile radionuclides exist 
within a select, few fission product mass chains, these mass chains can be affected by the 
rapid condensation differently than other mass chains.  Similarly, the interaction of heavy 
particles, such as ejected soil or containment chamber materials blown up during the 
detonation, with the fission product radionuclides can enhance fractionation.  Heavier 
particles tend to enhance condensation and settle more rapidly and therefore can skew 
downwind measurements.  Other fractionation-prone influences include varying 
solubilities of radionuclides in water, radionuclide uptake by microorganisms, and the 
affinity of certain radionuclides toward specific sample collection processes. 
 
For atmospheric detonations, if the fireball does not reach the ground, then fractionation 
effects tend to be minimal.  However, in situations where external influences were more 
pronounced (e.g., during a rain storm), even if the fireball does not touch the ground, 
considerable fractionation can occur.  Underwater nuclear explosions tend to experience 
more fractionation that air bursts.  Even so, initial fractionation effects in water have been 
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moderate -- similar to the limited fractionation that occurs in air (likely because air and 
water demonstrate fluid-like properties).  Later fractionation effects in water can be 
significant.  When a nuclear weapon explodes underground, it can result in extreme 
fraction effects.  These effects, however, are predictable based upon years of 
underground nuclear testing experience.   
 
Medical Industry Emissions 
 Introduction 
Radioisotope use within the medical industry has increased significantly over the past 
two decades.  Medical radioisotopes are used around the world in over 13 million 
procedures per year to palliative, diagnostic, and treatment purposes.  The most 
commonly used radioisotopes are listed in Table 5.  As a result of the continued growth 
in radioisotope production, use, and disposal, radioisotopes have been periodically 
detected by airborne radionuclide monitoring systems.  A number of medical 
radioisotopes are also indicative of a nuclear detonation.  These radionuclides are bolded 
with a carrot (^) in Table 5.  The six radionuclides that have been detected by the 
international network of sensors analyzed by the Prototype International Data Center 
(PIDC) are bolded and italicized with an asterisk in Table 5.     
 
Table 5:  Commonly Used Medical Radionuclides 
Nuclide t1/2 Nuclide t1/2 Nuclide t1/2 Nuclide t1/2 
Ac-225 10.0 d Cu-64^ 12.7 h Mn-52 5.59 d Sm-145 340 d 
Ac-227 21.8 y Cu-67 61.9 h Mo-99^ 65.9 h Sm-153^ 2.00 d 
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Am-241^ 432 y Dy-165 2.33 h N-13 9.97 m Sn-117m 13.6 d 
As-72 26.0 h Eu-152^ 13.4 y Nb-95^ 35 d Sr-85 65.0 d 
As-74^ 17.8 d Eu-155^ 4.73 y O-15 122 s Sr-89 50 d 
At-211 7.21 h F-18 110 m Os-191 15.4 d Sr-90 29.1 y 
Au-198^ 2.69 d Fe-55 2.73 y Os-194 6.00 y Ta-178 9.3 m 
Be-7 53.2 d Fe-59^ 44.5 d P-32 14.3 d Ta-179 1.8 y 
Bi-212 1.10 h Ga-64 2.63 m P-33 25 d Ta-182 115 d 
Bi-213 45.6 m Ga-67 78.3 h Pb-203^ 2.16 d Tb-149 4.13 h 
Br-75 98 m Ga-68 68.1 m Pb-212 10.6 h Tc-96 4.3 d 
Br-77 57 h Gd-153 242 d Pd-103 17 d Tc-99m^* 6.01 h 
C-11 20.3 m Ge-68 71 d Pd-109^ 13.4 h Th-228 720 d 
C-14 5730 y H-3 12.3 y Pu-238 2.3 y Th-229 7300 y 
Cd-109 462 d I-122 3.6 m Ra-223 11.4 d Tl-201^* 73.1 h 
Ce-139 138 d I-123^*  13.1 h Ra-226 1.6E3 y Tm-170^ 129 d 
Ce-141^ 32.5 d I-124 4.17 d Rb-82 1.27 m Tm-171 1.9 y 
Cf-252 2.64 y I-125 59.9 d Re-186 3.9 d W-188 69.4 d 
Co-55 17.5 h I-131^* 8.04 d Re-188 17 h Xe-127 36.4 d 
Co-57^ 272 d I-132 2.28 h Rh-105^ 35.4 h Xe-133^* 5.25 d 
Co-60^ 5.27 y In-111 2.81 d Ru-97 2.89 d Y-88^ 107 d 
Cr-51^ 27.7 d In-115m 4.49 h Ru-103^ 39 d Y-90 64 h 
Cs-130 29.2 m Ir-191m 6 s S-35 87.2 d Y-91^ 58.5 d 
Cs-131 9.69 d Ir-192^ 73.8 d Sc-46^ 84 d Yb-169 32 d 
Cs-137^* 30.2 y Kr-81m 13.3 s Sc-47^ 3.34 d Zn-62 9.22 h 
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Cu-61 3.35 h Lu-177 6.68 d Se-72 8.4 d Zn-65^ 244 d 
Cu-62 4.7  m Mn-51 46.2 m Se-75 120 d Zr-95^ 64.0 d 
 
 Radionuclides Detected by Atmospheric Radionuclide Sensors 
Relatively few studies have investigated radionuclide effluents that result from medical 
industry processes.  The PIDC is one organization that has devoted research to this issue 
and presented experimental results in peer reviewed technical publications.  
Consequently, the overwhelming majority of the literature cited in this area originated at 
the PIDC.   
 
The PIDC monitored an international network of radionuclide sensors that could detect 
and quantify radionuclides from any industrialized continent.  This type of global 
coverage made the PIDC network ideal for monitoring radionuclide effluents associated 
with the medical industry because medical radioisotope development and use has 
historically been most prevalent on industrialized continents.  As table 1 indicates, the 
medical radionuclides identified by the network includes I-123, I-131, Tc-99m, Tl,-201, 
Cs-137, and Xe-133, and all of the medically-relevant detections were collect locally.  In 
other words, there is no known global background concentration of radionuclides that has 
resulted from the medical radioisotope industry.  Because PIDC analyses indicated that 
the Cs-137 and Xe-133 detections were unrelated to the medical isotope production or 
use, only the remaining four are addressed in this section. 
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I-123 is a radionuclide that is used for medical diagnostics purposes.  The primary I-123 
gamma-ray (159 keV, 83.3% abundance) is useful for cerebral imaging.  I-123 is 
generated in a cyclotron through the proton bombardment of Xe-124 and subsequent 
decay of Cs-123.  The reaction is listed in Equation 3. 
 
Xe-124 (p,2n) Cs-123  5.94 m   Xe-123  2.08 h   I-123  Equation 3 
 
I-123 was measured at only one of the international network of sensors; however, it was 
measured with some regularity (in approximately one-third of all analyzed spectra) over 
the three year history of the monitoring site.  The quantities measured were miniscule and 
orders of magnitude below national safety standards.  Although quantities were minute, I-
123 is generally easy to detect because its primary gamma-ray is not in the vicinity of any 
other relevant gamma-rays.  As a result of the abundance of radionuclide data, PIDC 
scientists were able to use analytical techniques to trace the I-123 from the sensor back to 
the origin -- a cyclotron producing I-123 for medical purposes.   
 
I-131 is a fission product radionuclide that is most commonly used in the treatment of 
thyroid disorders.  As a medical radioisotope, it is produced in reactors specifically for 
use within the medical industry.  Because I-131 is a fission product, it has been detected 
on all of the continents where radionuclide monitoring sensors report data to the PIDC.  
While the overwhelming majority of these detections were directly to the nuclear power 
industry and nuclear research, a few may have been related to the medical industry.       
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Tc-99m is one of the most commonly used isotopes in the medical industry and is 
regularly used as a tracer for imaging purposes.  It is estimated that over 80 percent of all 
medical procedures involving the use of radioisotopes utilize Tc-99m.  This radionuclide 
is produced onsite at medical facilities by separating it from its fission product parent, 
Mo-99.    
 
As a result of the broad use of Tc-99m, it is readily available and has been detected 
worldwide.  Correspondingly, as in the case of I-131, Tc-99m has been detected on every 
continent that has sensors that report to the PIDC.  Also like I-131, because Tc-99m is a 
fission product, not all detections of Tc-99m can be directly linked to the medical 
industry.  Even so, medical facilities were identified as likely sources for multiple Tc-
99m detections on two continents. 
 
Tl-208 is used in cellular viability analyses.  It is a generated by proton bombardment of 
Tl-203 in a cyclotron and emits a 167.4 keV gamma-ray with 100% abundance.  The Tl-
208 generation equation is shown in Equation 4.  Like I-123, only one radionuclide 
sensor has confirmed the presence of Tl-201, but the radionuclide has been detected at 
the site on several occasions.  PIDC scientists identified the likely source of the detection 
as a local medical facility. 
 
Tl-203 (p,3n) Pb-201  9.4 h   Tl-201  Equation 4 
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Nuclear Reactor Emissions 
 Reactor Operations 
During the normal operation of light water reactors, gaseous and particulate radionuclide 
waste products are generated through the fission process and the activation of non-fissile 
materials in the reactor core.  The overwhelming majority of these waste products never 
escape the system due their short half-lives and various chemical processing techniques; 
nevertheless, an infinitesimal fraction of these wastes are released into the atmosphere.  
The most common radionuclide emissions into the atmosphere consist of noble gases, 
iodine, tritium, and particulates.  History has shown these processes to take place in all 
manner of nuclear reactor systems including PWRs, BWRs, HWRs, GCRs, LWGRs, and 
FBRs.  However, due to differing operational processes and regulations around the world 
governing effluent releases, the effluent quantities can vary greatly.  Table 6 lists the 
average activity emitted from nuclear facilities worldwide, normalized per year from 
1990 through 1994.  As a comparison, Table 7 shows the same information from 1995 
through 1997.  
 
Table 6:  Worldwide Average Activities Normalized per year (1990 - 1994),  
 (TBq (GW y)-1) 
Reactor Type Noble Gases Tritium I-131 C-14 Other Particulates 
PWR 27 2.3 0.33 0.22 0.18 
BWR 354 0.94 0.81 0.51 178 
HWR 2050 650 0.35 1.4 0.051 
GCR 1560 4.7 1.4 1.6 0.30 
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LWGR 1720 26 6.8 1.3  14 
FBR 380 49 0 0.12  12 
 
Table 7:  Worldwide Average Activities Normalized per year (1995 - 1997),  
 (TBq (GW y)-1) 
Reactor Type Noble Gases Tritium I-131 Particulates 
PWR 13 2.4 0.17 0.13 
BWR 171 0.86 0.33 351 
HWR 252 329 0.11 0.048 
GCR 1 240 3.9 0.42 0.17 
LWGR 465 26 6.9 8.4 
FBR 209 49 0 1.0 
 
Tables 8 and 9 express the noble gas and iodine radionuclides emitted from U.S. PWRs 
and BWRs in detail along with their activity fractions based on data obtained throughout 
1982.   
 
Table 8:  Noble Gases Activity Fractions resulting from U.S. PWR and BWR Operations 
 (1982) 
Radionuclide Half-life  PWR Act. Fract. BWR Act. Fract. 
Ar-41 1.8 h 0.005 0.029 
Kr-85m 4.5 h 0.0042 0.061 
Kr-85 10.8 y 0.0162 0.013 
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Kr-87 76 m 0.0086 0.083 
Kr-88 2.8 h 0.0039 0.143 
Xe-131m 12 d 0.0063 0.034 
Xe-133m 2.2 d 0.0059 0.0071 
Xe-133 5.3 d 0.806 0.198 
Xe-135m 15 m 0.002 0.056 
Xe-135 9 h 0.139 0.171 
Xe-138 14 m 0.003 0.195 
 
Table 9:  Radioiodines Activity Fractions resulting from U.S. PWR and BWR Operations 
 (1982) 
Radionuclide Half-life  PWR Act. Fract. BWR Act. Fract. 
I-131 8 d 0.272 0.065 
I-133 21 h 0.68 0.27 
I-135 6.6 h 0.043 0.658 
 
 
In atypical situations more significant quantities of radionuclides and radiation can be 
released.  The two most prominent examples in recent history are the Three Mile Island 
accident in 1979 and the Chernobyl accident in 1986.  Because these accidents were so 
different in their scope and their overall radiological effects, they are effective at 




 Three Mile Island 
The Three Mile Island (TMI) power plant, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, consisted of 
two PWRs, TMI-1 and TMI-2.  The 800 MWe TMI-1 began operation in 1974 and is 
amongst best performing units in the US, according to the NRC.  TMI-2 was rated at 900 
MWe and almost new at the time of the accident.   
 
The TMI-2 accident occurred at 4:00 am on March 28, 1979 when the reactor 
experienced a relatively minor malfunction while operating at 97% power.  In response to 
this malfunction in the secondary cooling circuit, the primary coolant temperature 
increased.  As a result, the reactor automatically shut down after only one second.  
However, due to a relief valve that was stuck in the open position, much of the primary 
coolant drained out of the core which limited heat removal and caused severe damage to 
the core and fuel rods.  Because of a faulty display, the operators were unable to properly 
diagnose and respond to the unplanned automatic shutdown of the reactor.  Because of 
the misdiagnosis and subsequent time delay, radioactive material was released into the 
cooling water. 
 
Two and one-half hours after the onset of the accident, the operators were able to stop the 
coolant loss through the relief valve.  But superheated steam and gases that had been 
generated blocked the coolant flow through the core cooling system.  The problem 
persisted well into the afternoon when operators began injecting high-pressure water into 
the cooling system to increase pressure and to collapse steam bubbles.  By 7:50 pm, 
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enough water and pressure had been restored to the core that a reactor coolant pump 
could be restarted.   
 
Over the next two days, operators were able to shift the gas into waste gas decay tanks 
using various pipes and compressors.  However, due to leaky compressors, some 
radioactive gases were released into the environment.  Moreover, small amounts of 
radiation were likely released as operators vented a hydrogen bubble that had formed in 
the containment vessel.   
 
Although the accident and the environmental consequences were studied in detail by the 
NRC, the EPA, the predecessor organization to the Department of Health and Human 
Services, and several independent organizations, radionuclide release levels were so low 
that they are scarce in literature.  Average radiation dose levels were estimated to be 1 
millirem for the 2 million residents in the vicinity, one percent of the annual background 
in the area.  The maximum dose to a hypothetical person at the TMI site boundary was 
estimated to be less than 100 millirem.  Therefore, the TMI-2 accident serves as a 
representative example of the lower boundary of environmental releases that can result 
from nuclear reactor accidents.          
 
 Chernobyl 
The Chernobyl nuclear accident was far more severe and had much more serious 
environmental consequences than the TMI accident.  The accident occurred in April 1986 
in the Ukrainian Republic of the Former Soviet Union.  At the time, the Chernobyl 
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nuclear power plant consisted of four RBMK-1000 graphite nuclear reactors (Soviet 
LWGRs) that were rated at 1000 MWe.  The accident occurred in Unit 4, which was 
constructed in 1983.     
 
On April 25, the day before the accident, Unit 4 was scheduled for a maintenance 
shutdown.  During the reactor shutdown period, an emergency electrical power capability 
test was to be conducted.  The test, similar to previous tests, was slated to investigate 
whether the turbines coasting down would provide sufficient power to initiate emergency 
equipment.  To conduct this test, the power was to be reduced from full power to 25% 
power (250 MWe - 300 MWe) and the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) was to be 
disconnected.   
 
The experiment began uneventfully with the initiation of power reduction and the 
disconnection of the ECCS.  However, during the power reduction phase, a need for 
power within the power grid arose, so instead of steadily decreasing down to 25% power, 
the power reduction was paused at 50% power for approximately 9 hours.  In addition to 
disconnecting the ECCS, the automated neutron flux (reactivity) regulator was also 
disconnected.  This enabled Xe-135, a reactor poison, to build up in the core during the 9 
hour delay, which greatly reduced the neutron flux.  Because the automated reactivity 
control system was not operating, the reactor became unstable and power dropped to 10 
MWe before leveling at 60 MWe.  However, because of the Xe-135 concentration and 
low neutron flux, the power could not be increased.  Had the reactor been shut down at 
this point, as safety instructions required, the accident would have been avoided.  But 
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instead, the operators apparently tried to “jump start” the reactor, and increased the power 
so quickly that a steam explosion occurred, which led to a secondary hydrogen explosion.  
The hydrogen explosion led to parts of the nuclear reactor core to be ejected into the 
surroundings, and a graphite fire in Unit 4 which burned for over 10 days.  The graphite 
fire led to the most significant quantities of radionuclide effluents to be released and 
emissions that reached altitudes on the order of 1 km.  . 
 
Approximately 3.5% of the total fuel inventory (6 tons of fuel) was dispersed into the 
atmosphere.  In contrast, about half of the more volatile particulates, including isotopes of 
cesium, iodine, and tellurium, were released.  At the other end of the spectrum, 100% of 
the noble gases were released.  The radionuclides emitted were in the various forms 
including gases, aerosols, and particles. Table 10 compares the quantities of selected 
radionuclides available in the rector core with the quantity of radionuclides released.   
 
Table 10: Radionuclide Quantities in Core vs. Radionuclide Quantities Released 
Core inventory on 26 April 1986 Total release during the accident 
Nuclide Half-life Activity (PBq) Percent of inventory Activity (PBq) 
Xe-133 5.3 d 6 500 100 6500 
I-131 8.0 d 3 200 50 - 60 ~1760 
Cs-134 2.0 y 180 20 - 40 ~54 
Cs-137 30.0 y 280 20 - 40 ~85 
Te-132 78.0 h 2 700 25 - 60 ~1150 
Sr-89 52.0 d 2 300 4 - 6 ~115 
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Sr-90 28.0 y 200 4 - 6 ~10 
Ba-140 12.8 d 4 800 4 - 6 ~240 
Zr-95 1.4 h 5 600 3.5 196 
Mo-99 67.0 h 4 800 >3.5 >168 
Ru-103 39.6 d 4 800 >3.5 >168 
Ru-106 1.0 y 2 100 >3.5 >73 
Ce-141 33.0 d 5 600 3.5 196 
Ce-144 285.0 d 3 300 3.5 ~116 
Np-239 2.4 d 27 000 3.5 ~95 
Pu-238 86.0 y 1 3.5 0.035 
Pu-239 24 400.0 y 0.85 3.5 0.03 
Pu-240 6 580.0 y 1.2 3.5 0.042 
Pu-241 13.2 y 170 3.5 ~6 
Cm-242 163.0 d 26 3.5 ~0.9 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the activity release rates with respect to time.  The initial release was 
largely the result of the reactor fuel that was disbursed during the explosion and the 
emission of the more volatile gases and particulates.  The sustained increased release rate 
between days 7 and 10 was associated with the core melt.  After day 10, the release rates 
dropped significantly.  This was likely due to a rapid cooling of the reactor fuel as the 
core melted and began interacting with other materials.  Subsequent release rates were 




Figure 1: Activity Release Rates with respect to Time 
 
Two particle size distributions were evident amongst the emissions.  The smaller particles 
generally ranged between 0.3 and 1.5 µm in diameter and the larger particles had 
diameters of approximately 10 µm.  Between 80 and 90% of the nonvolatile radionuclide 
activity was present amongst the larger particles.  Contributing radionuclides included 
transuranics, Zr-95, Nb-95, La-140, and Ce-144.  These larger particles were deposited 
close to the accident site, while the smaller particles were dispersed more widely.  
Vaporized fuel constituents, such as ruthenium isotopes, condensed and formed metallic 
particles.  These, as well as the smallest of the fuel particles, were disbursed even further.   
Corresponding activities ranged between 0.5 and 10 kBq for the ruthenium particles and 
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0.1 and 1 kBq for fuel fragments.   The particles containing I-131 and Cs-137 ranged 
from 0.4 to 0.7 µm in diameter.  
 
  Behavior of Deposited Radionuclides  
The distributions and interactions of radionuclides deposited in the environment were a 
function of several factors including:  the physical and chemical characteristics of the 
radionuclides, whether the fallout was dry or wet, the particle size and shape, etc.  For 
example, when comparing particles generated directly via the explosion with those that 
originated as gases and were converted into particles via chemical reactions, nucleation, 
condensation, or coagulation, the explosion generated particles tended to be larger and 
less soluble.  As a result, these particles interacted differently than those generated by the 
gas-to-particle conversion process.  The large, 10 µm fuel particles containing uranium, 
plutonium, refractory elements (Zr, Mo, Ce, etc.), Ru, Ba, and Sr were deposited 
primarily by gravitational settling within 100 km of the accident site.  On the other hand, 
the small particles, consisting of the more volatile elements (I, Te and Cs) were more 
widely dispersed to distances on the order of thousands of kilometers and primarily 
deposited through rainfall.  Due in part to the easy measurability of Cs-137, it was the 
principal radionuclide used to characterize ground deposition quantities.   
 
The result of the varied competing influences led to the formation of three hotspot 
locations of unusually high deposition.  The central hotspot included the 30 km region 
surrounding the reactor site where Cs-137 measurements exceeded 1500 kBq/m2.  The 
northeastern hotspot was centered 200 km away from the accident site.  This region was 
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formed because of rainout that occurred on the 28th and 29th of April.  Although the 
amount of radioactivity emanating from the reactor was relatively low on those days, the 
rainout processes served to concentrate the emissions, resulting in ground depositions of 
5000 kBq/m2.  These concentrations were the highest measured as a result of the accident 
-- over three times higher than concentrations measured adjacent to the reactor site.  The 
same precipitation system on April 28th and 29th led to the formation of the third hotspot, 
as well.  The third hot spot was formed 500 km to the northeast of the accident site.  Cs-
137 ground deposition concentrations were 600 kBq/m2.  In addition to the three 
hotspots, deposition concentrations ranging from 40 kBq/m2 to 200 kBq/m2 were 
prevalent in the European region of the Soviet Union.          
 
Chernobyl’s plume of radioactivity traveled across the European portion of the Soviet 
Union and then across Europe (Figure 2).  Beyond Soviet borders, radioactivity from the 
accident was first measured at a Swedish nuclear power station.  The initial southeasterly 
winds led to deposition in Scandinavia, the Netherlands, Belgium and Great Britain.  
Then the plume shifted south and caused deposition in central Europe, the northern 
Mediterranean region, and the Balkans.  Cs-137 and Cs-134 were the radionuclides 
deposited throughout most of Europe.  The deposition was higher (40 - 185 kBq/m2) in 
certain countries where rainfall occurred.  These countries included Austria, Switzerland, 
Germany, and Scandinavia.  On average, most countries in Europe received Cs-137 
depositions on the order of 50 kBq/m2.   Countries receiving the least Cs-137 deposition 
(on the order of 0.02 kBq/m2) included Spain, France, and Portugal.  Although the 
airborne plume was detectable throughout the northern hemisphere, including North 
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America and Japan, only minimal deposition was measured beyond Europe.  No 
deposition was measured across the equator in the southern hemisphere.    
 
Figure 2: Areas where Radioactive Plume Traveled 
 
At present, no significant quantities of deposited radionuclides are transferred into less 
contaminated areas through resuspension; however, resuspension has played a role in 
times past.  One year after the incident, a storm resuspended radioactivity that had been 
deposited in the highly contaminated central hotspot (within 30 km of the reactor).  As a 
result, the airborne radioactivity concentration increased by three orders of magnitude to 
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300 Bq/m3.  Forest fires have also led to notable increases in airborne radioactivity.  For 
example, in 1992, a forest fire near the 30 km central hotspot caused airborne 
radioactivity measurements to increase by two orders of magnitude to between 20 and 70 
Bq/m3.  In addition, radioactivity measurements were increased at remote monitoring 
stations as well.   Although contamination levels trended downward following the 
accident, due to the decay of the shorter lived radionuclides and the persistence of the 
longer lived Cs-137 (with a half-life of 30.17 years), the contamination levels seem to be 
decreasing less rapidly.  Historically, environmental radionuclide contamination can be 
expected to persist in statistically significant quantities for 10 half-lives.  In the case of 
the Cs-137 from the Chernobyl accident, the contamination would be expected to 
continue for another 300 years.   
 
Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing 
 Introduction 
Once nuclear fuel has been discharged from a reactor, it can be reprocessed to recover 
useful fission products, byproduct transuranics, and the remaining fissile material that can 
be used as nuclear fuel in the future; to isolate detrimental fission products from the 
recoverable materials; and to convert the radioactive waste products into a form suitable 
for long-term storage.  Although nuclear fuel is generally designed to be stored on the 
order of 150 days, in the near term, most fuel will be stored for much longer periods of 
time because of the significant backlogs.  One benefit of the long storage times is that it 
enables all of the radionuclide gaseous to decay to insignificant levels except for C-14 
compounds, H-3, Kr-85, I-129, and I-131.   
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Equation 5 shows the key C-14 generation equation.  Table 11 lists the specific activities 
of H-3, Kr-85, I-129, and I-131 for several types of reactors following 150 days of 
storage.  It should be noted that the Table 11 values reflect the relative dominance of 
radionuclide activities.  Because most reprocessing facilities service multiple reactors, 
actual activity levels entering a given reprocessing facility can be much higher.  
 
N-14 (n,p) C-14;  Note, N-14 exists as a contaminant in the fuel  Equation 5  
    
Table 11:  Radionuclide Specific Activity 150 Days after Discharge 
Specific Activity 150 
Days after Discharge 
PWR  
(33 MWd/kg;  
30 MW/Mg) 
LMFBR  
(37 MWd/kg;  
49.3 MW/Mg) 
HTGR  
(95 MWd/kg;  
64.6 MW/Mg) 
H-3 (Ci/Mg) 690 1050 1090 
Kr-85 (Ci/Mg) 11,000 8430 60,800 
I-131, I-129 (Ci/Mg) 2.22 3.55 4.07 
 
The overall activity of Kr-85 far exceeds the activities of H-3, I-129, and I-131.  
Accordingly, Kr-85 is the greatest contributor to airborne gamma-ray activity 
measurements that result from reprocessing.  C-14 and H-3 are strict beta emitters, and I-
129 is principally a beta emitter.  Although I-131 is a gamma-ray emitter like Kr-85, I-
131 discharges are minimal in comparison to the amount of Kr-85 released.  In most 
cases, the small amounts of I-131 that are released are indistinguishable from 
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background.  However, literature indicates that when fuel has been reprocessed for 
military applications, the cooling time can be greatly reduced, thereby increasing the 
significance of the I-131 concentration.  Moreover, it is also important to note that while 
all of the Kr-85 present is gaseous, approximately half of the tritium is entrained within 
the zircaloy cladding and is not readily releasable, and the physical properties of iodine 
enable I-129 and I-131 the be present as either a gas or a liquid. 
 
A historical review of literature revealed eleven methods for reprocessing nuclear fuel.  
The established processes identified include Bismuth Phosphate, Redox, Trigly, Butex, 
Purex, and Thorex.  Other approaches include aqueous, nonaqueous, pyrometallurgical, 
pyrochemical, and fluorine volatility processes.  Because of the wealth of literature 
available regarding the Purex process and its broad international use, it will serve as the 
model for nuclear fuel reprocessing in this analysis.         
 
 Decladding and Dissolution Phases 
By and large, off-gases are generated at the front end of the Purex process during the 
decladding and dissolution phases.  During the decladding phase, fuel assemblies 
containing zircaloy or steel clad fuel rods are fed into a mechanical shearer and cut into 
pieces between approximately 1 and 5 cm long, thereby exposing the irradiated fuel 
pellets.  In cases where the cladding remained fully intact prior to shearing, the shearing 
process can release up to ten percent of the xenon and radiokrypton contained in the fuel 
and a small portion of the H-3, molecular C-14 in the form of CO2, and other volatile 
fission products.  In addition, all of the helium injected between the cladding and fuel 
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pellets during fabrication to enhance heat transfer is released.  Once generated, these 
gases travel through the off-gas treatment system where iodine and other entrained solids 
are collected.  It is possible for krypton isotopes to be collected, as well; but H-3 and C-
14 collection processes are not generally used.   
 
Although H-3 is not generally collected, it can be removed from the gas stream through a 
chemical process called voloxidation.  The voloxidation process, developed by Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory, involves oxidizing the sheared fuel in a rotating kiln, which 
converts the denser UO2 to the less dense U3O8.  The change in density causes the fuel to 
swell and ultimately pulverizes it.  As a result, the occluded tritium is exposed to 
oxidizing gases and converted into tritiated water.  Voloxidation can release over 99 
percent of the H-3 and all of the remaining Kr-85 from the fuel.  The process ends by 
converting the unreacted hydrogen to water, cooling it, and collecting the tritiated water 
with a molecular sieve or anhydrous calcium sulfate.  Voloxidation is not an essential 
part of fuel reprocessing operations; but if the process is used, it occurs after the shearing 
phase to exploit the optimized fuel exposure, and prior to dissolution to avoid mixing the 
tritium with the deluge of hydrogen that is evolved in this phase.  
 
The dissolution phase involves reacting the fuel and cladding conglomeration with hot 
nitric acid.  This phase is principally intended accomplish three tasks: to dissolve the 
uranium and plutonium, fully separate the fuel from the cladding, and chemically prepare 
all of the fuel constituents for further separation.  The majority of the dissolution off-
gases consist of air, nitrogen oxides, and steam.  The steam is contaminated with tritium 
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if voloxidation was not used.  These gases also contain the remaining nuclides of interest 
including Kr-85, elemental and compound forms of C-14, and the overwhelming majority 
of the I-129 and I-131.  It should be noted that not all of the iodine within the system is 
present as a gas.  Some of the iodine exists in aqueous form as iodides, iodates, and 
elemental iodine.   
 
The two primary nitric acid reactions that occur in the dissolution phase are listed below. 
 
OHNONOUOHNOUO 2223232 22)(4 ++→+   Equation 6 
OHNONOUOHNOUO 223232 42)(383 ++→+   Equation 7 
 
The dominance of either reaction is generally a function of the nitric acid concentration.  
By flooding the dissolution environment with oxygen, the generation of off-gas reaction 
products can be essentially eliminated; however, the gaseous fission products will persist.  
The governing reaction is shown below. 
 
OHNOUOOHNOUO 2232232 2)(242 +→++          Equation 8 
 
 Off-gas Treatment  
Prior to stack discharge into the environment, radionuclide gases from the decladding, 
voloxidation, and dissolution phases undergo radioiodine absorption and sometimes 
krypton retention procedures.  Gases generated during later reprocessing phases also 
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experience radioiodine absorption, but no krypton retention.  C-14 and H-3 retention is 
not generally practiced.   
 
Radioiodine removal is a complicated process due to the variety of reprocessing phases 
that liberate it and the varied chemical forms in which it is present.  Approximately one 
percent of the radioiodine present is released during the decladding phase; a portion is 
also released during voloxidation, if used.  Most of the radioiodine is released during the 
dissolution phase, but a small percentage continues into other phases of the reprocessing 
system.  The radioiodine may be present as a gas or a liquid, and may exist in elemental 
or organic forms, as HI or HIO, or as HIO3 in nitric acid.   
         
Iodine is normally removed by drawing the decladding and voloxidation off-gases into 
iodine absorbers, and distilling the iodine present within the dissolution mixture.  
Experimental studies have shown that distilling 20 percent of the nitric acid solution can 
remove 99 percent of the iodine present.  Some of the remaining traces of iodine are 
released amongst the other dissolution gases.        
 
Several other iodine removal methods have been pursued, as well.  Elemental iodine and 
HI can be removed by adsorption by aqueous NaOH; however, disposing of the spent 
solution can be challenging.  The Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s Iodox method used 
absorption in boiling concentrated nitric acid to convert all elemental and compound 
forms of iodine into the solid, nonvolatile I2O5.  In another Oak Ridge process, nitric acid 
containing small amounts of Hg(NO3)2 is boiled and absorbs elemental and compound 
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forms of iodine as HgI2.  The solution is then evaporated from vermiculite, leaving the 
iodine in a stable, storable form.  At Hanford, silver nitrate coated berl saddles were used 
to remove elemental iodine and HI from dissolution off-gases.  However, research 
conducted at Idaho Nuclear and in Karlsruhe, Germany have demonstrated that a more 
effective way to use silver is to impregnate it with a zeolite catalyst.  In a humid 
environment at 150oC, all volatile iodines are absorbed as silver iodide, a stable 
compound that is suitable for permanent storage.   
 
As Table 11 shows, Kr-85 generates a significant portion of the gaseous product activity 
prior to reprocessing.  As in the iodine case, several methods for removing krypton for 
reprocessing off-gases have been pursued.  Some of the notable approaches are listed 
below in Table 12.  Each process listed below has been proven to achieve a 99 percent 
krypton removal efficiency. 
 
Table 12:  Kr-85 Off-gas Removal Processes 
Process Status/Comments 
Room temperature adsorption on 
charcoal or molecular sieves 
In nuclear power plants, process used for xenon 
decay storage; simple operation principle; large 
beds required; charcoal poses flammability hazard   
Low temperature adsorption on 
charcoal or silica gel 
Pilot tested at reprocessing facility; smaller beds 
required; charcoal poses flammability hazard 
Permselective membrane 
separation 
Pilot tested; small equipment; no flammability 
hazard 
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Cryogenic distillation Pilot tested; small equipment; ozone explosion 
hazard 
Chlorofluoromethane absorption Pilot tested; small equipment; no flammability 
hazard 
     
Nuclear power plants have proven the use of room temperature adsorption to retain 
krypton contained in off-gases.  The process impedes the flow of all the gases long 
enough to allow the non-inert radionuclide gases to decay to insignificant quantities.  In 
order to retain Kr-85, large beds would be required along with a complex system for bed 
regeneration.  Because of the flammability hazard posed by treating reprocessing off-
gases with charcoal, both oxygen and NOx would need to be extracted from the off-gases 
prior to entering the retention system.    
 
Cryogenic adsorption requires smaller beds, but the off-gases must be pretreated 
beforehand to remove condensables.  This method has been tested on a pilot plant scale at 
a reprocessing facility.  As with room temperature adsorption, the beds pose a 
flammability hazard.  As a matter of fact, the risk of ignition may be more severe due to 
the possible adsorption of ozone generated through oxygen radiolysis.   
 
Using permselective membranes is another process that has been investigated for the 
removal of krypton from reprocessing off-gases.  However, the future of this method for 
reprocessing applications is not promising.  Disadvantages include the deterioration that 
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results from radiation, ozone, and NOx exposure and the severe consequences of 
mechanical failures.     
 
One of the most promising krypton removal methods was tested widely at the Idaho 
Chemical Processing Plant.  This process begins by purifying the incoming off-gases 
from the reprocessing system.  CO2 and NO2 are removed by scrubbing with a NaOH 
solution.  Although the CO2, containing C-14, could be collected by using lime to 
precipitate CaCO3, this step is generally not practiced.  By passing the off-gas over a 
650oC rhodium catalyst, N2O can be separated into N2 and O2.  After the off-gas is 
purified, regenerators are used to cool the gas to -160oC, which condenses H2O, NOx, and 
the remaining traces of CO2.  The now purified off-gas is then washed with liquid 
nitrogen to condense the krypton, which is later concentrated by fractional distillation.  
The two chief concerns with this process are that solid H2O, CO2, and NOx can clog the 
low temperature equipment, obstructing the gas flow; and the proximity of the 
accumulating solid hydrocarbons and the condensed oxygen and ozone poses an 
explosion risk.       
 
The other promising method, absorption in halogenated solvents, was studied at both 
Brookhaven and Oak Ridge.  In this process, the reprocessing system off-gases are 
compressed to almost 1 MPa and cooled to approximately -30oC in a cold trap, which 
removes the majority of the H2O, NO2, diatomic iodine, and iodine compounds.  The rest 
of the off-gas continues through an absorber-fractionater column that contains -28oC R-
12 refrigerant at the top and is reboiled at 31oC at the bottom.  N2 and O2 are removed at 
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the top of the system, and an R-12 solution containing Kr, CO2, and N2O, and traces of 
N2, O2, NO2, H2O, and iodine compounds is removed from the bottom.  The bottom 
contaminants are then fed into a stripper where the Kr, CO2, and N2O are removed.  
These stripper products can then be processed further to separate and package the C-14 
and Kr-85.  Benefits of this absorption process are that flammability and explosion 
hazards are minimal, the gas does not need to be purified prior to processing, the process 
does not require extremely low temperatures, and the process offers some level of 
flexibility.  Disadvantages include the need for high-pressure operations, the fairly 
complicated process flow, and the need for an auxiliary system to fully separate the C-14 
from the Kr-85. 
 
 Reprocessing Facilities and Data              
As of 1979 in the U.S., five reprocessing facilities had been built, each using some 
variation of the Purex process.  Basic information about these facilities is contained in 
Table 13.  As Table 13 shows, only two facilities were operating in 1979.  As a result in a 
shift in U.S. governmental policy, the Barnwell facility remains unused even today.     
 
Table 13:  Principal U.S. Reprocessing Facilities as of 1979 
Facility Location Owner Initial 
Operation 
Status 
Hanford, WA U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission; U.S. 










U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission; U.S. 
Department of Energy 
1953 Operating 
Savannah River, SC U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission; U.S. 
Department of Energy 
1954 Operating 
West Valley, NY Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. 1966 shut down in 
1972  
Barnwell Nuclear Fuel 
Plant; Barnwell, SC 
Allied General Nuclear 
Services 
n/a no license 
issued 
 
Internationally, seven major reprocessing facilities had been planned or operated by 
1979, not including sites in the Former Soviet Union. Basic information about these 
plants is included in Table 14.  Smaller facilities have been operated in India, Italy, and 
probably in other countries.   
 
Table 14:  Principal Reprocessing Facilities Overseas as of 1979 
Facility Location Owner Initial 
Operation 
Status 
Marcoule, France Cogema 1958 Operating 
Windscale 
(Sellafield), UK  
British Nuclear Fuels, 
Limited 
Site 1, 1964; 




Mol, Belgium Eurochemic 1966 Shut down 
La Hague, France Cogema Site 1, 1967; 





KFK/GWK 1971 Operating 






DKW Planned for 1992 n/a 
 
Research conducted in Europe and Asia indicate that the total quantity of radionuclides 
emitted into the atmosphere during normal reprocessing plant operations can be 
insignificant.  One study determined that the annual emission quantities for Japanese 
facility corresponded to a mere 1 mSv/y dose equivalent.  Averaged atmospheric 
reprocessing emission quantities are shown for each of Europe’s three reprocessing 
facilities in Table 15. 
 
Table 15:  Airborne Radionuclide Releases from European Reprocessing Plants from 
1980-1985 (all units are TBq/GWy(e))  




Kr-85 1.4 E4   1.2 E4  1.4 E4  
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H-3 1.2 E2 3.2 5.7 E1 
C-14 3.5 n/a n/a 
Beta emitting 
particulates 
6.3 E-2 4.5 E-5 2.9 E-4 
Alpha emitting 
particulates 




In addition to the aforementioned processes that cause radionuclides to be emitted into 
the atmosphere, radionuclides can be generated through front-end uranium fuel cycle 
processing, high energy physics experiments, and traditionally non-nuclear processes, as 
well.  Of course, these processes, even when considered in collectively, only contribute to 
a fraction of the overall radioactivity that includes the more dominant processes.  Because 
of the stringent containment requirements on radioactive wastes, their contribution to the 
overall concentration of radionuclides emitted into the atmosphere is negligible.         
 
The front-end processes related to the uranium fuel cycle include mining, milling, 
conversion, enrichment and fabrication.  The mining and milling process is the initial 
phase of the fuel cycle.  Although these processes are distinctly different, they are 
grouped because they are normally collocated.  The two principal mining methods are 
underground mining and open pit mining.  Rn-222 is the chief radionuclide that is 
released into the atmosphere from mining.  Because Rn-222 is a gas, it is much more 
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readily disbursable than particulate releases.  During the ore granulation and 
concentration associated with milling, particulates containing natural uranium daughters 
can be emitted into the air.  Although the same particulates can be released through 
mining, their concentrations are infinitesimal when compared to Rn-222 emissions.  Mill 
tailings, if not sufficiently contained, can be blown into the air by the wind or release 
additional radon gas.  Table 16 lists normalized atmospheric releases that result from the 
mining and milling process and the other front-end processes as well. 
 
Table 16:  Atmospheric Releases Resulting from Front-End Uranium Fuel Cycle 
Processing (all units are MBq/GWy(e)) 
 U-238 Th-230 Ra-226 Rn-222 Pb-210 
Mining    2.0 E 7  
Milling 6.6 E 2 7.4 E 1 4.0 E 1 8.8 E 5 4.0 E 1 
Mill 
Tailings 
7.0 E -1 1.5 E 1 1.5 E 1 1.0 E 6 1.5 E 1 
Conversion 7.4 E 1 7.4 E -1 7.0 E -2 8.1 E 3  
Enrichment 3.7 E 1 7.4    
Fabrication 7.4 E -1     
 
The concentrated ore, called yellow cake (U3O8), that results from the milling phase is 
typically converted to uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and enriched by gaseous centrifuges or 
gaseous diffusion to increase the relative percentage of U-235.  Afterwards, in 
preparation for the fuel fabrication process, the uranium is converted into uranium metal 
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(U) or uranium dioxide (UO2) so that it can be used as nuclear reactor fuel.  As Table 16 
shows, these processes result in much less atmospheric radioactivity than the mining and 
milling process.    
    
High energy physics experiments typically involve linear accelerators or cyclotrons that 
accelerate heavy charged particles (protons, deuterons, alpha particles, etc.) into a known 
target material to generate a reaction.  Depending on the type of particles being 
accelerated, the target material, the energy of impact, and other factors, the resulting 
reaction may involve the target material absorbing the particles, the formation of a large 
product (on the scale of the target atoms) and a small product (on the scale to the 
particles), or the formation of several products.  In general, radionuclides resulting from 
accelerator applications are proton rich and neutron poor with respect to either their 
stable counterparts or the reactants.  These product radionuclides generally emit gamma-
rays which can facilitate their characterization.  High energy physics experiments are not 
known to play a major role in atmospheric radionuclide emissions.  In rare situations, 
product radionuclides have been quantifiable above background locally; however, even in 
these cases, the measured concentrations were near zero. 
 
Naturally Occurring Radionuclides 
 Introduction 
Radionuclides that exist within nature can generally be grouped into one of three 
categories: primordial radionuclides, primordial radionuclide daughters, and induced 
radionuclides.  Primordial radionuclides are those that exist with half-lives on the order of 
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the age of the universe (~108 years or greater).  There are many more primordial 
radionuclide daughters in nature than primordial radionuclides.  In general, these 
daughter radionuclides have half-lives shorter than their primordial parents.  Induced 
radionuclides can be found within the atmosphere and are principally the result of cosmic 
proton and neutron interactions with stable natural elements.   
 
 Primordial Radionuclides 
There are two distinct categories of primordial radionuclides.  The first category includes 
radionuclides that decay directly into stable nuclides and those that parent short decay 
chains before reaching stable nuclides.  This first category can be generalized as 
“singular” primordials because of the dominance of radionuclides with stable daughters.  
The second category, called “series” primordial principals, includes radionuclides that 
exist as the parent of an extended decay chain.  Singular primordials consist of alkali 
metals, transition metals, metalloids, lanthanides, and non-metals.  The list of singular 
primordial radionuclides and relevant properties are shown in Table 17.  Series 
primordial principals, on the other hand, are far fewer in number and only contain 
actinides, specifically U-238, U-235, and Th-232.  The series primordial principals are 
listed in tabular form with their daughters in Tables 18, 19, and 20. 
 
Table 17:  Singly Occurring Primordial Radionuclides 
Radionuclide Half-Life 
(y) 
Radiations Daughters Typical Terrestrial 
Concentration (Bq/kg)
K-40 1.26 E9 β−, γ Ar-40, Ca-40 630 
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V-50 6 E 15 γ Ti-50 2 E-5 
Rb-87 4.8 E 10 β− Sr-87 70 
Cd-113 > 1.3 E 15 β− In-113 < 2 E-6 
In-115  6 E 14 β− Sn-115 2 E-5 
Te-123 1.2 E 13 X-rays Sb-123 2 E-7 
La-138 1.12 E 11 β−, γ Ce-138, Ba-138 2 E-2 
Ce-142 > 5 E 16 not reported n/a < 1 E-5 
Nd-144 2.4 E 15 α Ce-140 3 E-4 
Sm-147 1.05 E 11 α Nd-143 0.7 
Sm-148 7 E 15 α Nd-144  9 E-6 6000ppbwt 
Gd-152 1.1 E 14 α Sm-148 7 E-6 
Hf-174 2.0 E 15 α Yb-170 2 E-7 
Lu-176 2.2 E 10 β−, γ Hf-176 0.04 
Ta-180 > 1.2 E 15 γ Hf-180 < 1.3 E-8 1700ppbwt 
Re-187 4.3 E 10 β− Os-187 1 E-3 
Os-186 2 E 15 α W-182 1 E-9 1.8ppbwt 
Pt-190 6.9 E 11 α Os-186 7 E-8 
Pt-192 1 E 15 α Os-188 3 E-6 
Bi-209 > 2 E 18 α Tl-205 < 4 E-9 
 
 64
 Primordial Radionuclide Daughters 
Series primordial principals and their daughters, along with the singular K-40, are the 
most significant contributors to external radioactive background.  The series radionuclide 
daughters are all similar in that they originate from a uranium or thorium parent with a 
half-life of at least 108 years.  In addition, each of the daughter decay chains generally 
consists of the same elements including thorium, actinium, radium, radon, polonium, 
bismuth, thallium, culminating in stable lead.  The three decay series, the uranium series, 
the thorium series, and the actinium series, are listed in tables 2 through 4 respectively.  
As the tables show, none of the series share any isotopes and daughter half-lives range 
from fractions of a microsecond to approximately 105 years.  Moreover, many of the 
radionuclides emit multiple types of radiation.  While α and γ radiation decay emissions 
dominate, a substantial number of radionuclides emit β particles as well.  
 
Table 18: The Uranium Series (parents listed immediately above daughters) 
Nuclide Historical Name Half-Life Major Radiations 
U-238 Uranium 4.47 E9 y α, < 1% γ 
Th-234 Uranium 24.1 d β, γ 
Pa-234m Uranium 1.17 m β, < 1% γ 
Pa-234 Uranium 21.8 y β, γ 
U-234 Uranium 244500 y α, < 1% γ 
Th-230 Ionium 7.7 E4 y α, < 1% γ 
Ra-226 Radium 1600 y α, γ 
 65
Rn-222 Emanation Radon 3.8 d α, < 1% γ 
Po-218 Radium A 3.05 m  α, < 1% γ 
     a)  Pb-214 Radium B 26.8 m  β, γ 
     b)  At-218 Astatine 2 s α, γ 
Bi-214 Radium C 19.9 m  β, γ 
     a)  Po-214 Radium C’ 164 µs α, < 1% γ 
     b)  Tl-210 Radium C” 1.3 m  β, γ 
Pb-210 Radium D 22.3 y β, γ 
Bi-210 Radium E 5.01 d β 
     a)  Po-210 Radium F 138.4 d α, < 1% γ 
     b)  Tl-206 Radium E” 4.2 m β, < 1% γ 
Pb-206 Radium G stable none 
 
Table 19: The Thorium Series (parents listed immediately above daughters) 
Nuclide Historical Name Half-Life Major Radiations 
Th-232 Thorium 1.4 E10 y α, < 1% γ 
Ra-228 Mesothorium I 5.75 y β, < 1% γ 
Ac-228 Mesothorium II 6.13 h β, γ 
Th-238 Radiothorium 1.91 h α, γ 
Ra-224 Thorium X 3.66 d α, γ 
Rn-220 Emanation Thoron 55.6 s α, < 1% γ 
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Po-216 Thorium A 0.15 s α, < 1% γ 
Pb-212 Thorium B 10.64 h β, γ 
Bi-212 Thorium C 60.55 m α, γ 
     a)  Po-212 Thorium C’ 0.305 µs α 
     b)  Tl-208 Thorium C” 3.07 m β, γ 
Pb-208 Thorium D stable none 
 
Table 20: The Actinium Series (parents listed immediately above daughters) 
Nuclide Historical Name Half-Life Major Radiations 
U-235 Actinouranium 7.04 E8 y α, γ 
Th-231 Uranium Y 25.5 h β, γ 
Pa-231 Proactinium 2.28 E4 y α, γ 
Ac-227 Actinium 21.77 y β < 1% γ 
Th-227 Radioactinium 18.72 y α, γ 
Fr-223 Actinium K 21.8 m β, γ 
Ra-223 Actinium X 11.43 d α, γ 
Rn-219 Emanation Actinon 3.96 s α, γ 
Po-215 Actinium A 1.78 ms α, < 1% γ 
     a)  Pb-211 Actinium B 36.1 m β, γ 
     b)  At-215 Astatine ~0.1 ms α, < 1% γ 
Bi-211 Actinium C 2.14 m α, γ 
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     a)  Po-211 Actinium C’ 0.516 s α, γ 
     b)  Tl-207 Actinium C” 4.77 m β < 1% γ 
Pb-207 Actinium D stable none 
 
 Induced Radionuclides 
Induced radionuclides in the atmosphere are normally generated through cosmic radiation 
interactions (principally high energy protons and high energy neutrons) with elements in 
the earth’s atmosphere.  It follows that all of the radionuclides listed in Table 21 are 
produced through cosmic radiation interactions with nitrogen, oxygen, and argon, since 
these elements constitute over 99% of the earth’s atmosphere by weight and by volume.  
The two radionuclides that have shown the greatest influence on the environment are H-3 
and Be-7.  Although H-3 is listed as the third most abundant radionuclide by activity 
concentration, given its 12.33-year half-life (which is orders of magnitude longer than the 
two more abundant radionuclides), H-3 is clearly the most abundant of the 
atmospherically induced radionuclides when considering total atomic concentration.  Be-
7’s effect on the environmental is largely due to its relatively high atmospheric 
concentration (0.01 Bq/kg) which is an order of magnitude greater than any of the other 
induced radionuclides in the troposphere.       
 
Table 21: Induced Radionuclides 






H-3 12.33 y β N,O 1.2 E-3 
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Na-22 2.60 y γ Ar 1 E-6 
S-35 87.4 d β Ar 1.3 E-4 
Be-7 53.3 d γ N, O 0.01 
Ar-37 35.0 d X-ray Ar 3.5 E-5 
P-33 25.3 d β Ar 1.3 E-3 
P-32 14.28 d β Ar 2.3 E-4 
 
 
Meteorological Influences on Radionuclide Transport 
Introduction 
The atmospheric release and dispersal of radionuclides is a key method through which 
they are introduced into the environment.  Even so, radionuclide emissions constitute 
only an infinitesimal fraction of the total quantity of pollutants released into the 
atmosphere.  Numerous studies have documented the dispersal of gaseous and particulate 
effluents in the atmosphere and the subsequent deposition on the ground.  Due to the 
complexity of spatial and temporal meteorological dynamics, developing highly detailed 
descriptions of atmospheric radionuclide dispersions is impractical, if not impossible.  
However, simplified models based on statistical data and time or statistical averages are 
able to approximate atmospheric dispersion to varying degrees of accuracy under certain 
conditions.       
 
Most atmospheric radionuclide emissions from nuclear sources can be effectively 
approximated as either a continuous flow or an instantaneous puff from a point source.  
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Various configurations of this nature have been investigated both theoretically and 
experimentally to assess downwind radionuclide and activity concentrations and patterns.  
Although considering the nuclear component of airborne radionuclide emissions adds a 
level of complication to the overall problem, some complexities, like urban pollution 
considerations, do not need to be evaluated as thoroughly because they are so 
infrequently encountered in the nuclear arena.   
 
Virtually all radionuclide releases originate from sources within the planetary boundary 
layer (altitudes less than 1 km) within the troposphere, which ranges from 0 to 
approximately 10 km altitude.  Similarly, nearly all radionuclide and radiation sensors 
exist within the planetary boundary layer, as well.  Because very little vertical mixing 
occurs between the troposphere and higher levels of the atmosphere, radionuclides 
released within the troposphere typically remain within the earth’s proximity.  
Correspondingly, most meteorological studies related to anthropogenic nuclear emissions 
focus on dynamics within the planetary boundary layer and the troposphere.   
 
There are also limits to the horizontal distances radionuclides emitted within the 
planetary boundary layer can travel before their concentrations are diluted to negligible 
levels.  Consequently, a wealth of research has been conducted to characterize 
radionuclide releases within a few kilometers of the emission location.  Far fewer 
techniques are available to address releases that travel over 10 km.    
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Vertical Temperature Structure of Troposphere 
For centuries, scientists have understood that temperature generally decreases with height 
within the troposphere.  Therefore, if a parcel of air travels upwards in the atmosphere 
slowly enough such that a quasi-equilibrium state can be maintained with its 
surroundings, then the parcel will experience a decrease in temperature.  However, in 
reality, atmospheric motions can occur so rapidly that the quasi-equilibrium state is not 
reached.  In these cases, very little heat is exchanged between the parcel and the 
surrounding atmosphere.  As a matter of fact, such a negligible amount of heat is 
exchanged that the process is said to be adiabatic -- that is, with no heat exchange 
whatsoever.   
 
Adiabatic processes are commonly assumed within meteorology.  As a result, the 
adiabatic lapse rate, the rate at which a parcel of air cools as it rises without exchanging 
heat with the surrounding atmosphere, is used as a frame of reference for other 
meteorological processes including atmospheric stability characterizations.  The adiabatic 
lapse rate in one U.S. Standard Atmosphere is 0.98oC/100m.  By comparison, the normal, 
or standard, lapse rate lapse rate is 0.65oC/100m. 
 
Several lapse rates are displayed in Figure 3.  The adiabatic lapse rate is identified as a 
dashed line.  The normal lapse rate is subadiabatic, generally characterized by more 
stable atmospheric conditions.  An isothermal lapse rate is one in which temperatures do 
not change with respect to height.  As the figure shows, inversion conditions indicate an 
atmospheric temperature profile that is upside down with respect to adiabatic and normal 
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lapse rate conditions.  Inverted lapse rates are indicative of some of the most stable 
atmospheric conditions, characterized by stratified horizontal atmospheric flow.  In 
contrast, superadiabatic lapse rates generally imply unstable atmospheric conditions, 




Figure 3:  Atmospheric Lapse Rates 
 
Instantaneous and Continuous Source Term Approximations 
The overwhelming majority of all radionuclide emissions can be approximated as 
originating from either instantaneous point sources or continuous point sources.  Events 
that are reasonably approximated as instantaneous point sources include explosions and 
other short venting emissions.  Instantaneous represents the chronological portion of the 
approximation, since a finite amount of time expires during any short venting emission.  








emission sources have some finite area, if not volume.  Once the instantaneous emission 
is generated, its movement from the source location is governed by the speed and 
direction of the wind at the moment of release, assuming negligible buoyancy, particle 
settling velocity, or other external effects.  As time progresses and the puff travels into 
other wind fields, its average speed and direction will change accordingly.  In addition, 
the puff will expand about its center over time as its edges interact and become diluted 
with the surrounding atmosphere.  Customarily, when an instantaneous point emission 
occurs, the amount of material released is quantified in terms of total mass or activity 
released.  Downwind, the puff is usually described in terms of exposure or a time 
integrated concentration as it passes over a specified observation point.     
 
The continuous point source emission has been studied more thoroughly by diffusion 
meteorologists.  This approximation adequately models stack emissions and structural 
leaks where radionuclides are released into the atmosphere.  A continuous emission is 
essentially an infinite sequence of instantaneous puff emissions released with a 
differential time increment between each puff.  Like the instantaneous point source 
approximation, these releases are initially governed by the wind properties upon their 
release.  However, because of the time duration associated with the release, the amount of 
material released is expressed as a mass or an activity rate.  As the puff travels 
downwind, it is described as an average volumetric concentration.  The cross-sectional 
area of a continuous source plume tends to increase as it travels downwind because of 
transverse wind influences.  As a result, the plume’s centerline concentration decreases as 
its distance from the source increases.   
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Most radionuclides that enter the atmosphere via continuous atmospheric emissions are 
released at an elevation through stacks.  The ground concentration distribution that would 
be expected following a continuous stack emission is shown as a function of longitudinal 
and transverse distance in Figure 4.  Although the airborne concentration is highest at the 
stack release, the ground concentration at the base of the stack is essentially zero.  The 
ground concentration then typically rises to a peak value in the local vicinity of the stack, 
and gradually decreases as the distance from the stack increases.  As Figure 4 illustrates, 
at any point downwind from the stack, a cross-section of the ground concentration 
distribution will be Gaussian in shape.  The peak concentration is principally a function 
of the downwind distance traveled, and the standard deviation is primarily a function of 
the wind’s turbulent effects on the plume.   
 
Figure 4:  Ground Concentration Distribution Downwind from an Elevated Continuous 
Source 
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Characteristic Effluent Plumes 
 Fanning 
 
Figure 5:  Fanning Plume Illustration and Vertical Temperature Profile 
 
When a vertical temperature inversion inhibits vertical mixing, thereby creating very 
stable atmospheric conditions, plumes are limited to effectively one-dimensional 
horizontal diffusion in a manner called fanning.  During these inverted lapse rate 
conditions, the extent of the transverse spreading is determined by shearing within the 
horizontal winds.  This shear may be significant at night.  If the prevailing horizontal 
winds are light, the fanning plume might be narrow and ribbon-like, meandering in an 
oscillating manner.  Because the spreading of the plume is minimal, the plume may hold 
its form for tens of kilometers -- orders of magnitude greater than distances that would be 
expected in less stable atmospheric conditions, for example, during windy, daytime 
conditions.  
 
Fanning plumes are very difficult to model because they are most affected by localized 
atmospheric variations and other unique factors that are not statistically governed.  Even 
so, because of the distance they tend to travel without ground deposition, stack 
emanations during stable, inversion conditions can be desirable.  A fanning plume may 
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be undesirable in situations where the emissions stack does not generate the plume above 
local obstructions like buildings, trees, or mountains.  In addition, fanning plumes are not 
well suited for radionuclide emissions.  Because of the limited spreading, the 
radionuclide flow can effectively act as an airborne line or planar source that delivers 
radiation exposures to the ground downwind even though the ground level radionuclide 
concentrations are zero.  However, it should be noted that the stable conditions needed to 




Figure 6:  Fumigation Plume Illustration and Vertical Temperature Profile 
 
When the sun rises on a clear day, the earth’s atmosphere is normally heated from the 
ground upwards.  As the atmosphere in heated, the inversion conditions that were present 
overnight are replaced by neutral or unstable atmospheric conditions.  At some point in 
time, the newly generated daytime atmospheric conditions are present at the height of the 
emission stack.  Therefore, the stable inversion layer exists just above the stack, and the 
less stable daytime conditions exist below.  The result of these conditions is a fumigation 
plume.  Fumigation plumes may also be formed through sea breeze conditions which 
generally occur during the late morning or early afternoon.      
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Fumigation plumes can deliver the greatest ground level concentrations when compared 
to all other types of effluent plumes.  This is because a) the concentrated fanning plumes 
are able to dump their full concentrations into the ground level air, and b) the above 
ground inversion keeps subsequent emissions from fully spreading vertically restricting 
them to ground level air.  Depending of the speed of the inversion layer dissipation, the 




Figure 7:  Looping Plume Illustration and Vertical Temperature Profile 
 
As the day progresses and the lower layers of the atmosphere continue to become 
warmer, remnants of the overnight temperature inversion completely vanish.  During the 
hottest parts of clear days in warm seasons, the resulting temperature profile can be very 
unstable due to the strong lapse rate.  This can lead to large vertical eddy flows that 
generate looping plumes, which can cause the stack emissions to chaotically be brought 
down to the ground in large puffs.  In some cases, the thermally induced downdrafts can 
bring the plume to the ground in close proximity to the emission location.  However, 
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since the principal cause of such chaotic flow is atmospheric turbulence, which also 
contributes to ample mixing, when the looping plumes reach ground level, they tend to be 
more diffuse than fumigation plumes and also dissipate more quickly.  Even so, it is 
possible to produce high average effluent concentrations on the ground simply because 
the deposition locations are so close to the stack emission point where the plume is most 
concentrated.   
 
 Coning      
 
Figure 8:  Coning Plume Illustration and Vertical Temperature Profile 
 
During normal or weak lapse rate conditions, stack plumes tend to form cones oriented 
horizontally.  Ground deposition from these coning plumes generally occurs at shorter 
distances than fanning plumes, but longer distances than looping plumes.  This is because 
the thermally induced turbulence below a coning plume is between that of the other two 
plume types.  Coning plumes can occur in the day or night and are most frequently 
present during cloudy or windy conditions.  As a matter of fact, in climates that are 
characterized by cloudiness, coning plumes may be the most abundant of all plume types.  
On the other hand, in dry climates, they may be more seldom.    
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 Lofting  
 
Figure 9:  Lofting Plume Illustration and Vertical Temperature Profile 
 
Lofting plumes are characteristically observed around sunset as the atmosphere 
transitions from unstable daytime conditions to the very stable night time conditions.  The 
persistence of the lofting conditions is a function the stack height and the rate of change 
from the strong lapse rate to the inversion conditions.  Therefore, lofting plumes may 
exist from time scales on the order of minutes to those on the order of hours.  In rare 
cases, lofting plumes can persist throughout the entire night.  Lofting plumes are ideal for 
minimizing ground deposition concentrations.  Because the lower levels of the 
atmosphere are dominated by the inversion conditions, plumes can travel long distances 
before deposition is likely.  Moreover, since mixing is occurring at higher levels, when 
deposition does occur, concentrations are likely to be relatively dilute.       
 
 Caveats 
Each of the preceding plumes has been idealized for purposes of description and general 
analysis.  However, in reality, several of the features that have not been considered in this 
section would need to be addressed if detailed calculations were necessary.  For example, 
while none of the plumes considered an emission velocity of the effluents as they exit the 
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stack and enter the atmosphere, in actuality, all effluent plumes exiting a stack have a 
vertical velocity associated with them.  In addition, the effluents being emitted may have 
a temperature that is higher than the surrounding atmosphere, which will lead to an 
increased plume rise and other buoyancy effects.  Moreover, the plume constituents may 
not have the same material density as the surrounding air into which it is emitted.  
Therefore, in the case of more dense constituents, the plume would have a downward 
motion component not previously addressed.  Furthermore, once a portion of a plume 
comes in contact with the ground, downwind plume depletion and resuspension of 
deposited particles must be considered.  Other meteorological factors not addressed by 
the characteristic plumes include precipitation scavenging, ground boundary reflection, 
and building wake effects on diffusion.  Finally, radionuclide generation and decay, 
atmospheric fractionation effects, and other phenomena not specifically related to 
meteorology would need thorough consideration as well for these approximations to 
approach reality. 
 
Atmospheric Diffusion of Radionuclide Emissions 
Radionuclide particles and gases emitted into the atmosphere experience random 
collisions with other atmospheric constituents and are influenced by wind fluctuations.  
These interactions cause the radionuclide emissions to become more dilute over time.  
While the wind influences have proven to be difficult to model from a strict mathematical 
perspective, the random mixing portion of the problem has been studied for decades and 
found to have a more straightforward mathematical solution.  The random mixing of 
effluents emitted into the atmosphere has been shown to be adequately described by 
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diffusion theory.  Therefore, in homogeneous atmospheric conditions when the wind is 
still, diffusion theory can accurately describe radionuclide dispersion in the atmosphere.  
However, these conditions are extremely rare when considering atmospheric diffusion 
distances.    
 
The principal mechanism governing the dispersion and mixing of radionuclides in the 
atmosphere is turbulent airflow.  The corresponding winds are the result of eddy flow and 
exhibit heterogeneous speeds and directions, but tend to fluctuate around some central 
value.  The driving eddies are largely dependent upon the stability of the atmosphere and 
terrain effects.  Unlike the well-characterized diffusion theory description of ambient 
dispersion, to date, no exclusively mathematical explanation for turbulent flow and 
mixing has been developed.  All existing descriptions are dependent upon empirical data.   
    
The eddy flows governing plume dispersion can generally be classified in two categories.  
Small scale eddies are much smaller than plume diffusion distances.  These eddies tend to 
cause mixing amongst the plume’s constituents and dilution as outside air is mixed into 
the plume.  The net result is an overall size increase of the plume.  Large scale eddies are 
larger than plume diffusion distances.  These eddies do not mix or dilute the plume, 
rather they shift the overall direction of the plume’s migration.  The net result of these 
eddies is the meandering, sometimes oscillating track that most plumes display.  Both 




Figure 10:  Plume Spreading and Meandering as a result of Eddy Flow  
 
Figure 10 also shows vertical concentration distributions at some downwind location, 
identified as x0.  The instantaneously measured distribution shows irregular concentration 
fluctuations within the plume.  In addition, the peak concentration of the plume rests at a 
specific height at that instant.  However, if the plume is not measured at a specific instant 
in time, but as an averaged value over some time interval, the plume shows fewer internal 
concentration fluctuations.  Similarly, if the averaging time is increased further, the 
concentration profile within the plume becomes smoother and more Gaussian in 
appearance.  In addition, the figure shows that the position of peak concentration shifts 
towards the center of the distribution as the length of time increases.      
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Diffusion Equations 
 Concentration Calculations -- Infinite Medium 
Because the diffusion of atmospheric pollutants is well studied, equations describing 
atmospheric diffusion are well established.  The general diffusion equation which 
expresses the concentration of a pollutant instantaneously released into an infinite 
medium of air is shown in Equation 9.  In this equation, Cair represents the pollutant 
concentration in air, Q represents the quantity of pollutant released, the release point of 
(x0, y0, z0) is used in standard Cartesian space, and σx, σy, and σz are the standard 
deviations of the plume spread, called diffusion parameters. 
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 Equation 9   
 
Of course, if steady winds are active in an arbitrary direction (for example, the x 
direction), then the diffusion equation is modified slightly to reflect the influence.  The 
modified equation is shown in Equation 10.  In this equation, u represents the average 
wind velocity, t represents the duration of diffusion, and the diffusion parameters remain 
constant with respect to time.   
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By integrating with respect to time and approximating, the diffusion equation for a 
continuously emitting source into an infinite atmosphere with a constant wind can be 
found.   This result is shown as Equation 11.  For convenience, the point of origin is 
defined as (0,0,0), the diffusion parameters are assumed to be constant with respect to the 






















 Equation 11  
 
 Concentration Calculations -- Finite Medium 
When considering non-infinite media, the influence of contaminant reflection arises.  
Contaminant reflection is the property of certain types of contaminants to remain in the 
atmosphere even after they have interacted with a surface boundary.  For example, if, 
during atmospheric dispersion, a contaminant touches the ground does not settle due to 
gravity, is not absorbed, and is not adsorbed, and is therefore still a part of the 
atmospheric diffusion process, then contaminant reflection has occurred.  To address 
contaminant reflection given a continuous emission from a stack of height z - z0 = h, an 
imaginary source is emitted from a height -h and is assumed to follow identical idealized 
diffusion patterns.  Because contaminant reflection can vary from 0% to 100%, the value 
α (ranging from 0 to 1, respectively) is used as a scaling factor for the amount of 





Figure 11:  Plume Reflection 
 
The corresponding concentrations of contaminants in the three regions identified as A, B, 
and C are shown in Equation 12A, 12B, and 12C, respectively.  In region A, the 
contaminant concentration is simply the standard concentration determined by Equation 






















 Equation 12A   
  
In region B, relatively close to the ground at greater distances, the airborne concentration 
calculation is much more complicated.  It includes the standard concentration in air 
















































 Equation 12B   
 

























α  Equation 12C   
 
Considering the extremely conservative estimate of α = 1, which means that none of the 
atmospheric contaminants are extracted when the plume interacts with the ground, 
Equation 12C reduces to the well known Sutton Equation.  The Sutton Equation, 
introduced in 1953, expresses the ground level concentration downwind from a 






















 Equation 13   
  
 
 Additional Relationships 
Of the many relationships that can be derived from the various concentration equation 
variables, one of the most practical is the relationship between the distance a plume has 
traveled and its ground level concentration, given a certain emission height and 
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atmospheric conditions.  In order to develop these correlations, it is useful to normalize 
the ground level concentration with the emission rate and wind speed.  These normalized 
relationships are shown for release heights of 0 m (a surface level release), 30 m, and 100 
m in Figures 12, 13, and 14 respectively.   
 
 










Figure 14:  Normalized Ground Level Concentrations following Release from 100 m 
Altitude 
 
In all of the concentration calculations that have been noted, the diffusion coefficients are 
assumed to be known.  Literature has shown that an efficient, effective way to determine 
the diffusion coefficients is to use standardized charts.  Recall from the derivation 
Equation 11 that diffusion in the direction of the blowing winds can be assumed to be 
constant (i.e., σx = 0).  The charts for σy and σz determination are shown as Figures 15 









Figure 16:  σz as a Function of Diffusion Distance in x Direction 
 
Figures 12 through 16 all show multiple curves, each related to a different atmospheric 
condition.  These atmospheric conditions were defined by Pasquill and are listed in Table 









∆ T (oC) / altitude (km) 
Extremely Unstable A < -19 
Moderately Unstable B -19 to -17 
Slightly Unstable C -17 to -15 
Neutral D -15 to -5 
Slightly Stable E -5 to +15 
Moderately Stable F > +1.5 
  
Table 23:  Relationship between Atmospheric Conditions and various Meteorological 
Phenomena 
Daytime Insolation Nighttime Conditions Surface Wind 
Speed (m/s) Strong Moderate Slight Thin Overcast 
(≥ 4/8 cloudiness) 
≤ 3/8 
cloudiness
< 2 A A - B B - - 
2 A - B B C E F 
4 B B - C C D E 
6 C C - D D D D 





Collection and Detection Systems  
Introduction 
Generally, radionuclide levels within the environment are quantified onsite directly or 
collected and quantified in a laboratory environment.  Several factors can govern which 
method is best for any given set of circumstances including the type of radiation(s) being 
measured, the time sensitivity of the measurements, the fidelity of information needed, 
etc.  The discussion below addresses various radionuclide collections systems and 
radiation detection systems -- some of which are suitable for field use and others are 
suitable for laboratory use. 
 
Radionuclide Collection Systems 
 General Methods for Airborne Sample Collection 
In general, there are six ways in which airborne radionuclide samples are collected.  
These methods are filtration, volumetric sampling, bowed flow collection, adsorption, 
condensation, dynamic flow sampling.  Although in some situations, multiple methods 
could prove to be effective, each method listed offers unique benefits given certain 
limitations that may be present. 
 
Filtration air sampling is the most common method used to capture airborne particulates.  
While this method is effective at efficiently collecting particulates, it is ineffective as a 
gas collector.  This simple process involves drawing air through some sort of filtration 
medium, thereby concentrating the airborne contaminants in the medium.  After a set 
amount of time has elapsed with a measured flow rate of air passing through the filtration 
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medium, the filtration medium can be removed, and the captured radionuclide 
particulates can be measured and analyzed.  Knowing the average flow rate of air through 
the filtration medium, the amount of time the medium collected particulates, and the 
amount of radioactive material measured on the medium, the corresponding airborne 
radioactivity can be calculated.     
 
Numerous filtration media are available.  Several factors can influence which medium is 
ideal in specific situations.  These factors include the required particulate collection 
efficiency, porosity of the medium, durability, cost, cross-sectional size, air flow 
resistivity, inherent background radioactivity, and chemical solubility.  The most 
commonly used filters are glass fiber filters, cellulose-asbestos filters, and membrane 
filters.  Because membrane filters are soluble in organic solvents, they work well when 
the radioactivity collected will be measured by a liquid scintillation counter.  Radiation 
entrained within the other two types of filters is typically measured by standard radiation 
counting practices or by radiochemical assay.     
 
Volumetric sampling simply involves drawing air and interspersed contaminants into a 
container.  This method can be used to collect particulates or gases.  Some of the more 
common ways to draw the contaminant-laden air into the sampler include pre-evacuated 
container collection, vacuum pump collection, and dynamic evacuation collection.  The 
pre-evacuated container collection process involves evacuating the container in a remote 
location with a vacuum pump.  When the evacuated container is brought to the collection 
site and opened, the negative pressure gradient draws air into the container.  The now air-
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filled container can then be sealed and removed to a remote location for analysis.  
Vacuum pump collection uses a pump to draw air into the container.  One disadvantage 
of this method is that some of the air drawn into the container by the pump is likely to be 
drawn through the container into the pump, possibly causing a portion of the 
contaminants to be lost.  In the dynamic evacuation collection process, a container filled 
with a liquid is brought to the sampling site.  The liquid is then poured out, which 
dynamically draws air into the container to fill the volume.  As in all of the other 
methods, the air filled contained can be analyzed remotely. 
 
In the bowed flow collection process, particulate contaminants are collected in the flow 
stream at a location where the direction of flow changes abruptly.  The momentum of the 
particles in the airflow prevents them from changing directions as quickly as the air in 
which they are carried.  At the location within the flow stream where particles are likely 
to be collected, the inner wall of the flow mechanism is typically coated with a coagulant 
or an adhesive to improve collection efficiency.  Bowed flow collectors may incorporate 
various stages with differing airflow speeds to tailor their collection to particulates of 
specific sizes.   
 
Adsorption sampling involves collecting contaminants on a medium within the airflow 
path through chemical bonding processes.  These collectors are traditionally used as 
gaseous radionuclide samplers.  They can be used to collect particulates, but they do so 
with poorer efficiency than other processes.  To maximize the available surface area for 
trapping the gaseous contaminants, the adsorption medium is porous or granulated.   
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Common adsorber materials include silica gel, activated charcoal, and silver zeolite.  
Silica gel is typically used to collect tritium oxide (T2O) vapor.  Activated charcoal can 
be used to collect radioiodine, xenon, krypton, and argon.  Silver zeolite is used to collect 
radioiodine exclusively, with no noble gases. 
 
Condensation sampling, also known as dehumidifier sampling, uses a cold trap to 
condense water vapors within the sampled air.  The condensate liquid is then analyzed for 
radioactive contaminants -- often with a liquid scintillation counter.  When calculations 
related to the radioactivity of the condensate are performed, the temperature and relative 
humidity of the air drawn into the sampler must be known to determine the concentration 
of radiation per unit volume of air.  The condensation surface can be cooled any number 
of ways.  Cryogenic and liquid nitrogen cooling are frequently used options.  This 
sampling method is generally used to sample tritium oxide and tritiated water (HTO) 
vapors. 
 
In dynamic flow sampling, air is drawn directly over or through a detection system so 
that real time measurements can be taken obtained.  This method is used when the 
radionuclides being studied are difficult to collect or when measurements are needed on a 
continuous or an instantaneous basis.  One drawback to this method is that the detection 
system efficiency and operation can be hampered because of the accumulation of 
particulates and the condensation of certain gases.  To prevent this from occurring, 
particulates are filtered and gases are adsorbed before the flow stream reaches the 
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detector.  These detectors are useful for detecting tritium through its low energy gamma-
rays.    
 
  Airborne Radionuclide Samplers and Monitors 
High volume air samplers, also called high flow rate air samplers, are known for their 
ability to provide accurate estimates of airborne radioactivity concentration at a particular 
location for a set duration of time.  These noisy samplers typically operate at flow rates of 
at least 500 cubic feet per hour.  They use a vacuum system to draw air from the 
atmosphere across a filter that collects entrained particulates.  In addition to particulate 
filters, these samplers can be equipped with greased plate for bowed flow collection or 
activated charcoal inserts for adsorption collection.  Although high volume air samplers 
have been known to run for several days for collection operations, they are generally 
stopped for brief periods of time to replace the filter, so that the used filter can undergo 
remote radionuclide analysis.  A limited number of advanced high volume air samplers 
are able to perform the radionuclide analysis automatically within the sampler.     
 
Low volume air samplers, or low flow rate samplers, operate similarly to their high 
volume counterparts.  However, these systems operate more quietly due to the reduced 
power requirement that results from the lower flow.  Low volume samplers are typically 
used in situations when the collection period needs to span a longer duration of time, or 
as backup collection systems.    
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Continuous air monitors (CAMs) are low flow rate sampling systems that are equipped 
with radiation detectors that monitor the airflow.  These systems can be designed to 
detect are report alpha, beta, or gamma radiation activity, radioiodine activity, or noble 
gas activity.   Traditionally, they are used in radiation safety alarm systems and provide 
some type of display or other indication of the instantaneously measured or averaged 
radiation.   
 
Personal air samplers (PASs) are small, portable devices which unobtrusively sample air 
near a worker’s nose and mouth.  These battery-powered systems estimate the airborne 
radioactivity concentration present in a cumulative manner while they are in operation.  
They contain a battery-powered pump that operates at a flow rate of approximately 20 
liters/minute which simulates the breathing rate of a moderately active worker.   
 
Radiation Detection Systems  
 Gas-filled Detection Systems 
Gas-filled detection systems are typically those that detect direct ionization radiation as it 
passes through and excites gas molecules in the system.  The three main types of gas-
filled detectors are ionization chambers, proportional counters, and Geiger-Mueller 
counters.  Each of the systems uses progressively strong electric fields to create ion-pairs.  
The created ion pairs are then used to quantify the amount of radiation present.  Figure 17 





Figure 17:  Voltage Relationships of Gas-Filled Detectors 
 
An ionization chamber, also known as an ion chamber, is the simplest of the gas-filled 
detection systems.   These detectors use an air filled chamber and can be designed with a 
small voltage drop either coaxially or across two parallel plates.  The radiation that enters 
the system directly ionizes the gas inside the chamber.  The resulting ion pairs are then 
accelerated and collected through the voltage drop and either electrical pulses or the 
current associated with the charge migration is measured.  Ion chambers can be used to 
detect radiation per unit time for alpha particles, beta particles, gamma rays, and x-rays.    
 
A proportional counter is typically used in a laboratory.  The standard proportional 
counter is equipped with a counting tray for the radioactive sample being analyzed and a 
flowing “proportional gas” of argon or methane.  Depending on the arrangement of the 
detector, it can be used to detect, alpha, beta, x-ray, and gamma radiation, as well as 
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neutrons.  To detect neutrons, the standard proportional gas is changed to either boron 
triflouride (BF3) or helium-3 (He-3).  Because of the common use of these modified 
proportional counters, they are generally referenced as BF3 counters and He-3 counters.  
These detectors rely on the B-10(n,α)Li-7 and He-3(n,p)H-3 reactions, respectively.  BF3 
counters are limited to detecting slow neutrons only, while the He-3 counters are able to 
detect both slow and fast neutrons.     
 
The Geiger-Mueller Counter is a historic gas-filled radiation detection device that still 
has broad applicability and use today.  The system is known by several names including a 
Geiger Counter, a G-M Counter, and a G-M Tube.  A Geiger Counter operates by using 
an electric field that generates an electrical signal when radiation interacts with either the 
gas inside the tube or the tube wall.  The electrical pulses are then converted to a display 
measurement reading and sometimes an audible clicking sound.  G-M Counters typically 
measure radiation per unit time but are limited to low count rates since they have the 
disadvantage of long dead times which can cause high count rate measurements to be 
underestimated. Because G-M counters cannot measure energy, they are not especially 
useful for identifying radioisotopes.  They can be used to detect x-rays, gamma-rays, 
alpha particles and beta particles, but it is unable to distinguish between them.         
 
 Scintillation Counters 
A scintillation counter detects radiation through light that is emitted as ionizing radiation 
interacts with certain materials.  The emitted light can then be transformed into an 
electrical pulse.  The pulse amplitude is a function of the number of electrons that were 
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excited during the interaction and therefore scale with the amount of radiation that 
generated the scintillation. These detectors have several benefits including a compact size 
and the ability to detect alpha, beta, gamma, x-ray, and neutron radiation.   
 
Some of the most popular scintillation detectors are the liquid scintillation counter, the 
sodium iodide (NaI(Tl)) detector, and the bismuth germinate (BGO) scintillator.  Liquid 
scintillation counters are typically used in a laboratory.  With the appropriate 
configuration, these counters can achieve low background counts and correspondingly 
low minimum detectable activities.  Sodium iodide detectors are known for their high 
light yield.  These detectors have become the standard scintillator systems for performing 
gamma-ray spectroscopy.  They can be used in a laboratory or in the field.  Although the 
NaI(Tl) crystal can be fragile, it can be useful in the field because it does not need 
cooling.  BGO detectors are similar in principle to sodium iodide detectors.  However, 
they have the disadvantage of lower light yields than sodium iodide detectors.  The chief 
functional difference between the BGO detector and the NaI(Tl) detector is the 
ruggedness of the BGO system.  Because of its durability, it is more suitable for use in 
the field than NaI(Tl) detectors. 
 
Integral to the functionality of scintillator detectors is the ability to convert the weak light 
outputs into detectable electrical signals.  The two types of devices that are used to 
accomplish this are photomultiplier tubes (PMTs) and photodiodes (PDs).  PMTs convert 
the emitted scintillation light into a small number of low energy electrons.  These 
electrons then proceed through the electron multiplier portion of the tube which results in 
 101
an amplified, detectable output electrical signal.  Photodiodes can be used as an 
alternative to PMTs and offer the advantage of increased ruggedness, smaller sizes, and 
decreased power needs.  In addition, unlike PMTs, PDs are virtually insensitive to 
magnetic fields which enable them to be used in circumstances where magnetic fields 
may be present.        
 
 Other Detectors 
Thermoluminescent detectors (TLDs) are the most widely used personal radiation 
detection devices.  As opposed to most detectors that offer count rate data, TLDs serve as 
integral counters and provide information regarding radiation exposure over a duration of 
time.  In order to measure the amount of exposure, TLDs must be heated.  The heating 
process causes light to be generated that corresponds to the amount of TLD radiation 
exposure.  In addition to enabling a quantifiable measurement of exposure, the heating 
process effectively anneals the exposed portions of the detector which enables the 
detector to be fully reused.  Through the process of use and heating, a TLD can be reused 
many times.   
 
High-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors are useful for detecting x-rays and gamma-rays 
principally in a laboratory environment, but increasingly in the field.  HPGe detectors 
offer good detection efficiency and high energy resolution.  As a result, these detectors 
are an ideal choice for performing x-ray and gamma-ray spectroscopy -- especially in 
situations where the spectra have been generated by multiple radiation sources or may 
have other complexities.  Although these detectors must operate cooled for proper 
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performance, they can be allowed to heat up between uses with essentially no 
performance degradation.  Now that cooling mechanisms are becoming more compact, 
HPGe detectors are increasing in their field use.        
 
Radionuclide Concentration Calculation 
Calculating radionuclide concentrations collected on filter paper can be a relatively 
straightforward process.  The governing equation describing the change in filter paper 
activity with respect to time is expressed as Equation 14.  As Equation 14 shows, the total 
plume activity with respect to time is calculated by multiplying the plume activity 
concentration with the flow rate of sampled air through the filter.  Both the plume activity 




Q t F t A= −( ) ( ) λ  Equation 14 
 
where,  A = Activity on Filter Paper (disintegrations/time) 
 Q = Plume Activity Concentration (disintegratons/(time · volume) 
 F = Sampler Flow Rate (volume/time) 
 λ = Decay Constant (1/time)  
 
The number of counts generated by a radionuclide collected onto the filter paper, which 
corresponds to its peak area, is simply the time dependent integral of the filter paper 
activity equation, Equation 14.  However, because the filter paper activity is not readily 
measurable, the number of counts must be related to the plume activity concentration and 
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flow rate.  Because the time varying nature of the plume concentration and flow rate can 
lead to solutions that cannot be addressed analytically, time averaging can be used to 
generate constant, average values.  This greatly simplifies matters and results in a 
standard first order differential equation in terms of filter paper activity.  This equation 
can be integrated with respect to the sampling time, the independent variable in Equation 
14.  Then it can be integrated with respect to the decay time, the time between the 
radionuclide collection onto the filter paper and counting the sample using a radionuclide 
detection system.  The result can then be integrated with respect to the counting time in 
the detection system.  Because the decay time and counting time are independent of one 
another and all other processes considered, integrating with respect to these variables is 
also straightforward.  The result of these three integrations is shown as Equation 15.   
 
( ) ( )C T Q F e e eT( , , )µ φ ε γλ
λ λ µ λ φ= − −− − −2 1 1  Equation 15 
 
where,  C = Number of Counts (Area) Generated by Specific Radionuclide 
(disintegrations) 
 Q = Plume Activity Concentration (disintegratons/(time · volume) 
 F = Sampler Flow Rate (volume/time) 
 λ = Decay Constant (1/time) 
 T = Sampling Time (collecting airborne particulates onto filter paper) 
φ = Decay Time (neither collecting nor counting)  
 µ = Counting Time (generating spectra based upon filter paper activity) 
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 ε = Energy Dependent Efficiency of Detector (scalar) 




Numerous models have been developed to track the generation and dispersion of airborne 
radionuclide contaminants.  A search of the available literature has led to over thirty 
atmospheric radionuclide generation and dispersion models that have been used or are in 
use by the U.S. and foreign governments -- each model reportedly offering differing 
types of output and benefits. The U.S. Government has identified a select set of these 
models as being functional and reliable enough for use within regular emergency 
response and site characterization procedures.  The models most widely used within the 
Government include RASCAL, developed for use by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC); HPAC, developed for use by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
(DTRA);  SHARC, developed for use by Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia); and 
ARAC and HOTSPOT, both developed for use by Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratories (LLNL). While some of these radionuclide models have broad applications 
including nuclear, chemical, and biological dispersion phenomena (e.g., HPAC and 
ARAC), others are specifically intended to address nuclear-related phenomena alone (i.e., 
RASCAL and HOTSPOT).  
 
A review of these models highlights the novelty and utility of the model developed.  The 
principal void within this body of models is that none of these models fully integrates 
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human judgment throughout the analytical process.  As a result, these models are 
dependent upon quantitative inputs and are incapable of processing qualitative data.  One 
effect of these limitations is that none of these models are able to achieve site 
characterization because they are only able to analyze data that have been input into them 
-- a subset of total quantity of data available.  Another effect is that none of the models 
identified are able to correct themselves during analysis.  If inconsistent or incomplete 
data is input into these models, they are likely to either fail during analysis or output an 
errant result.  Because human judgment is fully integrated into the model developed, it is 
the only one that is capable of overcoming the shortfalls identified within existing 
models.      
 
Principal Radionuclide Dispersion Models Used within U.S. Government 
 ARAC 
LLNL’s Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) was developed to assess the 
consequences of radiation releases by modeling plume movements in near-real time.  
ARAC offers sophisticated modeling capabilities and is able to simulate complex terrain 
effects, multi-location, real-time wind field data, etc.  Because the model operates in 
near-real time, it is able to effectively estimate the spread of radioactive contaminants for 
emergency response applications. three-dimensional atmospheric flows, and dispersion of 
releases on all scales of interest, from local to global 
 
ARAC’s dispersion component uses a Lagrangian stochastic, Monte Carlo method to 
solve the three-dimensional advection-diffusion equation. This component simulates 
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numerous processes including radioactive decay and generation, mean wind advection, 
turbulent diffusion, and wet and dry deposition as a function of aerosol spatial and 
dimensional distributions.  The decay and corresponding generation of radionuclides 
within decay chains is calculated during the simulation. Because of the versatility of the 
source and emission mechanism specifications including point, line, area, or volume 
sources, and continuous or instantaneous emissions, the model can address stack 
emissions with momentum and/or buoyant plume rise, fires, and explosions.  For aerosol 
sources, the mass, activity, and particle size distributions can be predetermined with 
tabular or lognormal distribution input parameters.  Moreover, due to ARAC’s 
robustness, multiple, time-dependent sources can be applied during each run.  One of 
ARAC’s unique features is that it can address time-varying emission of radionuclide 
mixtures and time-dependent decay and generation of radionuclides within decay chains 
during atmospheric transport.    
 
The ARAC model is linked to a system that automatically accesses global databases of 
geographical data including terrain elevation, high-resolution land use and coverage data, 
real-time meteorological observations and forecasts, and population data.  In addition, the 
system accesses both radionuclide decay chain and dose factor databases. As a result, 
ARAC is able to output varying air and ground concentrations, doses, and dose rates.  
The doses can be calculated in a time-averaged or time-integrated manner.  The overall 
output of the ARAC model and its supporting resources is an explanation of the nature of 
the release, a description of the assumptions used in the calculations, and a summary of 
the predicted effects.    
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The principal strength of the ARAC model is its robustness.  The code has been proven to 
be both versatile and effective through thousands of assessments, exercises, and 
emergency response applications ranging over a period of twenty years.  The key 
weakness of the code is its difficulty in handling sparse data.  For example, the diagnostic 
wind fields can have large errors if sparse data is input into the model.  Errors within such 




DTRA’s Hazard Prediction & Assessment Capability (HPAC) Gaussian puff model 
which is capable of treating the dispersion of contaminants wide variety of atmospheric 
conditions. HPAC can be used to evaluate nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological 
dispersal events.  HPAC models the atmospheric dispersion of gases, particulates, and 
liquid aerosols from multiple sources, and is functional with varying levels of 
meteorological input ranging from an individual wind speed and direction to spatial and 
time dependent wind and temperature fields. One of the principal objectives of HPAC is 
to assess the consequences of weapons of mass destruction.  The model also assists the 
military with selecting the optimum targeting options when nuclear, biological, and 
chemical materials are in the vicinity.  Another customary use of HPAC involves 
providing support during accidents or after terrorist events involving nuclear, biological, 
and chemical materials.  Due to the complexity of the program, HPAC users must be 
trained and obtain a license prior to running HPAC on a personal computer.   
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HPAC’s modules perform four principal functions: source term generation, 
meteorological data retrieval, plume transport and dispersion, and effects estimations.  
The source term modules applicable include nuclear facilities and devices with defaults 
for nuclear power stations, nuclear weapon accidents, and yield generating nuclear 
detonations.  HPAC is able to access a climatology database for its meteorological input.  
HPAC Meteorological Data Servers accounts are available for emergency response 
purposes.  These data servers provide access to both real-time observations and forecast 
models.  With a few meteorological inputs, sufficient to enable the code to perform 
interpolations and extrapolations, a three-dimensional time-varying wind field can be 
initialized.  The wind field may be developed either with or without terrain 
considerations.  If the terrain consideration is chosen, a terrain database with 
approximately a one kilometer resolution coordinate system can be used.   
 
HPAC uses the Second-order Closure Integrated PUFF (SCIPUFF) model to for 
dispersion calculations.  SCIPUFF uses a series of Gaussian puffs that are released and 
tracked in either a stationary or moving frame of reference.  The puff approach is flexible 
enough to allow plumes to split and merge depending meteorological influences.  Other 
associated phenomena that can be addressed include radionuclide decay, plume rise due 
to buoyancy and momentum, dense gas effects, and wet and dry deposition. 
    
HPAC users have a choice of two modes of operation.  The operational mode uses default 
source terms, while the advanced mode allows the user to specify relevant source term 
parameters.  Advanced mode operation of HPAC can accommodate almost all varieties 
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of source terms; however, due to the complexity of this mode, a high level of training and 
experience with HPAC is needed to successfully use this mode.   
 
HPAC can output mapped plots of dose and deposition and can highlight lethality values.  
One of HPAC’s more unique features is its Hazard Area plot, which is presented as the 
probability of that a specified dose level is exceeded.  All of HPAC’s plotted outputs are 
able to show city and national boundaries from a 1:1,000,000 database.  These products 
may be exported in into other types of computer software, such as ARCInfo.    
 
HPAC has several strengths.  First, it uses a second-order turbulence closure model 
within its dispersion calculations.  Therefore, it tends to be reasonably accurate for 
dispersions that travel long distances.  The model has been especially useful determining 
the radiological impacts that result from nuclear reactor accidents.  Next, the SCIPUFF 
portion of HPAC is able to address complex terrain by using a terrain-following 
coordinate system within the model.  Finally, the code considers varying dynamic effects 
in an integrated manner which gives it the capacity to more accurately extrapolate results.  
Even so, weaknesses exist within the model, as well.  For example, HPAC does not 
address dispersions at high altitudes (above 30 km) or complicated localized aerodynamic 
flow patterns like flow within a forest or around buildings.  In addition, HPAC is not 
suitable for emergency response situations because it does not accept real-time 
meteorological data inputs.  HPAC also assumes that the density of the atmospheric 
releases to be similar to that of air.  Therefore, radionuclide releases of high buoyancy or 
density may be modeled inaccurately.       
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 RASCAL    
The Radiological Assessment System for Consequence AnaLysis (RASCAL) was 
developed for use by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  The model is 
designed for emergency response teams who respond to nuclear power reactor accidents 
and other radiological emergencies at NRC licensed facilities.  The NRC favors the 
RASCAL over other dose assessment models because RASCAL can estimate releases 
based strictly upon accident progressions and can therefore address releases from 
unmonitored pathways.  By using RASCAL, the NRC is able to conduct analyses that are 
completely independent of EPA analyses and can have an added level of confidence in its 
results.      
 
RACSAL consists of four subprograms.  First, the Decay Calculator computes the decay 
and corresponding generation of radionuclides. Although it does not integrate the total 
activity over the decay period, it can calculate time-dependent activities.  The Decay 
Calculator also accesses the RASCAL radionuclide database and can display decay series 
in a tabular or graphical format.   
 
Next, the Field Measurement to Dose (FMDose) portion of the model uses empirical 
measurements to calculate emergency response team safety limits, and acute and residual 
doses. Because FMDose utilizes real-time measurements for its calculations, the 
empirical field data must be acquired from the accident site to be useful.  Like the Decay 
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Calculator, FMDose is able to access the RASCAL radionuclide database and can display 
decay series in a tabular or graphical format.   
 
Then, the Meteorological data Processor subprogram uses manually entered 
meteorological data within atmospheric transport and diffusion models.  Meteorological 
data can be entered for the release location onsite and up to 35 additional meteorological 
observation locations for subsequent use by the final subprogram, STDose.  Entering data 
from multiple stations will cause a two-dimensional surface wind field to be generated by 
using a simple distance weighting of station data.  Moreover, if the meteorological data is 
provided by an NRC-regulated facility, then the surface fields can be further refined to 
include mass consistency using known topographic data in the vicinity.   
 
The final portion of the RASCAL model, the Source Term to Dose (STDose) 
subprogram, computes doses from radionuclide releases by using a Gaussian plume-puff 
transport and diffusion model.  While a steady-state Gaussian plume model is used in the 
vicinity of the release (at distances up to approximately 1 km), at later travel distances a 
time-dependent Gaussian puff code calculates the dispersion. STDose also evaluates 
plume rise, wet and dry deposition, and radionuclide decay.  This subprogram also 
incorporates time-dependent source emission rates for several predetermined scenarios.  
For example, nuclear power reactor releases can be characterized by evaluating the plant 
type and conditions or from assessing measured release data.  Other predetermined 
scenarios include spent fuel sources, which can be stored in a wet or dry storage 
environment, UF6 canisters, uranium oxide fires and explosions, criticality accidents, and 
other direct radionuclide releases.  STDose allows the user to input the quantity and types 
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of radionuclides in the source term in the direct release scenario.  STDose output includes 
plots of dose contours and tables of dose vs. downwind distance.   
 
 HOTSPOT 
The HOTSPOT set of health physics codes was developed by LLNL for emergency 
planners and emergency response personnel.  HOTSPOT was designed to provide these 
individuals with fast, portable software tools to enable a more effective evaluation of 
accidents involving radioactive materials.  It is most effective in evaluating a localized 
release within a few hours of the emission with steady winds over flat terrain.  Because of 
HOTSPOT’s effectiveness, it is used for emergency planning at several Department of 
Energy facilities, and for civil defense purposes internationally.  The model is also useful 
for performing safety analyses of nuclear material handling facilities.     
 
The HOTSPOT model is a first-order approximation of the radiation effects related to the 
release of radioactive materials into the atmosphere.  The Gaussian Plume Model that is 
incorporated into HOTSPOT has been used widely for initial emergency assessments of 
radionuclide releases and for safety analysis planning.  Therefore, HOTSPOT is 
reasonably accurate for initial assessment purposes.    
 
Given basic user input values for atmospheric stability and wind speed and direction, 
HOTSPOT computes downwind assessments of atmospheric radionuclide releases using 
one of four subprograms:  PLUME, EXPLOSION, FIRE, and RESUSPENSION.  These 
subprograms can address continuous or puff releases, explosive releases, fuel fires, and 
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area contamination incidents in the vicinity where the basic input are applicable.  
Therefore, complicated meteorological dynamics can impair the accuracy of the output.  
Other options can expedite preliminary nuclear weapon accident assessments by 
addressing tritium, uranium, and plutonium releases.  Moreover, if certain radionuclides 
are known to be present, HOTSPOT enables the user to manually enter them for 
evaluation.    
 
The EXPLOSION subprogram calculates the effects of nuclear weapon detonated on the 
earth’s surface.  These include prompt effects such as neutron, gamma, blast, and thermal 
effects, as well as delayed effects like fallout information.  The fallout data calculated 
include arrival time, and dose rate upon arrival.  In addition, the subprogram can compute 
integrated dose contours for several time intervals and display these contours on 
geographic maps.    
 
The principal strength of the HOTSPOT model is its simplicity.  Because HOTSPOT is 
based on simple, first-order approximations, it is easy to use, it operates quickly, and it 
can be applied in a variety of situations.  Although other models can provide more data 
than the HOTSPOT model, due to the limited amount of input data that is typically 
available in emergency response situations, the accuracy of the additional data may be 
questionable.  On the other hand, the more limited amount of data generated by 
HOTSPOT is quite reliable.  The main limitation of HOTSPOT is its inaccuracy when 
addressing complex terrain, meteorological conditions, or aerodynamics. 
 
 114
 SHARC  
The Sandia Hazard Assessment Response Capability, SHARC, models and assesses the 
effects of weapons of mass destruction by using field-portable codes.  SHARC 
principally consists of the following subprograms:  AIRRAD, ERAD, NUKE, BLAST, 
and SHARC.  The BLAST subprogram evaluates general blast effects and predicts 
distance ranges for these effects.  NUKE uses well-established computational methods to 
estimate prompt effects related to a nuclear detonation including blast overpressure, 
thermal output, and gamma and neutron effects including electromagnetic pulse 
influences.  The Explosive Release Atmospheric Dispersal subprogram, ERAD, 
computes the atmospheric dispersion of materials that were emitted by the detonation of 
high explosives.  AIRRAD models the transport of radionuclide fallout.  This subprogram 
estimates the fallout arrival time and duration, dose rate, and integrated dose.  Finally, the 
SHARC subprogram provides the user with dialog boxes to operate the other 
subprograms and enables output contours to be displayed on maps.       
 
Other U.S. Radionuclide Dispersion Models 
 GENII 
Originally developed in 1990, GENII is an older, general purpose environmental health 
physics model.  GENII was designed to incorporate internal dosimetry models 
recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) into 
updated versions of existing environmental pathway analysis models. Although GENII 
was developed for use at DOE’s Hanford facility, it is said to be flexible enough to be 
applicable to a variety of generic sites.  The name GENII originates from the fact that at 
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the time that the code was developed, it was considered to be a second generation 
environmental dosimetry computer code; hence, the name Generation II, or GENII. 
 
GENII can be used to determine radiation doses to populations from both acute and 
chronic atmospheric releases, as well as releases that might emanate from a spill or a 
waste disposal site.  The Gaussian plume model that is used is capable of addressing air 
transport in one of several manners including the use of an effective stack height and/or 
the calculation of plume rise from momentum or buoyancy effects.  GENII is also 
versatile enough to incorporate building wake effects and seasonal effects in acute 
atmospheric release scenarios.  More recently, a stochastic version of GENII was 
developed, GENII-S, as a combined product of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
and Sandia National Laboratories. 
 
 GXQ 
GXQ is a PC-based model that uses a straight-line Gaussian plume model to calculate 
atmospheric dispersion coefficients for instantaneous and continuous atmospheric 
releases.  The model was developed by Westinghouse safety analysts for use at DOE’s 
Hanford facility to supplement the GENII downwind dispersion and radiological dose 
calculations.  GXQ utilizes several subprograms that enable it to address plume meander, 
rise, depletion, building wake effects, and gravitational settling.  The model is essentially 
a compilation of various aspects of several relevant industrial models.  The primary 
strength of GXQ is its ability to address such a wide variety of sources, including nuclear 
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and non-nuclear releases.  However, the model cannot be run independently and can only 
provide meaningful assessments when run in conjunction with GENII and other codes.   
 
 AIRISK 
The AIRISK radiological assessment model was developed by Los Alamos National 
Laboratories to facilitate ground contamination and health consequence analyses related 
to possible Hanford high-level radioactive waste tank explosions.  AIRISK models the 
atmospheric transport of radionuclides to determine doses downwind and the related 
acute and latent health effects.  Because this DOE model was developed for use in the 
DOE complex, its radiological assessment capabilities are quite suited for accident 
scenarios that would be expected at DOE facilities.  In addition to the DOE-specific 
nature of AIRISK, it is strong in that it can incorporate terrain effects into the model.  
However, for complex releases, the model may be limited because it can only address 
releases of up to forty radionuclides.   
 
 ERAD 
Sandia National Laboratory developed the Explosive Release Atmospheric Dispersion 
(ERAD) model to provide near-real time assessments of localized radiological hazards 
that could be caused by explosions involving hazardous materials.  ERAD models 
turbulent atmospheric transport and diffusion in three-dimensions.  To characterize and 
model the emission of warm and other buoyant gases, ERAD utilizes an integral plume 
rise technique.  A discrete time Lagrangian Monte Carlo method is used to model particle 
dispersion stochastically.  Using the Monte Carlo approach enables a more realistic 
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treatment of spatially variant meteorological conditions, calm wind conditions, and 
buoyancy effects.  Although Monte Carlo methods traditionally require substantial 
computing power, ERAD’s three-dimensional simulation is relatively low because it 
relates each Monte Carlo particle to a small puff that spreads horizontally based upon 
Gaussian law.  Although ERAD is user-friendly, because it can only address one 
radionuclide at a time, it can become cumbersome for complex releases involving 
multiple isotopes.   
 
 DOSEEP 
DOSEEP, a Gaussian plume model, was developed by NOAA in the 1970s to predict 
centerline radiation exposures downwind from gaseous radionuclide emissions following 
underground nuclear weapons tests.  The model was developed to address radionuclide 
gases that had migrated to the surface and into the atmosphere after several nuclear 
weapons had been detonated underground.  This model was used along with PIKE, a 
gaseous and particulate venting model, to predict the exposure due to radionuclide gases 
and particulates following actual nuclear weapons tests.  DOSEEP has been useful when 
addressing both unplanned releases and planned gaseous releases from underground 
nuclear weapons tests.    Because these gaseous emissions typically migrate to the surface 
rather slowly, they generally reach the surface with no thermal buoyancy.  Therefore, 
DOSEEP does not address buoyancy phenomena.  DOSEEP is easy to use and requires 
only basic input to operate such as a source term, wind speed, and atmospheric stability.  
However, because of the general nature of the model, it cannot incorporate terrain effects, 
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does not have any deposition calculation capabilities, and only predicts centerline 
radiation exposures, likely overestimating them at great distances.     
 
 PIKE 
PIKE is a 1960s NOAA analog model that estimates the quantity of gases and 
particulates energetically released into the atmosphere resulting from severe underground 
nuclear explosion venting. Because these releases occur within minutes of the 
detonations, both heat and pressure must be modeled as a part of the release process.  As 
a result, as PIKE calculates fallout patterns and radiation exposure levels, buoyancy is 
considered along with standard meteorological phenomena.  PIKE has also been designed 
to plot the predicted fallout patterns on map of the Nevada Test Site area and surrounding 
locales due to the abundance of underground nuclear weapon tests that have been 
conducted there.  Strengths of the PIKE model include its simple input capabilities and its 
ability to incorporate readily available meteorological data.  Weaknesses of the model 
include the fact that it is heavily based on a limited amount of historic data, local terrain 
is only marginally considered, and no scavenging, precipitation, or other dynamic 
meteorological effects are considered.   
 
 CATS 
The Consequences Assessment Tool Set (CATS) was jointly developed in 1993 by the 
Defense Special Weapons Agency and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.  
This broadly applicable model predicts the consequences of natural, industrial, and 
technological catastrophic events.  CATS’ two operational modes, express and detailed, 
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enable both novice and expert analysts to predict the consequences of nuclear, biological, 
and chemical (NBC) events.  Express mode operation uses prescribed terrorist or military 
explosion data along with current weather data.  It enables the inexperienced user to input 
basic information and generate radiation intensity and concentration distributions.  The 
detailed mode is much more flexible and allows the experienced user to vary the type of 
NBC material, explosive, and deployment mechanism.  Moreover, complex 
environmental data can be incorporated into this mode, even multi-dimensional wind 
fields.   
 
The primary purpose of the CATS model is to calculate and analyze consequences; 
therefore, its graphical display capabilities are minimal.  However, because it operates 
within a graphical information system, it has robust graphical output capabilities.  
Because of the usefulness of the CATS model, it has been used in a variety of fora within 
the U.S., including the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta, Georgia. 
 
 ARCON96 
ARCON96 was developed jointly by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.  This model has been used by the NRC to 
calculate radiation concentrations in nuclear power plant control rooms and in urban 
areas under accident conditions.  For urban area calculations, ARCON96 uses 
meteorologically data averaged hourly to simulate both point and area source releases.  
However, questions exist regarding the accuracy of this model.  One source of inaccuracy 
is the relative coarseness of hourly averaged data when evaluating urban dispersions.  
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Moreover, constant accident release rates and wind fields are assumed, which introduce 
further inaccuracies.  The model was designed to address releases that traverse under 10 
km from a release height of no more then 100 m.   
 
 BNLGPM 
BNLGPM was developed by the DOE’s Brookhaven National Laboratory to provide 
emergency response estimations of downwind particulate and gaseous radionuclide doses 
following an accidental emission from the onsite 60 MWt High Flux Beam Reactor 
(HFBR) stack.  Because this model was developed for use at only one site, it is able to 
incorporate site-specific data, like the topography onsite and readings from the 100-meter 
tall emissions stack.  BNLGPM uses local meteorological data along with user-input 
values, such as Pasquill-Gifford-Turner stability class.  In addition, the model makes use 
of a steady state, straight-line Gaussian dispersion model.  The BNLGPM model is fast, 
user friendly, and generally effective in calculating downwind doses from the HFBR; 
however, because the model was specifically developed for HFBR emissions, it is not 
readily applicable to other sites, emission mechanisms, or radionuclides.     
 
 GAUS1 
GAUS1 is a Gaussian plume model that was developed by LANL to be run on a handheld 
graphical calculator.  This model estimates radiological doses resulting from 
resuspension, wet and dry deposition, and complicated flow patterns, such as in building 
wakes.  It also computes plume rise with buoyancy and momentum effects, and long 
range transport.  Because of the calculator-based portability of GAUS1, it is especially 
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convenient during emergencies.  The model has also been used to assess radiological 
risks at both LANL and Cape Canaveral.  However, since the model is somewhat 
complicated, it is best suited for experienced users.  
 
 CAP88-PC 
The Clean Air Act Assessment Package - 1988 (CAP88-PC) was developed in the late 
1970’s by the Environmental Protection Agency.  The model was later finalized with 
assistance from Oak Ridge National Laboratory and DOE Headquarters.  This model was 
designed to estimate average radionuclide dispersions from up to six sources by using a 
modified Gaussian plume equation.  CAP88-PC originated as the rather limited AIRDOS 
model and was later expanded to address radionuclide emissions with the addition of the 
RADRISK and DARTAB components.  
 
CAP88-PC is robust in its ability to address a broad variety of sources including elevated 
emission stacks and area sources.  The model can use either a momentum-based or a 
buoyancy-based plume rise to determine airborne radionuclide concentrations and ground 
deposition rates within an 80 km radius of the emission location.  However, the model 
does not address varying terrain heights, certain localized atmospheric phenomena, like 
building wake effects, and radionuclide decay during transport.   
 
 TRIAD 
TRIAD was developed by NOAA in the late 1980’s for use by the NRC and DOE to 
model the accidental dispersion of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas into the atmosphere.  
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TRIAD is capable of modeling both reactive and non-reactive gases at distances less than 
30 km.  The model’s Gaussian puff dispersion algorithm can calculate dry deposition 
rates while addressing multiple, non-stationary sources, and dispersions that traverse 
variable terrain elevations.  However, the model is limited in that it assumes wind 
directions that are constant with height and that the puff is only transported by winds at 
the effective release height.  Other limitations include the model’s inability to treat large 
puffs that split into smaller puffs, chemical reactions, and complex terrains including 
building wakes and cavities.   
 
 TRAC RA/HA 
This modification of the Terrain Responsive Atmospheric Code (TRAC) was specifically 
developed to focus on both risk assessments and hazard assessments (RA/HA) in 
complex terrain.  The original TRAC model was developed in the mid 1980s to address 
the complex atmospheric flows associated with the Rocky Flats Environmental 
Technology Site (RFETS).  Because of the complexity of the terrain, straight-line 
Gaussian plume models were not able to accurately characterize the atmospheric airflow.  
As a result, TRAC employed a three-dimensional Lagrangian model to address the 
complex atmospheric airflow.  TRAC RA/HA uses the same type of Lagrangian model 
and has expanded it to include risk assessment and hazard assessment capabilities.      
 
TRAC RA/HA has broad applications and is capable of modeling releases of plutonium, 
enriched and depleted uranium, fission products, and other non-reactive radiological 
particulates and gases.  It is robust enough to consider the generation and decay of 
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radionuclides and their daughters within the plume, time-varying emission rates, wet and 
dry deposition, and gravitational settling.  The model provides deposition and dose 
contours along with statistical summaries of each for distances up to 100 km.  However, 
TRAC RA/HA is unable to address emissions originating from energetic releases and 
fires. 
 
 VENTSTAR XL 
VENTSAR XL is a user-friendly dose assessment model developed and used at the 
Savannah River Technology Center Site to calculate short term atmospheric release 
doses.  This straight-line Gaussian plume model is able to incorporate the effects of 
plume rise and buildings into its atmospheric dispersion calculations.  The plume rise can 
be evaluated as a function of either buoyancy or momentum.  The building effects that 
can be addressed include recirculation cavities, high turbulence zones, and wakes beyond 
the building.  The model outputs doses that are calculated at various distances specified 
by the user.  A key limitation of this model is that it does not incorporate the decay and 
generation of radionuclides within the plume.    
 
 RSAC-5 
The Radiological Safety Analysis Computer Program (RSAC-5) was developed by the 
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) and Lockheed 
Martin Idaho Technologies to calculate the both acute and chronic effects of airborne 
radionuclide releases.  RSAC-5 uses a Gaussian plume diffusion model that can be used 
in combination with the Pasquill-Gifford and other auxiliary models.  One special feature 
 124
of RSCA-5 is its ability to model fumigation conditions (stability Class F), the 
meteorological condition that results in the highest ground level concentrations following 
an elevated atmospheric emission.   
 
This model has many strengths, including its ability to correct for plume rise, building 
wakes, and ground depletion during transport.  In addition, the model is able to calculate 
radionuclide generation and decay during transport.  A fission product library is 
incorporated into the model, and the user can modify the library, or import actinide and 
activation product libraries from other models if desired.  Atmospheric radionuclide 
concentrations can be modified to simulate fractionation, processing, or filtration.  The 
fractionation and other options can be evaluated in a simple manner (e.g., by calculating a 
percentage of the total radionuclide concentration), or using more complex approaches 
(e.g., as a function of the chemical group or element).  Therefore, RSAC-5 is capable of 
evaluating complex emission and transport scenarios.          
 
 PUFF-PLUME 
The PUFF-PLUME model was developed by Pacific Northwest Laboratory in the early 
1970s and was later revised by the Savannah River Site approximately a decade later.  
This Gaussian atmospheric transport diffusion model can address puff and plume 
dispersions of both radionuclide and chemical emissions.  The model uses real-time 
meteorological measurements and forecasts as it estimates wet deposition, dry deposition, 
and doses.  PUFF-PLUME uses Pasquill horizontal diffusion parameters and Briggs 
vertical diffusion parameters which enable the model to address atmospheric turbulence 
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on a fundamental level.  The model is also able to address radioactive decay during 
transport.  Aside from the robustness of the model, its principal strengths are its 
simplicity and its speed of operation.  However, the model is limited in that it is unable to 
model  three dimensional wind fields, dense gas dispersions, or short duration 
atmospheric transport.   
 
 AXAIRQ 
AXAIRQ was originally developed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the early 
1980s and was enhanced by the Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC) in 1995.  
The AXAIRQ model is used to assess doses from atmospheric radionuclide releases at 
SRTC.  Although the atmospheric transport portion of this model is limited in that it is 
unable to address plume rise, the dose calculation features are robust in that it can 
calculate plume shine, ground shine, and inhalation doses.  Population doses are 
automatically calculated out to a radius of 80 km and the position of maximum dose is 
noted.  The user is also able to specify dose calculation distances outside of 80 km.    
 
 HARM-II 
HARM-II was developed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for 
use by the U.S. Department of Energy Oak Ridge Operations Office.  This emergency 
management dose assessment model was designed to predict the effects of accidental 
radionuclide and chemical emissions within 50 km of the release location.  One of the 
benefits of this model is that it is able to address particulate emissions, passive gas 
releases, and heavy gas releases.  Therefore, it can model gaseous uranium hexafluoride 
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(UF6) plumes.  Another benefit of HARM-II is that it is able to accommodate time 
varying emission rates that can be input by the user, via a mathematical function, or using 
direct readings from an emissions stack.  HARM-II uses a Gaussian model for particulate 
and passive gas emissions, and a Colenbrander-type dispersion algorithm for heavy gas 
emissions and modeling.  The model is especially suited for uranium fuel cycle releases 
in that it incorporates the production of UO2F2 and HF by the reactions between UF6 and 
water.  Finally, the HARM-II meteorological modeling capabilities enable it to address 
radionuclide source depletion, dry deposition, and gravitational settling.     
 
 AXAOTHER XL 
The Savannah River Site originally developed the AXAOTHER XL model to be run on 
an IBM mainframe in the early 1980s.  It was later modified into its current PC-capable 
form in 1996.  This model was designed to estimate doses following acute atmospheric 
radionuclide emissions during extreme wind conditions, specifically, during tornadoes or 
high-velocity straight line winds.  Doses within an 80 km radius are calculated, as well as 
the maximum offsite dose.  AXAOTHER XL uses its 500 radionuclide library and 
Gaussian plume dispersion modeling capabilities to automatically calculate radionuclide 
concentrations air within its straight-line wind calculations.  However, for tornado 
condition calculations, radionuclide concentrations must be provided by the user.  The 
chief limitation of AXAOTHER XL is that it does not calculate the generation and decay 




The SLAB dense gas dispersion model was first made public in 1985 by Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory.  Although the model does not calculate source release 
rates, it is able to determine gaseous radionuclide transport from area sources, horizontal 
jets, and vertical jets.  The model simplifies horizontal transport by assuming that all of 
the emitted radionuclides are uniformly affected by the prevailing winds; hence, the 
name, SLAB.  However, in compensating for this simplification, the model incorporates 
thermodynamic effects, such as latent heat exchanges that result from the condensation or 
evaporation of liquids.  SLAB’s output includes the location of the maximum 
radionuclide concentration and the time required to reach the maximum concentration.     
 
 PAVAN 
The PAVAN model was developed by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for use 
by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as it estimates ground level concentrations 
downwind of accidental radionuclide releases from nuclear facilities into the atmosphere.  
The model can accommodate radionuclide releases from building vents as well as 
emission stacks, and calculates relative radionuclide air concentrations as a function of 
time and direction.  Although PAVAN is unable to address multiple emission sources, it 
is able to model advanced plume dispersion processes such as those cause by building 
wakes.  The PAVAN model is limited in that it cannot accommodate complex terrains 




The MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System, version 2 (MACCS2) was 
developed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to model and perform consequence 
analyses of accidental radionuclide releases into the atmosphere.  MELCOR, which 
provides the initial conditions for the MACCS2 code, simulates the progression of severe 
light water nuclear power reactor accidents.  MACCS2 uses the output of the MELCOR 
to analyze the subsequent atmospheric transport, diffusion, and wet and dry deposition in 
time-dependent meteorological conditions.  
 
MAACS2 is most effective when it is applied to nuclear reactors and other facilities that 
emit radionuclides from ground level.  Moreover, it is comprehensive in that it 
incorporates emission, transport, environmental pathway, and dose models as it estimates 
the release effects of all radionuclides that may be generated during nuclear reactor 
accidents.  The key weakness within the MACCS2 model is the fact that it uses a straight 
line Gaussian plume model for atmospheric transport and diffusion calculations.    
 
Radionuclide Dispersion Source Term Models 
 KBERT 
In 1995, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) released KBERT to analyze worker 
safety risks during accidents at DOE nuclear facilities.  KBERT is most often used to 
during the risk estimation process inside a facility, but the model can also be used to 
predict that source term for radioactivity releases that escape the facility are enter the 
atmosphere.  As with most accident and emergency response models, KBERT is easy to 
 129
use, runs fast, and is broadly applicable.  However, weaknesses of the model include its 
need to have all flow rates defined, which may require data that is not available during 
accident conditions, and its inability to account for turbulence.   
 
 MELCOR 
MELCOR was developed by Sandia National Laboratories for use by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission in the analysis of severe light water nuclear reactor accidents 
that result in core damage.  MELCOR models the progression of a variety of severe 
accidents and can address several features including thermal hydraulic responses within 
the reactor coolant system, containment, and confinement buildings; the overheating and 
degradation of the reactor core; hydrogen and radionuclide generation, internal release, 
and transport within the system; and how safety features affect the system thermal 
hydraulics.  Benefits of this model include its fast run time, and its ability to model 
sprays, multiple flow paths into control volumes, and two-phase flow.  A chief weakness 
of this model is its inability to incorporate ventilation components into the system.     
 
 FIRAC 
The FIRAC model was developed jointly by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the 
U.S. Department of Energy and is currently administered through Los Alamos National 
Laboratory.  This model predicts fire-induced flows, thermal and material transport, and 
radioactive source terms within facilities.  It is able to address facilities that do and do not 
have ventilation systems, so it is well suited to provide source term information for 
radiation releases that escape a facility and enter the atmosphere.  FIRAC’s fire modeling 
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capabilities inside buildings include an ability to compute fuel mass consumption rates 
and energy generation rates, fire growth and smoke transport, and generation rates and 
size distributions of radioactive particles made airborne because of the fire.  FIRAC is a 
fast running, user friendly code that is able to address multiple flow paths and indoor 
aerosol transport problems.  The model can be run on a personal computer and can 
generate both tabular and graphical outputs.  However, diffusion, turbulence, and other 
multi-dimensional flow effects are not accurately addressed.      
 
 FIRAC/FIRIN 
The FIRAC/FIRIN model was collaboratively developed by the NRC, LANL, PNNL, 
New Mexico State University, and Westinghouse.  The model was originally developed 
in 1985 and was regularly updated during the 1990s.  FIRAC/FIRIN is intended to 
predict measurable system parameters (i.e., pressures, temperatures, flow rates) in 
networked systems or spaces where radioactive materials are involved.  It accomplishes 
this through submodels that address fire conditions, gas dynamics, material transport, and 
heat transfer.   
 
It can model airflow in any enclosed area that would be encountered in the workspaces of 
a nuclear facility including, glove boxes, rooms, and ventilation systems.  The airflow 
modeling capability enables radionuclides to be tracked as they traverse through various 
compartments.  Therefore, the model is useful for calculating atmospheric emission 
source terms that could result from a nuclear accident.  It is also useful for determining 
the rate at which radionuclide effluents are generated and their size distributions.  So the 
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FIRAC/FIRIN model effectively predicts the accident condition source terms releasing 
radionuclides within a nuclear facility and releasing radionuclides from a nuclear facility.   
 
The strengths of this model include its user friendliness, its ability to address all HVAC 
components within a facility ventilation system, and its ability to address complicated 
network configurations.  Because of these strengths, FIRAC/FIRIN is used throughout 
the DOE complex.  Even so, the model does have limitations.  First, its approximations of 
spatial variations are quite general and provide few details.  Next, the fire submodel is 
limited in that it can only model one fire at a time and no fire mitigation parameters are 
included.  Finally, the ventilation systems are modeled only include unidirectional flows.   
 
 CONTAIN 
CONTAIN was developed by Sandia National Laboratories for the NRC in 1995 to 
characterize the radiological, physical, and chemical conditions inside a nuclear power 
plant containment building after a severe primary coolant system accident.  The model 
accomplishes these tasks through submodels that address ventilation systems, closed 
systems such as glove boxes and workspaces, radionuclide diffusion, turbulent transport, 
and spray phenomena.  Through these calculations, CONTAIN is able to generate 
effective source terms for atmospheric dispersions that could result from these accident 
conditions.  It is applicable to any number of commercial nuclear reactor and DOE 
facilities with and without ventilation systems.  CONTAIN has many strengths.  It is fast, 
versatile, and robust in its ability to address multiple flow paths, two phase flow, and 
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sprays.  However, the model is limited in its inability to address spatial acceleration 
within momentum balance analyses.   
 
Foreign Radionuclide Dispersion Models 
 COSMYA 
Germany and the United Kingdom jointly led the development of the Code System from 
the Methods for Assessing the Radiological Impact of Accidents (COSYMA) model.  
Originally released in 1990, COSMYA is the European equivalent to the MACCS model.  
Like MACCS, COSYMA performs offsite consequence analyses of accidental 
radionuclide releases into the atmosphere.  COSMYA can be used to model numerous 
radionuclides, but it cannot be used for modeling related to tritium.  
 
The COSYMA model is a compilation of subprograms and data sets.  Its three accident 
consequence subprograms are designed to be applied at various distances and time 
durations following the release.  The Near Early subprogram is useful for localized 
calculations of both initial health effects and the influence of emergency response 
actions. Like the Near Early subprogram, the Near Late subprogram is applicable in the 
vicinity of the accident.  However, the Near Late subprogram is different in that it 
evaluates delayed health effects and mitigating actions.   The Far Late subprogram 
addresses delayed health effects and the influence of mitigating actions far from the 
accident site. COSYMA’s five different atmospheric dispersion options include both 
Gaussian plume and Gaussian puff models.  Even so, COSYMA has difficulty modeling 




The German UFOTRI model was developed in 1991 for evaluating the consequences of 
accidental tritium releases from nuclear facilities.  Because the model specializes in 
tritium releases, it is capable of treating addressing tritium as tritiated water vapor (HTO) 
and tritiated gas (HT).  The UFOTRI model can be run in a deterministic manner by 
using one weather sequence, or for probabilistic assessments by processing up to 
approximately 150 sequences.  UFOTRI and COSYMA can be used in conjunction with 
one another for a comprehensive assessment of accidental releases of all radionuclides, 
including tritium.  Due to the effectiveness of the UFOTRI model, it is used as the 
reference model for tritium releases from the International Thermonuclear Experimental 
Reactor (ITER) facility. 
 
 PC-AQPAC 
The Personal Computer-based Air Quality Package (PC-AQPAC) is a chemical and 
radiological consequences model originally developed by the Canadian Atmospheric 
Environment Service.   
Although PC-AQPAC has been principally geared to characterize chemical accidents, 
because radioactive materials exist in the PC-AQPAC database, some limited 
radiological assessments are possible.  PC-AQPAC incorporates both Gaussian plume 
and Gaussian puff models, can address both heavy and buoyant gases, and can be used in 
emergency response situations.  However, the model is limited in that it uses straight-line 




The Environmental Tritium Model (ETMOD) was released by Ontario Hyrdo in Canada 
in 1991.  The model can simulate several tritium-related phenomena including the 
atmospheric transport of tritiated water vapor (HTO) and tritiated gas (HT) and ground 
deposition of HT.  ETMOD is also able to incorporate plume deposition depletion and the 
generation of HTO from HT oxidation within the plume within its analyses.  Like its 
German counterpart, UFOTRI, ETMOD is only capable of analyzing tritium releases.  
ETMOD is known as a user-friendly model that provides generous amounts of output 
data.     
 
Meteorological Dispersion Models 
 HYSPLIT 
In 1982, the Hybrid Single-Particle Lagrangian Integrated Trajectory (HYSPLIT) was 
developed by NOAA as a coarse atmospheric dispersion model.  Today, HYSPLIT is 
much more advanced and is able to simulate a wide range of long range gaseous and 
particulate transport scenarios.  The current version of the model is extremely robust in 
its capabilities and is useful for emergency response, routine atmospheric dispersion and 
air quality assessments, and forecasting.  HYSPLIT simulates transport and dispersion by 
integrating puff and particle dispersion model techniques.  The principal strength of 
HYSPLIT is its versatility; however, it tends to be less accurate when modeling transport 




The OMEGA atmospheric dispersion model, developed by the Science Applications 
International Corporation, became operational in 1995.  This dispersion model also has 
the capability to serve as a weather prediction model.  OMEGA is an extremely robust 
model and can track the dispersion of atmospheric pollutants through both Eulerian and 
Lagrangian operational modes.  The model is functional in complex terrains and in 
situations where only a limited amount of data is available.  Moreover, OMEGA can be 
operated in either a forecast mode or in a mode that facilitates the investigation of 
historical meteorological activities.  OMEGA can be coupled with several databases that 
have supplemental data (e.g., land/water fractions, soil type, land use, etc.), and the 
model can operate at resolutions down to 1 km.  Due to the functionality of this model, it 
has been used worldwide to support military, environmental, and homeland security 
activities.    
 
 INPUFF 
The Integrated Puff (INPUFF) meteorological model was developed by the 
Environmental Protection Agency in the late 1980s to facilitate atmospheric dispersion 
modeling associated with incineration ships.  This model is useful for simulating both 
short and long duration point source releases in variable winds.  Because INPUFF was 
developed to analyze ship-based releases, it is able to accommodate moving emission 
sources.  One of INPUFF’s greatest strengths is its ability to model time dependent 
release rates.  However, the model is unable to address dense gas dispersions or buoyant 




The Random Puff Transport and Diffusion (RAPTAD) model was developed in the 
1980’s by Los Alamos National Laboratory and the YSA Corporation.  This model is a 
Lagrangian random puff model that can be used to predict the diffusion and transport of 
airborne pollutants over complex terrains.  A key advantage of the random puff model is 
the speed and accuracy of the computations.  The type of puff model requires much fewer 
puffs (1% - 10%) to be released than similar particle methods.  RAPTAD is frequently 
used with the HOTMAC model to predict the transport of pollutants over complex 
terrains in situations where other models are less reliable.  When RAPTAD and 
HOTMAC are used in conjunction with one another, they are able to model mesoscale 
meteorological activities and time-dependent transport and diffusion in the midst of 
three-dimensional winds.   
 
 CTDMPLUS 
The Complex Terrain Dispersion Model Plus Algorithms for Unstable Situations 
(CTDMPLUS) was developed by the Environmental Protection Agency in the late 1980’s 
to serve as a refined air quality model that can accommodate the full range of 
atmospheric stability conditions and complex terrains.  CTDMPLUS models the plume 
trajectory at regularly scheduled, prespecified time intervals.  The output of the interval 
computations incorporates the terrain and deforms the airborne plume accordingly.  The 
principal weakness of this model is its inability to address dense gas plume dispersions.   
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Chapter II:  ITEMIZED PROCEDURE 
1.  Initial Condition -- Obtain Anomalous Radionuclide Measurement 
(Note 1:  An anomaly only needs to be evident in one feature of the radionuclide 
measurement.  Therefore, no insight into the cause of the anomaly -- be it 
the presence of atypical radionuclides, issues related to the collection or 
detection system, or another catalyst -- is necessary in order to assess that 
a measurement is anomalous.) 
(Note 2:  Although several radionuclide measurements may be initially obtained 
that appear to be associated with the same event, only one is necessary as 
an initial condition.  The others can be incorporated in section 4.1.3 during 
the Environmental Characterization.) 
2.  Evaluate Accuracy of Measurement, Highlight Anomalies, and Make Superficial 
Corrections as Needed 
  2.1  Assess directly measurable initial data relevant to aggregate data  
    quantification 
    2.1.1. Note sampling time 
    2.1.2. Note decay time 
    2.1.3. Note counting time 
    2.1.4 Note total volume of air sampled 
    2.1.5. Note all emission lines identified 
      2.1.5.1. Evaluate accuracy of peak curve fits 
        2.1.5.1.1. Note FWHMs 
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        2.1.5.1.2. Ensure that peak areas > Net Peak Detection  
           Threshold (PDTn, see Appendix 5) 
        2.1.5.1.3. Verify that peak areas of overlapping peaks  
           (multiplets) are accurately fit  
      2.1.5.2. Evaluate accuracy of baseline continuum fit 
        2.1.5.2.1. Closely evaluate step functions and other  
           baseline features 
        2.1.5.2.2. Verify that baseline of overlapping peaks  
           (multiplets) are accurately fit 
    2.1.6. Note radionuclide identifications based upon emission lines  
      2.1.6.1. Note customary emission lines with no apparent  
         radionuclide association discrepancies 
      2.1.6.2. Note emission lines with multiple radionuclide   
         identifications 
      2.1.6.3. Note emission lines with no radionuclide identifications 
      2.1.6.4. Note apparent patterns or anomalies regarding   
         radionuclide identifications (i.e., all isotopes of same  
         element, set of radionuclides identified obviously  
         incomplete, etc.) 
  2.2. Assess derived data relevant to radionuclide identification and   
    quantification 
    2.2.1. Determine flow rate from sampling time and total volume 
    2.2.2. Verify soundness of automated calibrations 
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      2.2.2.1. Observe energy vs. channel calibration 
      2.2.2.2. Observe efficiency vs. energy calibration 
      2.2.2.3. Observe resolution vs. energy calibration  
    2.2.3. Identify complete and accurate set of radionuclides present based  
      upon emission lines identified 
      2.2.3.1. Evaluate relative radionuclide abundance of emission  
         lines associated with radionuclides identified 
      2.2.3.2. Note whether relative abundances are significantly  
         different than expected, and if so, check for single line  
         emitters and other possible obscurants 
      2.2.3.3. Hypothesize radionuclide associations with all true  
         emission lines identified but not associated with  
         radionuclides  
         (Note: Hypotheses should be based strictly upon  
           energies of gamma-ray emissions identified.   
           Physical, environmental, and other factor should 
           not be considered at this stage.) 
      2.2.3.4. Determine whether key line peak areas or the relative  
         average areas of all of peaks associated with each  
         radionuclide (average line peak areas) should be used to 
         calculate radionuclide concentrations  
    2.2.4. Determine accuracy of radionuclide concentration calculations 
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      2.2.4.1. Verify radionuclide concentrations and supporting  
         calculations 
      2.2.4.2. Note influence of radionuclides likely present but not  
         identified based upon step 2.2.3.2 and 2.2.3.3) 
    2.2.5. Determine parent and progeny radionuclides possibly present  
      based upon radionuclides identified 
      2.2.5.1. Determine whether half-lives of parents and progeny  
         are  appropriate for detection  
      2.2.5.2. Determine whether concentrations of radionuclides  
         identified correspond to detectable quantities of parents  
         and progeny 
    2.2.6. Perform preliminary analysis 
      2.2.6.1  Perform preliminary classification of the types of  
         radionuclides identified 
      2.2.6.2  Evaluate and correlate directly measurable and derived  
         data to determine whether the quantities are within  
         reason 
3.  Incorporate Data about Collection and Measurement Mechanisms and Procedures  
  into Analysis 
  3.1. Incorporate details regarding type of radionuclide sampler used 
    3.1.1. Incorporate details regarding specific collection mechanism 
      3.1.1.1. Note specific processes regarding radionuclide   
         collection 
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        3.1.1.1.1 Note whether cooling is required for collection 
        3.1.1.1.2 Note whether active or passive collection occurs 
        3.1.1.1.3 Note whether high volume or low volume  
           collection occurs 
        3.1.1.1.4 Note whether discontinuous or continuous  
           collection occurs 
      3.1.1.2. Note and investigate any data or hardware that indicates 
         malfunction 
        3.1.1.2.1 Pay close attention to output related to electrical 
           and mechanical systems associated with   
           collection mechanism 
        3.1.1.2.2. If malfunction apparent, estimate effects of  
           malfunction on collection processes and data 
        3.1.1.2.3 If total air volume (step 2.1.4), flow rate (step  
           2.2.1), or other relevant data show statistically  
           significant inconsistencies, investigate potential  
           causes for inconsistencies    
        3.1.1.2.4. If data or hardware anomalies are present,  
           compare potential hardware malfunction effects  
           (step 3.1.2.2.2) and data inconsistency catalysts  
           (step 3.1.2.2.3) with reality   
    3.1.2. Note physical state of radionuclides collected (gas vs. particulate) 
 142
      3.1.2.1. Verify that all radionuclides identified are consistent  
         with physical state of radionuclides being collected 
      3.1.2.2. As follow-up to step 2.2.3.3 and step 2.2.5, limit list of  
         parents and progeny likely collected based upon  
         physical state   
  3.2  Incorporate information regarding surroundings and type of radionuclide  
    detection and analysis 
    3.2.1. Determine whether internal or external background impairs  
      meaningful data acquisition 
      (Note: Internal background is largely the result of detector   
        contamination.  External background is generally the result  
        of radiation sources in the vicinity.)  
    3.2.2. Incorporate details regarding specific detection and analysis  
      mechanisms 
      3.2.2.1. Note specific processes involved in detection and  
         analysis 
        3.2.2.1.1 Note whether cooling is required for proper  
           detection 
        3.2.2.1.2 Note whether sample and system isolation are  
           required for proper detection 
        3.2.2.1.3 Note level of automation of analysis 
      3.2.2.2  Note and investigate any data or hardware that indicates 
         malfunction 
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        3.2.2.2.1 Pay close attention to output related to   
           electrical, mechanical, and software systems  
           associated with detection and analysis   
           mechanisms 
        3.2.2.2.2. If malfunction apparent, estimate effects of  
           malfunction on detection and analysis processes 
           and data 
        3.2.2.2.3. If data, hardware, or software anomalies are  
           present, compare potential malfunction effects  
           (step 3.2.2.2.2) with reality  
    3.2.3. Determine whether decay time is too long for meaningful data  
      acquisition 
      3.2.3.1. Determine minimum half-life detectable based upon  
         decay time  
      3.2.3.2. Verify that radionuclides identified meet half-life  
         threshold for detection 
      3.2.3.3. As follow up to step 3.1.1.2, determine which   
         radionuclides likely not detected due to limited half- 
         lives and which radionuclides should have been   
         detectable if present 
4.  Characterize Environment 
  4.1. Identify other sensors in the region 
    4.1.1. Identify sensors within geographic vicinity of detection sensor 
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      4.1.1.1. Identify all types of facilities where sensors may be  
         present 
        4.1.1.1.1. Determine whether sensor data is available for  
           external observation/analysis 
        4.1.1.1.2. Determine type of data collected with sensors  
           (e.g., radionuclide data, integrated activity, etc.) 
        4.1.1.1.3. Gather sensor data 
          4.1.1.1.3.1  Follow steps 2 (Evaluate Accuracy  
              of Measurement, Highlight   
              Anomalies, and Make Superficial  
              Corrections as Needed) and 3  
              (Incorporate Data about Collection  
              and Measurement Mechanisms and  
              Procedures into Analysis) as closely  
              as possible for each sensor 
          4.1.1.1.3.2. Evaluate veracity of original sensor  
              detection in light of other sensors in  
              vicinity 
          4.1.1.1.3.3. Cross reference data from other  
              sensors to determine veracity of  
              sensor detections in vicinity 
      4.1.1.2. Identify all stand-alone sensors 
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        4.1.1.2.1. - 4.1.1.2.3.3. Follow steps 4.1.1.1.1 -   
               4.1.1.1.3.3  
    4.1.2. Identify sensors within continuous similar terrain as terrain of  
      detection sensor 
      4.1.2.1. - 4.1.2.2.3.3.  Follow steps 4.1.1.1 - 4.1.1.1.3.3 
    4.1.3. Identify sensors that indicate detections that may be relevant to  
      detection at detection sensor  
      4.1.3.1. - 4.1.3.2.3.3.  Follow steps 4.1.1.1 - 4.1.1.1.3.3 
4.1.4. For all sensors identified where data is available, gather data for 
time periods preceding and following time period when original 
detection was noted 
  4.2. Characterize natural environment 
    4.2.1. Characterize terrain 
4.2.1.1. Identify type of land in vicinity of detection sensor  
   based upon regions identified in steps 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and  
   4.1.3 
4.2.1.2. Identify bodies of water in vicinity of detection sensor 
  4.2.1.2.1. Identify size of water body 
4.2.1.2.2. Identify customary motion/activity level of 
   water body 
4.2.1.2.3. Estimate effects of water body on surrounding  
   environment (sea breeze, directionally   
   consistent prevailing winds, etc.) 
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4.2.1.3. Determine layout of terrain 
4.2.1.3.1. Develop general description of terrain(s) in 
vicinity of detection sensor 
4.2.1.3.2. Determine various altitudes of ground levels in 
vicinity 
4.2.1.3.3. Identify and characterize impediments to 
airflow 
  4.2.1.3.3.1. Identify impediment heights 
  4.2.1.3.3.2. Characterize impediment density 
4.2.1.3.3.3. Characterize seasonal features of 
impediments (trees vs. buildings, 
etc.)  
    4.2.2. Characterize meteorology to fullest extent possible 
4.2.2.1. Identify fundamental meteorological parameters in 
vicinity during time period preceding and following 
sensor detection 
       4.2.2.1.1. Identify geospatial and chronological   
          temperature distributions on earth surface and at 
          various altitudes in atmosphere 
4.2.2.1.2. Identify geospatial and chronological 
distributions of wind speeds and directions on 
earth surface and at various altitudes in 
atmosphere 
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4.2.2.1.3. Identify geospatial and chronological 
distributions of barometric pressure 
4.2.2.1.4. Identify geospatial and chronological 
distributions of humidity 
4.2.2.1.5. Identify general weather conditions in sensor 
detection and surrounding areas 
4.2.2.2. Identify vertical temperature of troposphere 
4.2.2.2.1. Estimate lapse rate 
       4.2.2.2.2. Estimate lapse rate trend from preceding time  
          periods 
  4.3. Draw preliminary conclusions based upon environmental determinations 
    4.3.1. Codify list of radionuclides likely present at detection site based  
      upon step 3.2.3.2 and 3.2.3.3 
    4.3.2. Determine whether any chronological correlations can be   
      determined  
4.3.3. Based upon radionuclide concentration distributions in region, 
estimate likelihood of various source regions in manner similar to 
source-receptor method (from very likely to very unlikely) 
      4.3.3.1. Further clarify likelihood of source regions based upon  
         radionuclide source emission requirements 
      4.3.3.2. Especially in case when minimal number of sensors  
         detect radionuclides, further clarify likelihood of source 
         regions by incorporating chronological factors (e.g.,  
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         peak spreading over time and distance causes   
         radionuclide sensor to be exposed to plume for longer  
         period of time, required time of emission, required time 
         of plume transport, etc.)  
  4.4. Identify potential radionuclide emission sources 
    4.4.1. Consider all radionuclide emission sources in vicinity 
      4.4.1.1. Identify radionuclide emission sources in geographic  
         vicinity as detection sensor 
      4.4.1.2. Identify radionuclide emission sources in similar terrain 
         as detection sensor 
      4.4.1.3. Remember to consider that certain radionuclide   
         emission sources are portable 
    4.4.2. Consider all radionuclide emission sources in most likely regions  
      from step 4.3.3 
      4.4.2.1. If too few sources are identified in this region, consider  
         radionuclide sources in less likely regions 
      4.4.2.2. If too many sources are identified, narrow the list by  
         incorporating radionuclide source emission   
         requirements from step 4.3.3.1 and possibly   
         chronological requirements from step 4.3.3.2 
      4.4.2.3. Remember to consider that certain radionuclide   
         emission sources are portable 
5.  Characterize Possible Sources  
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  5.1. Reference radionuclides and categories noted in step 4.3.1, step 2.1.6.4,  
    and step 2.2.6 
  5.2. Given consolidated list, reevaluate to determine whether any trends are  
    apparent in radionuclide categories 
  5.3. Determine types of radionuclide emission sources that could have emitted  
    radionuclide categories and half-lives 
5.4. Eliminate all emission sources from step 4.4 that do not fit categories 
identified in step 5.3 
5.4.1. Remember to include portable sources from steps 4.4.1.3 and 
4.4.2.3 
5.4.2. If possible, use radionuclide ratios to further refine list of possible 
candidate sources 
  5.5. Develop preliminary rank for each emission source identified in step 5.4  
    based upon estimated likelihood that emission source was source of  
    detection 
    5.5.1. Consider reasonableness of source emission requirements   
      identified in step 4.3.3.1 
    5.5.2. Consider reasonableness of chronological factors identified in step  
      4.3.3.2 
    5.5.3. Consider reasonableness of types of radionuclide emission sources  
      as they relate to radionuclide categories identified in step 5.3 
6.  Develop Characterizations of Possible Sources 
  6.1. Investigate historical releases from each radionuclide source (empirical) 
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    6.1.1. Characterize customary releases 
      6.1.1.1. Characterize radionuclide emissions 
        6.1.1.1.1. Identify radionuclides released 
        6.1.1.1.2. Identify radionuclide quantities released 
          6.1.1.1.2.1. Determine average quantities  
              released 
          6.1.1.1.2.2. Determine maximum and minimum  
              quantities released 
        6.1.1.1.3. Characterize chronological factors 
          6.1.1.1.3.1. Characterize radionuclide generation 
              rates in order to generate quantity of  
              radionuclides released during  
              customary emissions 
          6.1.1.1.3.2  Characterize any residence time  
              between radionuclide generation and 
              emission 
          6.1.1.1.3.3. Characterize radionuclide emission  
              rates and durations 
      6.1.1.2. Identify frequency of customary releases 
    6.1.2. Characterize anomalous releases 
      6.1.2.1. Identify frequency of anomalous events 
        6.1.2.1.1. Identify frequency of anomalous events that led  
           to release 
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        6.1.2.1.2. Identify frequency of similar anomalous events  
           that did not lead to release 
        6.1.2.1.3. Distinguish between process paths that led to  
           releases and paths that did not 
      6.1.2.2. Characterize radionuclide emissions 
        6.1.2.2.1. Identify radionuclides released 
        6.1.2.2.2. Identify radionuclide quantities released 
        6.1.2.2.3. Characterize chronological factors 
          6.1.2.2.3.1. Characterize radionuclide generation 
              rates in order to generate quantity of  
              radionuclides released during  
              emissions 
          6.1.2.2.3.2  Characterize any residence time  
              between radionuclide generation and 
              emission 
          6.1.2.2.3.3. Characterize radionuclide emission  
              rates and durations 
      6.1.2.3. Identify processes that led to release 
        6.1.2.3.1. Determine likelihood of reoccurrence 
          6.1.2.3.1.1. Determine whether mitigation  
              mechanisms have been incorporated  
              since anomalous event 
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          6.1.2.3.1.2. Determine need for human   
              intervention in mitigation process  
        6.1.2.3.2. Determine whether any alternate sequences of  
           events could have generated same or similar  
           release 
  6.2. Identify processes involved in each radionuclide emission source that may  
    contribute to release mechanism (theoretical) 
    6.2.1. Identify mechanical processes 
      6.2.1.1. Determine likelihood of processes leading to release 
      6.2.1.2. Determine radionuclides that would be released given  
         specific processes 
    6.2.2. Identify processes requiring human involvement 
  6.3. Identify physical parameters relevant to emission 
    6.3.1. Characterize boundary conditions at emission-atmosphere interface  
      6.3.1.1. Identify stack height 
      6.3.1.2. Identify cross-sectional area of emission 
        6.3.1.2.1. Identify whether individual or multiple release  
           points are necessary 
        6.3.1.2.2. If multiple release points are necessary, identify  
           whether releases can be considered as one  
           collective release or as multiple releases 
    6.3.2. Note effluent temperature 
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      6.3.2.1. Note whether effluent temperature is above or   
         below ambient air temperature (from step 4.2.2.1.1) 
      6.3.2.2. Note whether effluent temperature is consistent cross- 
         sectionally and over time  
    6.3.3. Note humidity of emission 
    6.3.4. Note total volume of emission 
    6.3.5. Note average density of emission 
    6.3.6. Note momentum/internal energy of emission 
    6.3.7. Note duration of emission 
    6.3.8. Note any directionality of emission 
  6.4. Estimate physical, chemical, and nuclear properties relevant to emission 
    6.4.1. Estimate physical state of emission 
    6.4.2. Estimate full chemical constituency of emission 
    6.4.3. Estimate activity and radionuclides associated with emissions 
  6.5. Incorporate related data 
    6.5.1. Review current and historical news reports 
    6.5.2. Acquire additional relevant historical and contextual data 
6.5.3. Analyze possible release, transport, and detection scenarios using 
various established computerized models 
7.  Use Source Characterizations and Natural Environmental Data to Estimate Chains 
 of Events from Most Likely Sources based upon Step 3, Step 6, and Step 4 
  7.1. Use emission precursor actions (from step 6.2) as initial conditions for  
  each likely radionuclide emission source 
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  7.2. Estimate emission parameters and their effects for each likely radionuclide 
  emission source 
    7.2.1. Start with determinations from steps 6.3 and 6.4 
    7.2.2. Narrow range of possible parameters by considering likelihood of  
      various combinations of parameters 
    7.2.3. Estimate effects 
      7.2.3.1. Estimate particle size distribution of emission 
      7.2.3.2. Estimate average and maximum initial height of plume  
       rise 
    7.2.4. Summarize chronology of emission 
  7.3. Estimate transport parameters and their effects for each likely radionuclide 
  emission source  
    (Note: This section is likely to be accomplished through established  
    models.) 
    7.3.1. Start with natural environmental determinations from step 4.2 
    7.3.2. Narrow range of possible parameters by considering likelihood of  
      various combinations of parameters 
    7.3.3. Estimate average and maximum height of plume rise 
    7.3.4. Estimate plume appearance and structure 
    7.3.5. Estimate radionuclide generation and decay during transport 
    7.3.6. Estimate chemical and physical transformations that occur during  
    transport 
    7.3.7. Estimate effects 
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      7.3.7.1. Estimate wet and dry depositions and deposition rates 
      7.3.7.2. Estimate downwind concentration contours  
    7.3.8. Summarize chronology of transport  
  7.4. Estimate collection and data acquisition parameters 
    7.4.1. Start with data about measurement mechanisms from step 3 and  
    collected radionuclide data from step 4.1.4  
    7.4.2. Compare radionuclides likely detectable from transport   
    calculations in step 7.3 with radionuclides identified at sensor  
    locations 
    7.4.3. If possible, calculate radionuclide ratios that should be detectable  
    based upon transport parameters their effects in step 7.3 and  
    collection mechanisms in step 7.4.1 
    7.4.4. Summarize chronology of collection and data acquisition 
8.  Use Estimated Chains of Events to Determine Most Likely Radionuclide 
 Emission Source 
8.1. Rank possible radionuclide emission sources based upon reasonableness 
of chain of events 
8.2. Select highest ranking radionuclide emission source as most likely source 
of detection at sensor location 
8.3. Develop possible explanations for data, aspects of sequence of events, and 
additional factors that appear to be inconsistent with overall analysis  
9.  Recreate Most Likely Chain of Events 
  9.1. Characterize most likely release source and mechanism 
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    9.1.1. Identify most likely source location 
    9.1.2. Identify most likely radionuclide emission source    
      (facility/portable) 
    9.1.3. Identify most likely release mechanism 
    9.1.4. Identify most likely chronology of emission (duration, etc.) 
  9.2. Characterize radionuclide transport 
    9.2.1. Identify initial conditions of emission once release enters   
      atmosphere 
    9.2.2. Characterize prevailing meteorological influences 
    9.2.3. Characterize dominant terrestrial factors 
    9.2.4. Determine chronology of transport 
    9.2.5. Identity plume spread during transport 
    9.2.6. Identify chemical/nuclear transformations that occur during  
      transport 
    9.2.7. Characterize plume deposition/depletion during transport 
9.3. Characterize radionuclide collection/data acquisition mechanism at source 
detection location 
9.3.1. Identify relevant parameters of detection sensor 
9.3.2. Verify relevant parameters of acquisition mechanism 
9.3.3. Verify correlation between radionuclides detected and 
radionuclides identified as present 
9.3.4. Explain why some radionuclides identified as present were not 
detected 
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9.4. Identify and address any additional information relevant to sequence of 





Chapter III:  CASE STUDY 1 -- SITE CHARACTERIZATION 
Highlights 
Section 1, Initial Condition:  The initial condition was the detection of several anomalous 
gamma-ray peaks that could not be associated by the automated processing system 
measured at a radionuclide detection facility in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.  
 
Section 2, Validate and Superficially Correct Data:  The measurements were validated as 
sound.  A model novelty revealed in this section is the introduction of seven candidate 
radionuclides as the sources for the atypical peaks measured.  Moreover, a rationale for 
the presence of these radionuclides was identified.  The computational model used 
identified the presence of these radionuclides as impossible.  Moreover, because the 
varying senior scientists used differing analytical processes that were not comprehensive, 
they all arrived at incorrect conclusions.      
 
Section 3, Validate Hardware and Software Operation:  All hardware and software 
systems appeared to operate properly.  A novelty of this model was revealed in this 
section through the estimation of minimum detectable half-lives.  Although the 
estimation was rough (± 26%), no other model was able to perform such an estimation.    
 
Section 4, Characterize Environment:  The low density of radionuclide detectors and 
possible emission sources in the detection region reduced the utility of the meteorological 
and other portions of this section.  Even so, this section highlighted a novelty in that it 
revealed critical qualitative data that proved to be instrumental to thoroughly 
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characterizing the radionuclide detection site.  Moreover, because of the incorporation of 
qualitative data, a likely source region was identified in this section when none of the 
computer models queried were able to generate solutions because of the incomplete data 
available.  
 
Section 5, Characterize Possible Sources:  Three possible emission sources were 
identified, one of which, the Vancouver International Airport is a nontraditional 
radionuclide emission location. The incorporation of nontraditional source locations is an 
additional benefit of this model.  Moreover, this section also isolates the likely 
radionuclide emission source that caused the anomalous detections, which served as the 
initial condition.  Making this determination based on such a limited amount of measured 
quantitative data is possible because of the incorporation of human judgment into the 
analytical process.  
 
Section 6, Develop Characterizations of Possible Sources:   This section revealed the 
most important output based upon the human judgment novelty.  This section specifically 
identified the radionuclide emission source facility, which was based largely upon 
qualitative data.  No existing model was able to output the emission source with 
specificity.  In addition, this section demonstrates that this model is the only one that was 
able to thoroughly characterize the detection site.  While only seven radionuclides were 
identified and believe to exist prior to analysis with this model, this model revealed the 
presence of 50 radionuclides and the reasons why the 43 undetected radionuclides were 
not identified through the spectral processing system.  
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Section 7, Estimate Likely Chain of Events:   This section codifies the factors governing 
the generation, emission, transport, collection, and detection of the radionuclides 
identified.  In addition, this section highlights the characterization of the detection site.  
Neither of these outputs is possible with existing models.   
 
Section 8, Determine Most Likely Emission Source:  This section was combined into 
section 7 since only one source was identified as likely. 
 
Section 9, Recreate Most Likely Chain of Events:  This section was combined into 
section 7 since only one source was identified as likely. 
 
1.  Initial Condition -- Obtain Radionuclide Data Measurement 
 The initial condition for this case study occurred from March 14 through March 23, 1997 
when several anomalous gamma-ray peaks were measured in addition to the peaks 
customarily present within spectra at the CA002 monitoring station located on the 
campus of the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.  
The increase in the total number of gamma-ray peaks identified was over 50%.  Table 24 
lists all of the peaks that were identified during the period in question.  In addition, the 
table contrasts the gamma-rays generally present in CA002 spectra with the atypical 
peaks that serve as the initial conditions for this case study.  Figure 18 contrasts the 
typical and atypical spectra graphically by overlaying a representative region of each.  
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Finally, Table 25 lists the automated peak areas in counts for some of the more notable 
atypical peaks. 
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Table 25:  Peak Areas for Most Notable Atypical Peaks 
Automated Peak Energy (keV) / Peak Area (Counts) Date 












 199.60  789.10  243.15  347.62  
18 March 
2004 
181.61  320.35  81.40  
19 March 
2004 
278.08  90.85  77.65  1090.66  225.27  144.62  
20 March 
2004 
 280.66   71.45  
21 March 
2004 
 326.72  71.58  
22 March 
2004 





2.  Evaluate Accuracy of Measurement, Highlight Anomalies, and Make Superficial 
Corrections as Needed 
Assess Directly Measurable Initial Data Relevant to Aggregate Data Quantification 
Note sampling time, decay time, counting time, and total volume of air sampled 
Because these gamma-ray measurements are intended for scientific analysis, they are 
accompanied by a wealth of fundamental, directly measurable data including sampling 
time, decay time, counting time, and volume of air sampled.  Historical station data 
indicate that the operational goals for these values are 24 hours, 4.25 hours, and 19.5 
hours, for the respective chronological measurements.  Because of the dependence of air 
volume on sampling time, no real operational goals for air volume exist.  The actual 
values measured are shown in Table 26.  Table 26 also lists equivalent data in italics for 
the days preceding and following the period in questions for comparative purposes.  
Obvious anomalies (deviations greater that 10% from operational goals) are highlighted 
with asterisks (*). 
 
Table 26:  Fundamental Data Directly Measurable   








11 March 2004 46.07* 4.47 19.5 49005
12 March 2004 24.05 4.42 19.5 23965
13 March 2004 24.94 4.28 19.5 24412
14 March 2004 24.17 4.26 19.5 23689
15 March 2004 24.95 4.23 19.5 24461
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16 March 2004 23.83 4.25 19.5 21661
17 March 2004 24.16 4.27 19.5 23572
18 March 2004 23.78 4.24 18.21 22735
19 March 2004 22.42 4.26 19.5 21336
20 March 2004 28.28* 4.24 17.23* 16909
21 March 2004 21.48* 4.25 18 20936
22 March 2004 22.26 4.24 19.5 21683
23 March 2004 25.96 4.26 18.38 25277
24 March 2004 22.64 4.26 19.50 22103
25 March 2004 24.57 4.26 19.50 23758
26 March 2004 24.20 4.26 17.89 23261
 
Although the overwhelming majority (3 out of 4) anomalies listed in Table 26 occur 
during the period in question, the anomalies are too infrequent to be directly linked to the 
anomalous gamma-rays measurements during the period. 
 
Note all emission lines identified and radionuclide identifications based upon emission 
lines  
Upon reviewing the spectral emission lines identified, all of the questionable peaks look 
similar in size, shape, baseline, and full width at half maximum (FWHM) to the peaks 
customarily present.  A representative spectrum is shown in Figure 19.  The complete set 
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Figure 19:  Typical CA002 Spectrum with Key Radionuclide Associations Identified 
 
Figure 19 also highlights key radionuclides associated with the peaks customarily 
present.  The actual radionuclides associated with the peaks identified by the automated 
spectral processing system are shown in the Peak Search Results section of the 
Atmospheric Radionuclide Measurement Reports (ARMRs) in Appendix B.  The 
percentage of unassociated peaks is substantial, generally over 20%, for these spectra.  Of 
course, the unusually high percentage of unassociated peaks was the anomaly that 
originally drew these spectra into question.  A representative sample of typical CA002 
spectra, with unassociated peak percentages ranging between 3% and 12%, are shown in 
ARMRs included within Appendix 3.  In addition to the increase in percentage of 
unassociated peaks for the spectra during the period in question, there was also an 
increase in the number of peaks that had multiple radionuclide associations.  While the 
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value was marginally over 2 during the baseline periods, it jumped to 3.5 during the 
period in question.  
 
Assess Derived Data relevant to Radionuclide Identification and Quantification 
Determine flow rate from sampling time and total volume 
The collection flow rate is the easiest property that can be derived from the directly 
measurable data.  The flow rate is determined by dividing the total sampling volume by 
the total collection time.  Therefore, it serves as a normalizing property that can be used 
to evaluate the state-of-heath of the collection process.  Flow rate values for the period in 
question are listed in Table 27. As in Table 26, these values are preceded and followed by 
baseline values in italics for context.  Anomalous values, those differing by more than 
10% from the customary flow rate of 975 m3/h, are identified with an asterisk (*).   
 
Table 27: CA002 Flow Rates  
Date Collection Flow Rate (m3/h) 
 
11 March 2004 1063.71
12 March 2004 996.45
13 March 2004 978.83
14 March 2004 980.10
15 March 2004 980.40
16 March 2004 908.98
17 March 2004 975.66
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18 March 2004 956.06
19 March 2004 951.65
20 March 2004 597.91*
21 March 2004 974.67
22 March 2004 974.08
23 March 2004 973.69
24 March 2004 976.28
25 March 2004 966.95
26 March 2004 961.20
 
The March 20 flow rate is clearly below normal.  Table 26 indicates that several aspects 
of the operational process deviated from normal values including the higher than normal 
sampling time, the unusually low volume of air that was collected, and the shorter than 
normal counting time.  The counting time was probably shortened to compensate for the 
long sampling time so that the data could be transmitted on schedule.  However, there is 
no known reason for the low volume of air which led to the low flow rate.  Obvious 
possibilities include an air flow impediment or blockage, or a problem with the motor 
that drew the air through the collection system.   
 
Verify Soundness of Automated Calibrations 
All of the automatically generated calibration equations for the CA002 spectra appear to 
be in order.  The three calibration equations that are incorporated into each spectral 
analysis are the energy vs. channel calibration, resolution vs. energy calibration, and 
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efficiency vs. channel calibration.  Of course, serious inconsistencies in any of these 
equations would have led to noticeable problems in the spectra and the spectral analysis.  
Therefore, given the sound appearance of the spectra, the satisfactory calibration 
equations are to be expected. 
 
Identify complete and accurate set of radionuclides present based upon emission lines 
identified 
A review of the ARMRs reveals that the automated spectral processing system was able 
to identify the presence of many radionuclides that are regularly seen at CA002.  These 
radionuclides include Bi-212, Bi-214, K-40, Pb-214, Tl-208, Be-7, Pb-212, I-123, and 
Ac-228.  The key lines for these radionuclides appeared intact.  Further evaluation of 
these spectra reveals that the relative radionuclide abundances of most peaks identified 
were sound.  However, a few of the secondary peaks associated with radionuclides were 
not consistent with expected gamma-ray abundances.  A more detailed investigation 
draws these inconsistent abundances into question, given the broad accuracy of the 
primary and other peak abundances in the spectra.  Considering the broad energy range 
covered by the anomalous peaks that serve as the initial conditions for this study, it may 
be that some anomalous gamma-rays are superimposed onto the secondary peaks, altering 
their apparent abundances.  
  
Because the key lines of the radionuclides identified appear to be intact, using 
radionuclide key lines to determine concentrations is likely to be more accurate than 
using the average of all peaks associated with a particular radionuclide.  Using the 
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average of abundances calculated from all peaks associated with a particular radionuclide 
is more likely to incorporate some of the peaks with inconsistent abundances into the 
calculation, while using the key lines, which appeared to be unaffected by these 
occurrences, offers a greater opportunity for overall accuracy.   
 
An analysis of the gamma-rays not associated with radionuclides reveals that they are the 
key lines and strong secondary lines of the following radionuclides:  At-209, Po-207, Bi-
206, Po-206, Bi-204, Po-204, and Bi-203.  Relevant information for these radionuclides 
is included in Table 28.  Even so, there is no known presence of these radionuclides in 
the local environment, nor is there any known reason why they would be present within 
the samples collected.  Therefore, without additional information, relating the 
unassociated gamma-rays with these radionuclides exclusively is premature.  However, 
these radionuclides serve as a reasonable set of candidates to be evaluated further.  
 
Table 28:  Relevant Data regarding Atypical Radionuclides 
Radionuclide Half-Life Primary Gamma-Rays Relative Abundance 
Bi-203 11.76 h 820.3 30% 









Po-204 3.53 h 883.984 29.9%
 270.068 27.8%
 1016.31 24.1%













Po-207 5.80 h 992.33 59.3%
 742.64 28.2%





Another point of interest regarding these unassociated gamma-ray peaks is that they 
appear to be somewhat consistent in several of the spectra in question.  Assuming that the 
anomalous peaks are associated with gamma-ray emitting radionuclides -- a reasonably 
sound assumption given the apparent soundness of the overall spectra -- then using key 
lines will increase the likelihood of sound their radionuclide quantifications.  Using the 
average gamma-ray abundance process could easily become unreasonably complex since 
none of the radionuclides, nor their sources, are known.    
 
Determine accuracy of radionuclide concentration calculations 
Because the intended purpose of the CA002 monitoring station is to measure for evidence 
of nuclear weapons testing and the radionuclides measured are not indicative of nuclear 
explosions, the overwhelming majority of these radionuclides are not quantified.  Be-7 
and Pb-212 are quantified because they offer an ongoing baseline of atmospheric and 
terrestrial radionuclide levels, respectively, to enable more elaborate quantifications, if 
necessary.  The Be-7 and Pb-212 concentrations are shown in Table 29.  The I-123 
identified is known to be associated with a medical radioisotopes manufacturing facility 
within 2 km of the station, and is therefore not quantified either.          
 
Table 29:  CA002 Be-7 and Pb-212 Concentrations Measured 
Date Be-7 Concentration (µBq/m3) Pb-212 Concentration (µBq/m3) 
11 March 2004 1.6E+03 3.2E+03 
12 March 2004 2.4E+03 2.7E+03 
 175
13 March 2004 2.8E+03 2.8E+03 
14 March 2004 2.2E+03 3.9E+03 
15 March 2004 2.5E+03 4.6E+03 
16 March 2004 2.1E+03 2.7E+03 
17 March 2004 3.8E+03 2.8E+03 
18 March 2004 3.5E+03 1.7E+03 
19 March 2004 1.1E+03 1.4E+03 
20 March 2004 2.9E+03 1.3E+03 
21 March 2004 3.4E+03 2.9E+03 
22 March 2004 3.3E+03 5.3E+03 
23 March 2004 3.5E+03 3.4E+03 
24 March 2004 1E+03 5.6E+03 
25 March 2004 5.8E+03 5.6E+03 
26 March 2004 3.9E+03 3.8E+03 
 
Of the seven radionuclides that may be associated with the atypical peaks, three (At-209, 
Po-207, and Bi-203) appear to have no relationship with any other radionuclides known 
to be or possibly present.  While the remaining four radionuclides do not have any 
relationship with any of the radionuclides known to be present, they do have relationships 
amongst one another.  Po-206 decays into Bi-206 with a branching ratio of 100% and Po-
204 decays into Bi-204 with a branching ratio of 99.3%.  Because the operational scheme 
of the CA002 monitoring station is geared towards measuring fission products indicative 
of a nuclear weapon detonation, most of which have half lives on the order of hours and 
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days, the radionuclides detected by the system typically have half-lives in this range.  The 
fact that all seven radionuclides possibly associated with the anomalous peaks have half-
lives ranging from 3.5 hours to 8.8 days lends credibility to their presence.  At this point, 
although no source of these atypical radionuclides is known, it is reasonable to conclude 
that they are the source of the anomalous peaks.  This conclusion is based upon the fact 
that the atypical peaks correspond to gamma-rays that would be identifiable if the 
radionuclides were present; the clear parent daughter relationships amongst a subset of 
the radionuclides; and the half lives that are ideally suited for detection.  If any of these 
circumstances was different, such a conclusion may be suspect.    
 
Determine parent and progeny radionuclides possibly present based upon radionuclides 
identified 
Given that the sampling system is geared towards collecting particulates with half lives 
that range between hours and days, it is possible that many other radionuclides not 
identified were present.  These radionuclides may not have been identified because they 
were not collected due to their gaseous states (i.e., radons), or they may have been 
collected but not detected due to a half-life that was either too long or too short.  A listing 
of the parents and daughters of the known anomalous radionuclides that may have been 
present but not detected are listed in Table 30.  As Table 30 shows, the number of 
nuclides possibly present but not detected is much larger than the number of anomalous 
radionuclides detected, outnumbering them by 3 to 1.   
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Table 30:  Parent and Daughter Radionuclides possibly present at CA002 but not 
Identified 
Nuclides not Collected due 
to Gaseous State 
Nuclides with Half-lives 
too Short for Detection 
Nuclides with Half-lives too 
Long for Detection or Stable 
Rn-211 (parent of Po-207) At-208 (parent of Bi-204) Bi-209 (granddaughter of At-
209) 
Rn-210 (parent of Po-206) At-207 (parent of Po-207; 
parent of Bi-203) 
Pb-207 (granddaughter of Po-
207) 
Rn-209 (parent of At-209) At-206 (parent of Po-206) Bi-207 (daughter of Po-207) 
Rn-208 (parent of Po-204) Pb-205 (granddaughter of 
At-209) 
Pb-206 (granddaughter of Po-
206; daughter of Bi-206) 
Rn-207 (grandparent of Bi-
203; grandparent of Po-207)
At-204 (parent of Po-204; 
grandparent of Bi-204) 
Tl-205 (great granddaughter of 
At-209) 
Rn-206 (grandparent of Po-
206) 
At-203 (grandparent of 
Bi-203) 
Pb-204 (daughter of Bi-204) 
Rn-204 (grandparent of Po-
204) 
Po-203 (parent of Bi-203) Tl-203 (granddaughter of Bi-
203) 




The apparent relationship between the noble gas, radon, and the anomalous radionuclides 
is particularly interesting because of its potential similarity to local emissions that led to 
the I-123 activation product detections.  The I-123 became airborne because minute 
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quantities of the noble gas, Xe-123, escaped from a local facility.  After the xenon 
escaped, it decayed directly into iodine, which was subsequently detected.  It is possible 
that minute quantities of gaseous radon escaped from a local facility and decayed into the 
anomalous radionuclides detected; however, at this point, there is no evidence to support 
this hypothesis. 
 
The parent daughter relationships between these nuclides are shown in Figure 20.  All of 
the nuclides referenced in Table 30, with direct relationships to the anomalous 
radionuclides, are identified in black font in the figure.  The radionuclides shown in white 
font are a) those that are not directly related to the anomalous radionuclides but could be 
present, and b) those that would have likely been present, given the known presence of 
the anomalous radionuclides and the possible presence of nuclides listed in Table 30, but 
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Perform preliminary analysis 
Because all of the atypical radionuclides are neutron depleted, it is reasonable to conclude 
that they are activation products.  The I-123 that is periodically measured at CA002 is 
also an activation product, so anthropogenic activation products are not uncommon at the 
CA002 monitoring station.  Finally, all the other radionuclides detected at the CA002 
station are natural radionuclides.  K-40 is a singular primordial.  Be-7 is an induced 
radionuclide.  Ac-228, Pb-212, Bi-212, and Tl-208 are radionuclides from the thorium 
series, and Bi-214 and Pb-214 are uranium series radionuclides.  
 
3.  Incorporate Data about Collection and Measurement Mechanisms and Procedures into 
Analysis 
Incorporate details regarding type of radionuclide sampler used 
The CA002 monitoring station utilizes a high volume particulate radionuclide sampler to 
extract radionuclides from the air at the full range of ambient temperatures.  The sampler 
draws air via a 1100 m3/h blower in 24 hour time blocks to accomplish nearly continuous 
sampling.  A representative picture of the sampler is shown in Figure 21.  The collection 
flow rate is controlled by a variable speed motor, which is shown in Figure 21 at the base 
of the thinner vertical pipe.  The motor is able to maintain constant flow by increasing its 
speed to compensate for the flow as the flow becomes increasingly impeded with 
collected debris.  Typical flow rates average approximately 975 m3/h, which correspond 




Figure 21:  High Volume Particulate Radionuclide Sampler  
 
The white cube shaped box shown in Figure 21 holds a high efficiency, glass fiber, 
particulate collection filter that measures 60 cm x 60 cm.  The collection filter collects 
1.0 micron diameter particles with an efficiency of 99.99%.  This size of interest is in 
direct response to the fact that nuclear weapons testing debris that traverses large 
distances typically range from 0.1 to 5 microns in diameter.   
 
Based upon this information, the collection system appears to have operated properly.  
This is evidenced by the generally consistent 975 m3/hr flow rates noted in Table 27, and 
the fact the only radionuclides in particulate form appear to have been collected. 
 
After the collection process is complete, each filter paper is manually isolated in a wax 
paper sleeve and pressed into the form of a hockey puck (r = 3.2 cm, z = 1.3 cm) in 
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preparation for subsequent analysis.  It is in this form that the short lived background 
radionuclides collected are allowed to decay.   
 
Incorporate information regarding surroundings and type of radionuclide detection and 
analysis 
After the decay period has been completed, the compressed filter paper is manually 
placed inside the detection system for counting.  Two pictures of the detection system 
used are shown in figures 22 and 23.  Figure 22 shows the coaxially mounted, 40% 
efficient, cryogenically cooled HPGe detectors with the low background shield closed, 
and Figure 23 shows the two detectors fully exposed, with no external shield.  The 
detectors are calibrated for 15 minutes with a known check source for quality control 
purposes.  Given the presence of the low background shield that minimizes the influence 
of external radionuclides, it is unlikely that the anomalous radionuclides exist outside the 
counting apparatus.  In addition, given the inconsistent presence of the anomalous 




Figure 22:  CA002 Detection System with Low Background Cover Closed 
 
 
Figure 23:  Representative Example of Detection System Uncovered 
 
In addition to the equipment specifically used for radionuclide sample collection and 
detection, auxiliary equipment including an ambient dose rate meter and a local weather 
conditions monitor is present at the collection site.  The equipment is enclosed in a 20 ft x 
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8 ft x 8 ft trailer an is powered by an uninterruptible power supply which can supply up to 
4 hours of continuous battery operation, if necessary. 
 
In general, conservative estimations assess that environmentally collected radionuclides 
are considered to have decayed to insignificant levels after eight half-lives and are 
considered to be essentially nonexistent after ten half-lives.  Therefore, given the 4 hour 
(240 minute) decay time, radionuclides with half lives of 30 minutes or less would be 
generally indistinguishable from background, and radionuclides with half lives of 24 
minutes or less would have essentially decayed away.  All of the anomalous 
radionuclides exceed these half-life criteria.   
 
The PDTn, a concept derived in Appendix 4, can also be used to estimate the minimum 
half-life detectable based upon the station’s standard operational parameters.  Assuming 
various background counts per channel of 500, 100, 50 and 20 at various points within 
each spectrum, the corresponding PDTn values are 76.27, 35.61, 25.97, and 17.42 
respectively.  In order to calculate the minimum half-lives, several values will need to be 
estimated.  The most sound estimations deal with the operational parameters of the 
collection system and include the sampling time, decay time, counting time, and flow 
rate.  These values were chosen as 24 h, 4 h, 19.5 h, and 975 m3/h, respectively, based 
upon the standard operational parameters for the station.  The energy dependent detector 
efficiency was chosen based upon the energy location in the spectrum where each 
background value typically occurs.  The minimum peak width was chosen to be five 
channels, and the branching ratio was conservatively chosen to be one.  Of course, the 
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minimum half-life detectable is directly dependent upon the airborne concentration 
present.  The relationship between the airborne concentration and the minimum half-life 
detectable for each of the background count values chosen are plotted in Figure 24.  
Because typically measured airborne radionuclide concentrations for this station range 
between 1E3 and 1E4, the figures show that the minimum half-lives measurable are more 
thoughtfully estimated to vary between 1.15 and 1.95 hours for these airborne 

































Figure 24: Aggregate Plot showing Minimum Half-Life to Detect Peak over 500, 100, 50, 




4.  Characterize Environment 
Identify other sensors in the region 
This case study is rather unique due to the low density of nuclear infrastructure in the 
region.  Correspondingly, as Figure 25 shows, the national network of radiation 
monitoring stations operated by the Health Canada Radiation Protection Bureau is of 
similarly low density in this region.  The network includes only one site in British 
Columbia -- the Vancouver station where the anomalous data was originally measured.  
Other sites where environmental radiation sensors are located are shown in figures 25 
through 28.  Each of these figures highlights the fact that there are no sensors close to the 
Vancouver site.  As a result, no other sensor data related to the atypical radionuclide 
detections is available.   
 
 




Figure 26:  EPA Radiation Ambient Monitoring System Air Sampling Stations 
 
  
Figure 27:  U.S. Nuclear Research Reactors with Standard Environmental Radiation 




Figure 28:  U.S. Nuclear Power Reactors with Standard Environmental Radiation 
Monitoring Sensors (NRC) 
 
Characterize natural environment 
Characterize terrain  
The detection site, shown in Figure 29, is located in an open grassy area on the University 
of British Columbia campus.  Therefore, there are no major impediments to airflow in the 
immediate vicinity of the monitoring station.  Trees and buildings of varying heights can 
be randomly found on the order of one hundred meters from the station.  As a result, no 
dynamic meteorological conditions that affect the station are created due natural or 




Figure 29:  Immediate terrain of collection site 
 
Considering the terrain from a broader perspective, the UBC campus, on which the 
monitoring station is located, is bordered on the south and west by a cliff that drops 
approximately 1000 meters to flowing water below.  The water below is the point at 
which the Frasier River flows into the larger the Strait of Georgia.  The Frasier River is 
immediately adjacent to the coast and flows from southeast to northwest.  At the point 
where the Frasier River meets the Strait of Georgia, on the order of a kilometer offshore, 
the Strait flows due south.  This dynamic is shown in Figure 30.  The broader region to 
the north includes forest and some buildings until coastline is reached.  The forest and 
buildings are also present to the east.  The layout of these surroundings is shown in 




Figure 30:  Location of UBC campus (Port Grey) with respect to Frasier River and Strait 
of Georgia.  (Note:  Flow arrows correspond to water velocities.  Also, the v, u, A, and s, 
coordinates are essentially arbitrary coordinates that were used to gather the data.)   
 













Figure 32:  Immediate regional surroundings of monitoring station in all directions 
 
When considering the region from as even broader perspective, to the south and west, 
beyond the Strait of Georgia, a strip of land approximately 100 km wide by 500 km long, 
is oriented from northwest to southeast.  The land appears to be dominated by high terrain 




the Strait of Georgia and the Frasier River, the flowing water likely impacts the detection 
site environment more significantly due to the dynamic nature of the water flow.  A map 
which displays these features is shown in Figure 33.  The figure also shows the broader 
northern and eastern regions, which is characterized by mountains approximately 1500 
meters in height.    
 
 
Figure 33:  Relief Map of Vancouver and British Columbia Region  
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Characterize meteorology to fullest extent possible 
The meteorological station that is integrated into the detection station has limited 
capabilities, reliably providing wind speed and direction at the site.  Therefore, all 
tangible meteorological data must be obtained from nearby stations.  Because a number 
of meteorological stations exist in Vancouver, some meteorological information was 
obtained by using data from the closest nearby station, while in other cases, when 
possible, a weighted average was used to estimate the actual values at the detection site.  
The annual average wind rose for the detection site is shown in Figure 34, and the 








Figure 35:  Mean Annual Precipitation for Greater Vancouver (mm/yr)  
 
Appendix E shows representative meteorological data, satellite imagery, meteorological 
trajectory models, and airborne concentration dispersion models for the detection site.  
Based on all of the meteorological data evaluated along with the radionuclide detection 
data and sensor location information, no conclusive correlations were derivable.  First, 
given the detected concentrations and the amount of concentration reduction during 
dispersion, any radionuclides that reached another sensor would likely have been too 
diffuse to measure.  In addition, given the forward and backtracking trajectories, there are 
no consistencies between trajectories and measured concentrations at the detection site.  
Therefore, either the atypical radionuclides originated from a highly localized source, or 
they traversed mesoscale distances but were to diffuse to be detected.  However, given 
the inconsistent mesoscale meteorological data coupled with the general consistency of 
detection, the localized source option is most reasonable.   
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Draw preliminary conclusions based upon environmental determinations 
Based on analysis to this point, Figure 20 still represents the most likely set of atypical 
radionuclides present at the detection site.  Moreover, the detection site is likely close to 
the source location -- not only due to the meteorological analysis, but also because of the 
short half-lives of some of the atypical radionuclides detected.  For example, the half-life 
of Po-204 is 3.53 hours.  If, as Figure 20 suggests, the polonium is the result of a Rn-204 
(t1/2 = 1.24 m) decay into At-204 (t1/2 = 9.1 m), which then decays into Po-204, then the 
radon and astatine have decayed to insignificant levels in approximately 1.5 hours, 
leaving the polonium as the principal remaining parent in the decay chain.  Therefore, the 
source and detection sites must be close enough for the short-lived Po-204 to be 
atmospherically dispersed, decay in transit, and be detected effectively.  Based upon the 
wind speeds indicated in Figure 34 at the detection site, the source location may be 
located within mere miles, possible five, of the detection site.  However, the quantities 
and concentrations released drive this rough estimation. 
 
According to Figure 34, the two most likely source locations are the TRIUMF high 
energy physics site and the Vancouver International Airport.  Another possible source is 
the University of British Columbia teaching hospital located 1 km to the northeast of the 
detection site.  Given the estimated close proximity of the source and detection sites, this 
set of possible source locations is reasonable.   
 
It should be noted that the resolution of the NGM atmospheric model used has a 
resolution of 2 km.  That means that the smallest dimension of each parcel used in the 
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model’s evaluation is 2 km.  While this is not uncommon amongst mesoscale 
meteorological models, the resolution causes the model to be of no analytical utility if the 
radionuclide source is the TRIUMF site, 2 km southeast of the detection site, or the UBC 
hospital, and limited utility if the source is the Vancouver International Airport located 10 
km southeast of the detection site.   
 
5.  Characterize Possible Sources 
Recall that the atypical radionuclides detected are At-209, Po-207, Bi-206, Po-206, Bi-
204, Po-204, and Bi-203.  These radionuclides are activation products with half-lives 
ranging from 3.5 hours to 8.8 days.  Moreover, as Figure 20 shows, these radionuclides 
are all daughters, grand daughters, and great grand daughters of various radon isotopes.  
The only reasonable source for such combinations of short-lived activation product 
radionuclides is the TRIUMF high energy physics site.  Neither history nor logic supports 
short-lived airborne activation products originating from any portable or permanent 
airport equipment.  Similarly, it would be unprecedented for a hospital to generate such a 
multifaceted set of environmentally detectable airborne activation products.  Therefore, 
the most likely source for the anomalous radionuclides detected is the TRIUMF site.  An 
aerial picture of the TRIUMF site is shown in Figure 36.  
 
Figure 36:  Aerial View of TRIUMF Site 
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Because only one viable source location exists, the ranking of possible sources in Section 
8, Use Estimated Chains of Events to Determine Most Likely Radionuclide Emission 
Source, will not be necessary.  Therefore, in this case study, the Section 8 evaluation will 
not be conducted.   
 
6.  Develop Characterizations of Possible Sources 
Infinitesimal radionuclide releases are not uncommon for the TRIUMF site.  The most 
common radionuclide released is Xe-123, with varying concentrations of I-123 as an 
impurity.  Xe-123 is a byproduct of the process used to generate I-123, which is used for 
to manage thyroid cancer and to image cardiac and neurological disorders.  The 
production equations are shown in Equation 16. 
 
   Equation 16a 
 Equation 16b 
 
Releases generally occurred daily on days when I-123 was being produced.  The typical 
schedule was either four straight days of production with three days of inactivity, or five 
straight days of production with two days of inactivity.  Because the releases occurred 
following a decay period intended to increase the quantity of I-123 generated, thereby 
reducing the amount of Xe-123, directly correlating production and emission rates is 
challenging.  The releases are best approximated as instantaneous emissions of low 
activity.     
123123123)2,(124 08.294.5 − →− →−− IXeCsnpXe hm
123123123)2,(124 08.262.1 − →− →−− IXemCsnpXe hs
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Besides the regularly occurring Xe-123 releases, atypical releases have been associated 
with the TRIUMF site.  The two radionuclides that have been referenced in literature are 
Kr-77 and Ne-24.  Kr-77 may have been released one or two times from the site; 
however, to date, no correlations have yielded conclusive results.  On the other hand, the 
Ne-24 emissions are much more conclusive, having occurred and the effects having been 
measured on the order of 100 times.    
 
The primary commonality between all three releases associated with the site is that they 
all involved an infinitesimal amount of gas escaping the particulate scrubber system.  In 
each case, the gases decayed into particle progeny which was detected at the detection 
site.  In the case of the Xe-123, it decayed and was detected as I-123; Kr-77 was detected 
as Br-77; and Ne-24 was detected as Na-24.  Given that all of the atypical radionuclides 
detected are the progeny of various isotopes of gaseous radon, it is possible, and may be 
likely, that the same process took place.  If the same process did indeed take place, then 
the set of radionuclides emitted are more closely represented by the radon isotopes listed 
in Figure 37, as opposed to the more limited set shown in Figure 20.  Again, as in Figure 













































































































































































































































































































































































Regarding the physical parameters relevant to the emission, a picture of one of the 
primary buildings on the TRIUMF site is shown in Figure 38.  The height of the 
emissions stacks and their cumulative area can be estimated based upon this figure.  The 
height of the emission stacks is approximately 35 feet and their cumulative area is 
approximately 5 square feet.  Based upon the picture, all emissions would have occurred 
in the vertical plane with at least nominal internal energy and momentum.  Given the 
height of the surrounding trees, it is reasonable to deduce that effluents emanating from 
the stacks were able to be dispersed without significant obstruction from the trees.    
 
 
Figure 38:  Picture of building on TRIUMF site 
   
Further investigations corroborated the hypothesis that the TRIUMF facility was the 
source of the atypical radionuclides detected, and that the hypothesized decay processes 
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from radon to the multitude of progeny actually occurred.  A member of the TRIUMF 
staff indicated that on the days in question, the facility was being used to bombard 
thorium carbide targets with 500 MeV protons to make isotopes of francium.  Based upon 
research conducted by CERN, shown in Figure 39, involving the bombardment of 
thorium carbide targets with 600 MeV protons, the staff member concluded that a suite of 
radon isotopes are generated through this process.  Although the radon isotopes listed in 
the figure range from Rn-198 through Rn-227, because the figure is a semi-log plot, the 
peak abundances are orders of magnitude above lesser values.  A clear break on both 
sides of the peak appears to occur at 10E6 atoms per second, leaving isotopes of radon 
ranging from 203 through 223 as most likely to have progeny collected and detected.  In 
addition, this also means that although no progeny of the other radons indicated in the 
figure are listed, they may indeed be present but undetectable due to their low 
concentrations.   
 
Isotopes of other gaseous radionuclides are also generated through the bombardment 
including krypton and xenon.  However, according to Figure 37, none of these progeny, 
or progeny of radon isotopes ranging from 220 - 223 was detected at the monitoring 
station. Further investigations revealed that the krypton and xenon progeny were either 
stable or pure beta emitters, rendering them undetectable by the gamma-ray detection 
system in place at the monitoring station.  Regarding the highly abundant isotopes of 
radon whose progeny were not detected, the lack of detection may be related to the 




Figure 39:  Distribution of Radon Isotopes following 600 MeV proton bombardment of 
thorium carbide, generated by CERN  
 
7.  Likely Chain of Events 
At the conclusion of Section 5, it was noted that since only one viable source location 
existed, there was no need to conduct the Section 8 analysis.  Another consequence of 
having only one feasible source is that it enables the evaluations in Section 7, Use Source 
Characterizations and Natural Environmental Data to Estimate Chains of Events from 
Most Likely Sources, and Section 9, Recreate Most Likely Chain of Events, to be 
combined.  Therefore, Section 9 will not appear as a separate evaluation.   
 
The initial conditions for the source term of this case study involved high energy physics 
experiments that were conducted at the TRIUMF site in Vancouver British Columbia on 
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the University of British Columbia (UBC) campus.  Protons were being used to bombard 
thorium carbide in an effort to produce francium.  As a result of the bombardments, a 
wide variety of secondary nuclides were generated -- including radons ranging in mass 
from 197 to 227 amu, as shown in Figure 39.  These, and other radionuclide products not 
specifically related to the experiment, were held in an emissions system where the 
overwhelming majority of radionuclides decayed to nondetectable levels.    
 
TRIUMF staff performed a brief daily venting of the airborne emissions system after the 
decay period.  Therefore, the radionuclides releases occurred under controlled conditions.  
While the decay period was long enough for the overwhelming majority of particulate 
and gaseous radionuclides present to decay to insignificant levels, some minute quantities 
of longer lived radionuclides remained.  The scrubbers associated with this experiment’s 
emissions system seem to have satisfactorily prevented particulates from escape; 
however, gaseous products, principally radon isotopes, were released through the stacks 
in minute quantities. 
 
The release point of the emission stacks stood approximately 35 feet above ground level.  
The momentum of the gas upon release was likely sufficient to carry it over the 
surrounding trees (shown in Figure 38) without significant interference.  Once airborne, 
the radionuclides were carried by the prevailing winds, which blew from the east-
southeasterly direction, towards the detection site.  The prevailing wind direction and the 
emission location relative to the detection site are shown in Figure 34.  During transit, the 
radon products released continued their natural radioactive decay processes into 
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daughters, grand-daughters, and subsequent progeny -- all of which are particulates.  The 
most significant radon isotopes emitted and their progeny are shown in Figure 37.   
 
The radionuclide collection mechanism generally operated continuously in 24 hour 
blocks of time.  It was designed to capture 1 µm diameter particulates with an efficiency 
of 99.99%.  Therefore, gases and smaller diameter particulates that were likely present 
were not collected as effectively.     
 
After material collection, the captured radionuclides experienced a 4 hour decay period 
prior to radionuclide data acquisition using an HPGe detector.  The decay period enabled 
the shorter lived radionuclides present to decay to nondetectable levels.  Based upon 
historical airborne concentrations measured at the site, the minimum half-life detectable 
ranged between 1 and 2 hours.  Therefore, although all of the radionuclides shown in 
Figure 37 are present at the detection at some concentration, only the subset identified in 
the figure was detectable. 
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Chapter IV:  CASE STUDY 2 -- QUALITATIVE DATA INCORPORATION 
Highlights 
Section 1, Initial Condition:  The initial condition was the detection of an anomalously 
high Cs-137 concentration at a radionuclide detection site in Schauinsland, Germany.  
 
Section 2, Validate and Superficially Correct Data:  The limited amount of data available 
prevented effective data validation.  It was interesting to note that only Cs-137 was 
measured.  Had the Cs-137 originated from an atmospheric release of fission products, 
other fission products would likely have been identified, as well.  The Cs-137 identified 
may have been the result of detector contamination or some other non-atmospheric 
source.        
 
Section 3, Validate Hardware and Software Operation:  No hardware or software 
malfunction is apparent; but given the limited amount of data accompanying the noted 
detection, no definitive conclusions can be determined.   
 
Section 4, Characterize Environment:  The large number of candidate radionuclide 
sources and detection sites in the region are overwhelming.  Other detection sites in the 
region detected anomalous Cs-137 concentrations, as well.  This fact served as validation 
of the initial condition of this case study and effectively eliminated the possibility that the 
detection was the result of detector contamination.  Based upon the chronology and 
location of the detections, the likely radionuclide emission location was in the region of 
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southern Spain.  Based upon existing computational models, this is the most refined 
source determination available.   
 
Section 5, Characterize Possible Sources:  Although over 1000 candidate radionuclide 
sources were identified, after analyzing the chronology and location of the detections, 
none of the candidate source facilities were likely.  The benefit of human judgment in this 
section was that it enabled unlikely sites to be eliminated from consideration even though 
they were in the region of possible sources.  These sites were eliminated through an 
analytical assessment of their likely outputs.      
 
Section 6, Develop Characterizations of Possible Sources:   This section revealed the 
most important output based upon the human judgment novelty.  This section specifically 
identified the radionuclide emission source facility, which was based largely upon 
qualitative data, press reporting in this case.  No existing model was able to output the 
emission source with specificity.  Moreover, this section revealed the model’s ability to 
identify a radionuclide emission source even when the source was not known as a 
radionuclide emission facility and had no known history of radionuclide emissions. 
 
Section 7, Estimate Likely Chain of Events:   This section codifies the factors governing 
the generation, emission, transport, collection, and detection of the Cs-137 identified.  In 
addition, this section definitively characterizes the detection site.  No existing model was 
able to conclusively identify that Cs-137 was the only radionuclide present at the 
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detection site.  At best, they were only able to say that Cs-137 was identified as being 
present.     
 
Section 8, Determine Most Likely Emission Source:  This section was combined into 
section 7 since only one source was identified as likely. 
 
Section 9, Recreate Most Likely Chain of Events:  This section was combined into 
section 7 since only one source was identified as likely. 
 
1.  Initial Condition -- Obtain Radionuclide Data Measurement 
 The initial condition for this case study occurred on June 8, 1998 when an atypically 
large Cs-137 gamma-ray peak was measured in addition to the peaks customarily present 
within spectra at the DE002 monitoring station located in Schauinsland, Germany.  Cs-
137 is regularly measured at the DE002 station and is associated with airborne 
resuspension of Chernobyl fallout.  The June 8 peak was easily noticeable, as it 
corresponded to a concentration 10 times normal Cs-137 concentrations measured at this 
station.  However, it is important to note that the concentration measured corresponded to 
a dose equivalent 10 orders of magnitude below ICRP limits. 
 
2.  Evaluate Accuracy of Measurement, Highlight Anomalies, and Make Superficial 
Corrections as Needed 
Historical station data indicate that the operational goals for sampling time, decay time, 
and counting time are 168 hours, 48 hours, and 120 hours, respectively.  The measured 
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values for the spectrum in question are 165 hours, 52 hours, and 124 hours, respectively.  
These values correspond to differences of 2%, 8%, and 3%, respectively.  Therefore, the 
operational parameters for the spectrum in question appear to be consistent with historical 
values for the monitoring station.  The nominal air collection flow rate is 500 m3/hr for 
this station; however, the measured flow rate was not available for evaluation in this 
study.  Given the consistency of the other operational values measured, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the flow rate was also consistent.    
 
Due to the limited amount of onsite data available for this case study, the only 
radionuclide identified as being present is Cs-137.  Natural radionuclides are known to 
have been present but their identifications were not preserved because their quantities 
were within normal bounds.  Only measurements of anthropogenic radionuclides and 
atypical quantities were preserved.   
 
Cs-137 essentially emits one gamma-ray with an energy of 661.7 keV.  Therefore, the 
only practical way to evaluate the concentration is through the key line.   The calculated 
Cs-137 concentration was 17.0 µBq/m3.  Supporting information was not available to 
validate the accuracy of the concentration, so its accuracy must be accepted until refuting 
data is made available.  In addition, because Cs-137 essentially decays directly into stable 
Ba-137, no parent daughter relationships can be correlated.   
 
Based upon the preliminary information available, it is difficult to determine whether the 
Cs-137 concentration measured is valid or is not valid.  The concentration is an order of 
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magnitude above of historical station Cs-137 concentration measurements.  However, 
because the measurements have been so consistent over time (± 1.5 µBq/m3), such a 
substantial deviation can reasonable be viewed with a level of skepticism.  
 
Perform preliminary analysis 
Because only Cs-137 was detected, it is unlikely that a fission event was the cause.  Had 
the emission been the result of a fission event, at least one of several other fission 
products would have likely been detected in addition to Cs-137.  These other 
radionuclides include Cs-136, Cs-134, Ba-140, I-131, and I-133.  Because none of these 
or any other fission product radionuclides were detected, nuclear reactors and nuclear 
detonations are not likely sources.  Similarly, because Cs-137 is a fission product, rich in 
neutrons, it is not likely to have originated from an accelerator facility.  The detected Cs-
137 was likely separated prior to its emission.  
 
3.  Incorporate Data about Collection and Measurement Mechanisms and Procedures into 
Analysis 
The DE002 monitoring station utilizes a high volume particulate radionuclide sampler to 
extract radionuclides from the air at the full range of ambient temperatures.  The sampler 
draws air via a 1000 m3/h blower in 7 day time blocks to accomplish nearly continuous 
sampling.  Radionuclides from the drawn air are entrained onto polypropylene filters.  
Typical flow rates average approximately 500 m3/h, which correspond to an air volume 
of 84000 m3.   
 
 212
There is no evidence that a hardware malfunction occurred.  The collection of Cs-137, a 
particulate, is consistent with the designed operation of the station.  Moreover, the HPGe 
data acquisition system worked well enough to be able to identify the Cs-137 peak and 
enable concentration quantification based upon the measured peak area.   
 
4.  Characterize Environment 
Identify other sensors in the region 
The radionuclide monitoring stations throughout the region are shown as white dots on 
the map in Figure 40.  The detection site is indicated by the yellow triangle.  Through 
these detection sites, it was revealed that the higher than normal Cs-137 concentrations 
were observed throughout Europe during this time period.  The highest concentration was 
measured in France, at 2400 µBq/m3.  The collection period for this sample lasted 8 




Figure 40:  Radionuclide Monitoring Stations in Vicinity of Detection Site 
 
Characterize natural environment 
Characterize terrain 
The detection site, shown in Figure 41, is located in a somewhat enclosed grassy area in 
the Black Forest.  Trees approximately ten meters tall can be randomly found on the 
order of tens of meters from the station.  Therefore, while there are no major 
impediments to airflow in the immediate vicinity of the monitoring station, no extended, 




Figure 41:  Immediate terrain of DE002 Collection Site 
 
Considering Germany’s Schauinsland and Black Forest regions from a broader 
perspective, they lie in the southwest corner of Germany.  The region is sporadically 
covered with dense patches of pine and fir trees.  The hundred mile stretch of rolling hills 
and mountainous land, which borders both Switzerland and France, lies along the eastern 
bank of the Rhine River.  However, due to the terrain, the river’s airflow does not govern 
the airflow in the immediate vicinity of the station.  The highest peak in the region is 
Feldberg at 1495 meters.  A relief map and a picture of this region are shown in Figures 
42 through 44.  The location of the German monitoring station relative to the French 




 Figure 42:  Relief Map of Schauinsland and Black Forest Regions 
 
 




Figure 44:  Another Picture of Schauinsland and Black Forest Regions 
 
 
Figure 45:  Location of German monitoring station relative to French monitoring station 
Maximum Measured Concentration 





Characterize meteorology to fullest extent possible 
The meteorology of the region is characterized by rain in the late spring and summer 
months, during the time period of the anomalously high Cs-137 detection.  June and July 
are the rainiest months during the year and the average annual rainfall in the area is 
approximately 1300 mm.  Temperatures in this region are generally cool.  July is the 
warmest month of the year with temperatures averaging 65OF.   
 
Draw preliminary conclusions based upon environmental determinations 
Because of the 7 day radionuclide collection period at the DE002 station, very little 
insight into the source location is gained through meteorological modeling.  Figure 46 
shows the OMEGA meteorological model’s assessment of the likely source region based 
upon the wind trajectories during the 7 day collection period.  The region clearly extends 
into central Europe.  In addition, it stretches into the Atlantic Ocean and into Africa; 




Figure 46:  7 day Field of Regard based upon June 8, 1998 Cs-137 Detection at DE002 
(shown as Green Triangle) 
 
Given that plumes tend to dilute as they traverse, because of the airborne concentration 
measured in France that was two orders of magnitude higher than the DE002 
concentration measured, there is a good chance that the French station is closer to the 
source location than the German station.  A secondary conclusion based upon this fact, 
and the fact that the French station’s collection time ended towards the beginning of the 
DE002 collection time, is that the emission likely did not begin during the end of the 
DE002 radionuclide collection period.  Therefore, the emission probably occurred on or 
before June 6, 1998 (a date arbitrarily chosen at 48 hours prior to the end of the DE002 
air sampling time).  If the emission was from an instantaneous puff source, then it 
probably occurred towards the overlapping periods of the sampling times, maybe 
between May 30 and June 2, 1998.  On the other hand, if the emission was from a 
continuously emitting source, then it may have begun towards the end of the French 
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detector’s collection period and ended during the German station’s collection period, 
possibly from May 30 through June 6, 1998.  These relationships are shown in Figure 47. 
 
Figure 47:  Relationships between Collection Periods and Possible Emission Periods 
 
Considering the continuous emission possibility, the relevant collection period for the 
DE002 monitoring station ranges from June 1 (the start of the DE002 collection period) 
through June 6 (the end of the postulated emission period).  Considering this adjusted 
time period, the corresponding regions of likely emission sources change from the ones 
shown in Figure 45 to those shown in Figure 48.   
 
5/25 36/1 2 426 5 6 7 8 27 28 3129 30
French Monitoring Station Collection Period 
German Monitoring Station Collection 
Possible Continuous Emission 
Possible Puff Emission 
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Figure 48:  Field of Regard based upon postulated June 1 through June 6, 1998 Cs-137 
Detection at DE002 (shown as Green Triangle) 
 
Similarly, the continuous emission source regions for the French monitoring station, 





Figure 49:  Field of Regard based upon postulated May 30 through June 2, 1998 Cs-137 
Detection at DE002 (shown as Yellow Triangle)     
 
Because the postulated continuous emission includes the entire time period from May 30 
through June 6, 1998, the likely source term regions can be represented by superimposing 
the German and French monitoring stations (Figures 48 and 49).  This superimposition is 




Figure 50:  Combined Field of Regard based upon German and French continuous 
emission Fields of Regard 
 
The same compound display of likely source regions (Figure 53) can also be derived for 
the instantaneous puff emission assumption.  This can be accomplished by combining the 
postulated puff source regions from the German monitoring station (Figure 51) and the 




Figure 51:  Field of Regard based upon postulated puff emission of Cs-137 Detection at 
DE002 (shown as Green Triangle) 
 
 
Figure 52:  Field of Regard based upon postulated puff emission of Cs-137 Detection at 




Figure 53:  Combined Field of Regard based upon German and French puff emission 
Fields of Regard 
 
It is interesting to note that the only land mass essentially identified as a source region 
exists in southern Spain. 
 
Based upon the meteorological analysis performed, depending on the postulated emission 
duration and start date, several source regions are reasonable candidates.  If we consider 
the region indicated through meteorological analysis related to the week long German 
monitoring station detection, then the source region includes portions of Europe, Africa 
and the Atlantic.  If we consider a continuously emitting source that influenced both the 
French and German monitoring station detections, then we may be looking at a smaller 
region, including a small section of south central Europe and much of southern Spain.  
Finally, if we consider a more instantaneous puff source, then the source region includes 
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even a smaller section of southern Spain.  However, at this point, no potential source 
facilities have been identified.    
 
Identify potential radionuclide emission sources 
The list of radionuclide sources initially considered includes the over one thousand 
sources throughout Europe.  A representative sample is shown in Appendix 6.  These 
facilities include nuclear power reactors, nuclear research reactors, nuclear research 
facilities, and hospitals that may use radioactive sources in patient care.  Because plotting 
all of these facilities on a figure would be difficult to interpret, a representative subset is 
included in Figures 54 and 55.  In addition to the nuclear facilities shown in Figure 54, an 
African seismic event is shown as well.  This is shown in the event that it might be 
correlated with a nuclear detonation. 
 
 




Figure 55:  Selected Nuclear Research Facilities in Europe 
 
5.  Characterize Possible Sources 
Recall that the Cs-137 was detected in isolation with no other fission products.  The 
overwhelming majority of the facilities listed as candidates are nuclear reactors, which 
would emit other fission products along with a Cs-137 emission.  So these reactors are 
likely not the source of the Cs-137 detected.  Similarly, it is unlikely that a hospital would 
emit the type of Cs-137 concentration that was detected in France.  Therefore, the 
hospitals probably are not the source either.  Moreover, because Cs-137 is a neutron rich 
isotope, it is unlikely that any of the accelerator facilities, which generally produce 
neutron depleted nuclides, are the source.  Thus, out of the over one thousand candidate 
radionuclide source facilities throughout Europe, none are likely. 
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6.  Develop Characterizations of Possible Sources 
Identify physical parameters relevant to emission 
While there are no likely candidate sources that can be analyzed in greater detail at this 
point, certain features associated with the release can be more definitively determined.  
Based upon the high concentration measured at the French monitoring station, and the 
stark reduction in concentration by the time the plume reached the relatively nearby 
German monitoring station, it is likely that the emission originated from a source 
relatively close to the French monitoring station (i.e., from a European or North African 
coastal location) at a time more conducive to the French station’s detection schedule 
(between May 25 and June 2, 1998).  However, it is also possible that the plume 
originated at a time closer towards the end of the French monitoring station’s collection 
periods and the beginning of the German station’s collection period.  If this was the case, 
then the stark difference in concentrations could simply be the result of the difference in 
terrain of the two stations.  According to Figure 45, the French station is located on the 
Mediterranean coast, easily accessible to most plumes in the region, while the German 
station is located in the mountainous forest and may be less accessible to plumes.  Based 
upon these chronological considerations, the chronologies and source regions postulated 
in Section 4 seem reasonable.   
 
The plume may have been emitted at above ambient temperatures or with substantial 
momentum or internal energy.  Otherwise, the plume might not have had the buoyancy 
needed to pass above the mountains to be detected by the German station.      
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Because the French monitoring station likely registered the Cs-137 plume prior to the 
German monitoring station (based upon the sampling schedules of the two stations), and 
the French station measured a concentration so much higher than the German station, it is 
likely that the plume was traveling from south to north.  More confidence in the 
extrapolated detection chronology yields the possibility that the plume was traveling from 
southwest to northeast. 
 
Incorporate related data 
In an effort to validate or eliminate some of the numerous estimations and assumptions 
made to this point, it is useful to incorporate additional data -- even data that is merely 
tangentially relevant -- that can add credibility to the suppositions or refute them.  
Throughout the analysis, the two governing sets of assumptions have been associated 
with the chronology of the release and the likely location of the release.  Because these 
two sets of assumptions are not independent, the most logical way to investigate them is 
to begin with the most restrictive chronological and geographical parameters, and work 
outwards to scenarios with broader parameters.  Ultimately, associated data regarding the 
entire European continent may be incorporated if sufficiently relevant data are not 
discovered earlier. 
 
The most restrictive chronological and geographic case involves an instantaneous 
emission that occurred towards the end of the French stations monitoring period and the 
beginning of the German stations monitoring period -- a total of 48 hours. The 
corresponding terrestrial source region includes only southern Spain (Figure 53).  An 
 229
interesting series of news and technical reports from this time period and region revealed 
that a Cs-137 emission had taken place on May 30, 1998.  Representative reports and 
excerpts are shown in Appendix 7.  According to the reports, a Cs-137 source of at least 
one Curie had inadvertently been smelted in a batch of scrap metal at the Acerinox Plant 
in Algeciras, Spain (Figure 56).  Although radiation detectors are present at the land and 
sea entrances of the facility to prevent radioisotopes from entering, the sea based 
radiation detector had been inoperable since May 25, 1998.  Therefore, it is possible that 
the Cs-137 entered through this entrance unbeknownst to the operators.  Based upon this 
information related to the timely Acerinox smelting facility accident, it is likely that the 
facility is the source of the plume emission that was detected.   
 
 





7.  Most Likely Chain of Events 
Because only one viable alternative exists, Section 7 (Use Source Characterizations and 
Natural Environmental Data to Estimate Chains of Events from Most Likely Sources), 
Section 8 (Use Estimated Chains of Events to Determine Most Likely Radionuclide 
Emission Source), and Section 9 (Recreate Most Likely Chain of Events) can be 
combined.  Therefore, Sections 8 and 9 will not appear as separate sections.   
 
The chain of events for this case study is relatively straight forward.  A Cs-137 source of 
at least one Curie entered a Spanish smelting facility located on the southern coast of 
Spain and was smelted with a batch of metal on May 30, 1998.  During the smelting 
process, Cs-137 effluents were ejected into the atmosphere and were carried towards the 
northwest.  These effluents were subsequently detected by the DE002 German 
radionuclide monitoring station and many other European radionuclide monitoring 
facilities.  While Cs-137 was the only radionuclide detected at the DE002 monitoring 
station, the analysis showed that it indeed was the only radionuclide present.    
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Chapter V:  CASE STUDY 3 -- COMPLICATED RADIONUCLIDE ANALYSIS  
Highlights 
Section 1, Initial Condition:  The initial condition was the detection of several anomalous 
gamma-ray peaks that could not be associated by the automated processing system 
measured at a radionuclide detection facility in Charlottesville, Virginia.  The spectrum 
was clearly an inauthentic sample prepared to test the capabilities of the human analysts 
and computational models in use at the Prototype International data Center, the data 
processing headquarters for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  
 
Section 2, Validate and Superficially Correct Data:  One novelty of this model revealed 
in this section is its utility in perform complicated radionuclide analysis without 
computational models.  In addition, although the manual implementation of this model is 
more labor intensive than its computational counterparts, it is shown to reveal more 
information. 
 
Sections 3 - 9 were not needed in order to complete this analysis. 
 
1.  Initial Condition -- Obtain Radionuclide Data Measurement 
 The initial condition for this case study occurred on June 9, 1997 when several 
anomalous gamma-ray peaks were measured in addition to the peaks customarily present 
within spectra at the US001 monitoring station located on the campus of the University of 
Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia.  Because of the combination of typical and atypical 
spectral features, this spectrum was clearly a manufactured test spectrum sent to evaluate 
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the abilities of the analysts and the computational models in use at the Prototype 
International Data Center, the data processing headquarters for the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty.  The total number of gamma-ray peaks identified was four times the normal 
amount -- a total of 120 peaks.  All of the customary peaks appeared to be present along 
with several associated with fission products of U-235.  The majority of peaks present 
were not associated with radionuclides.   
 
2.  Evaluate Accuracy of Measurement, Highlight Anomalies, and Make Superficial 
Corrections as Needed 
Much of the relevant data regarding this anomalous spectrum was not preserved so 
evaluating the accuracy of the accompanying data is not possible.  However, a 
preliminary analysis may prove to be revealing.   
 
Given that U-235 and a number of fission products were identified as present, it may be 
instructive to determine whether some of the other unidentified gamma-ray peaks are 
associated with fission products.  As a matter of fact, if the sample is associated with the 
fission of U-235, then the set of radionuclides present is well defined according to the U-
235 fission yields associated with the chart of the nuclides.  Although the process would 
be highly involved, the fission products present and those identifiable can be calculated 
by hand.  The hand calculations used determine the radionuclides present are included 
within Appendix H.      
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Based upon the U-235 fission yield abundance for each mass family of fission products 
and the half-lives of the radionuclides in each family, the fission product radionuclides 
that should have been identified are shown below. 
 
Table 31:  Radionuclides that Should Have Been Present 







































The presence of these radionuclides was confirmed by the computational models used to 
analyze the spectra.  However, since the computational models are void of human 
judgment, they are unable to determine any additional information.  On the other hand, as 
 235
the Appendix 8 derivation shows, several other radionuclides are identified as possibly 
present.  These radionuclides are shown below.   
 
Table 32:  Additional Radionuclides: 









The origin of the radionuclide sample analyzed is known to be inauthentic, and the 
radionuclides known to be and possibly present have been identified.  Therefore, there is 
no need to continue analysis through the environment, possible sources, and chains of 




Chapter VI:  CASE STUDY 4 -- ERRANT DATA PROCESSING 
Highlights 
Section 1, Initial Condition:  The initial condition was the detection of several anomalous 
gamma-ray peaks that could not be associated by the automated processing system 
measured at a radionuclide detection facility in Charlottesville, Virginia.  
 
Section 2, Validate and Superficially Correct Data:  The model novelty revealed in this 
section is the model’s ability to process errant data to generate an accurate conclusion.  
Automated processes that attempted to determine the cause for the atypical peaks were 
unable to do so.  A senior radionuclide modeler was quoted as saying “garbage in, 
garbage out.”  In many cases, the model developed is able to process inaccurate or 
incomplete data as if it were valid.    
 
Sections 3 - 9 were not needed in order to complete this analysis. 
 
1.  Initial Condition -- Obtain Radionuclide Data Measurement 
 The initial condition for this case study occurred on May 27, 1997 when several 
anomalous gamma-ray peaks were measured in addition to the peaks customarily present 
within spectra at the US001 monitoring station located on the campus of the University of 
Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia.  The total number of gamma-ray peaks identified 
was twice the normal amount -- a total of 30 extra peaks.  Table 33 lists all of the peaks 
that were identified within the spectrum.  In addition, the table contrasts the gamma-rays 
generally present in US001 spectra with the atypical peaks that serve as the initial 
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conditions for this case study.  An additional anomaly with this spectrum was that the 
peaks typically measured in US001 spectra appeared to be present, but with much lower 
peak areas. 
 





































































2.  Evaluate Accuracy of Measurement, Highlight Anomalies, and Make Superficial 
Corrections as Needed 
Much of the relevant data regarding this anomalous spectrum was not preserved, so 
evaluating the accuracy of the accompanying data is not possible.  However, it is 
interesting to note that most of the typical and atypical peaks seem to occur in an 
alternating pattern.  Closer scrutiny of the spectrum clarifies the pattern even further.  A 
number of Type I and Type II peaks are present in this spectrum.  These peaks seem to be 
the ones that disrupt the apparent pattern.  If they are corrected, additional information 
about the pattern may be revealed.  The type I errors include false peaks identified at 
921.29 keV, 968.50 keV, 1194.04, and 1649 keV.  The Type II errors include gamma-
rays with energies 255.9 keV (atypical), 331.4 keV (atypical), and 351.9 keV (typical).  
Removing the Type I errors from Table 33 and including the Type II errors results in a 
pattern consistent throughout the entire spectrum.   
 
Besides the simple pattern of alternating typical and atypical peaks, a more advanced 
pattern appears to be present.  As the peak energies increase, the spacing between each 
atypical peak and its closest lower energy neighbor (a typical peak) seem to steadily 
increase.  As a matter of fact, simple mathematical analysis reveals that all of the atypical 
peaks are located at energies that are 1.097% greater than their lower energy neighbors.  




Because the cause for the anomalous detection has been identified, there is no need to 
continue analysis through the environment, possible sources, and chains of events.  As a 
result, no additional sections will be evaluated within this case study. 
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Chapter VII:  CONCLUSIONS 
This study effectively developed and validated a radionuclide analysis model that relates 
the generation, emission, transport, collection, and measurement of anomalous 
anthropogenic radionuclides.  The principal difference between this model and existing 
models is that this model integrates human judgment throughout the entire analytical 
process.  Because of this revolutionary new approach in analysis, this model has several 
distinguishing features that set it apart from existing models.  This list of features, each of 
which was demonstrated through one or more of the four case studies, includes the 
model’s ability to: 
• thoroughly characterize radionuclide sites while other models are limited to 
merely interpreting measured data; 
• effectively process both quantitative and qualitative data, as compared to existing 
models, which are only able to effectively address quantitative data inputs; 
• analyze complex radionuclide data without computational models; and 
• compensate for errant and incomplete data during processing, as opposed to other 
models that generate errant results if the input data is not complete and accurate.  
 
As a result of these features, this model offers many associated benefits.  One benefit of 
the model is that it standardizes the radionuclide analysis process, which enables analysts 
of varying experience levels to normalize their assumptions and comprehensive 
consideration of relevant data.  The primary effect of this benefit is that junior level 
analysts are able to perform senior level analysis to develop meaningful, accurate results.  
Another useful feature of this model is that it enables definitive conclusions to be reached 
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through analysis since it allows for the incorporation of qualitative, “ground truth” data.  
Through this model, radionuclide analysis output that is more comprehensive, accurate, 
and precise can be achieved.  The development of this model represents a meaningful 
advancement in the state of the art. 
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Figure A10:  CA002 Spectrum Collected 23 March 2004 
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Appendix B:  CA002 ATMOSPHERIC RADIONUCLIDE MONITORING REPORTS 
DURING PERIOD IN QUESTION 
                 ATMOSPHERIC RADIONUCLIDE MEASUREMENT REPORT 




Station ID:         CA002               Detector ID:        CAA2                 
Station Type:       ISAR2               Detector Type:                           
 
Station Location: Vancouver, Canada                                  
Detector Description: Detector A in Vancouver, Canada                    
 
Sample ID:             0022595          Sample Geometry:    DISK       
Sample Quantity:      23689.00 m3       Sample Type:        Filter               
 
 
Collection Start:   1997/03/13 18:30    Sampling Time:        24.17 hours 
Collection Stop:    1997/03/14 18:40    Decay Time:            4.26 hours 
Acquisition Start:  1997/03/14 22:55    Acquisition Time:     19.50 hours 
Acquisition Stop:   1997/03/15 18:25    Avg Flow Rate:       980.10 m3/hr     
 
Collection Station Comments: 
goshka - Detector 1 Ranger (14-MAR-1997)  
 
IDC Analysis General Comments: 











Level 1  =  Normal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 2  =  Abnormal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 3  =  Normal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
Level 4  =  Abnormal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
 












Nuclide            Half-Life            Conc(uBq/m3)        %RelErr        
Notes          
 
BE-7               53.3 D                  2.2E+03          2.62 











MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION FOR KEY NUCLIDES======================== 
 
Nuclide            Half-Life               MDC(uBq/m3)          
 
BA-140             12.75 D                     10.29 
CE-143             1.4 D                        8.56 
CS-134             2.06135 Y                    2.88 
CS-136             13.16 D                      2.88 
CS-137             30.0197 Y                    2.92 
I-131              8.04 D                       3.33 
I-133              20.8 H                       6.13 
MO-99              65.94 H                     26.41 
NB-95              35.15 D                      3.10 
RU-103             39.26 D                      2.55 
TE-132             78.2 H                       3.04 
ZR-95              64.02 D                      4.55 
ZR-97              17 H                         7.01 
 
 
PEAK SEARCH RESULTS====================================================== 
 
      36 peaks found in spectrum by automated peak search.   
      34 peaks associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
       2 peaks not associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
      94 percent of peaks were associated with nuclides.     
 
 Note: "*" indicates that a peak was a component of a multiplet. 
 
 Energy   Centroid   Width  FWHM    %Eff    Net Area     %RelErr   Nuclide  Nts      
 
  74.81   102.40 *     17   1.26   10.53     13296.21      1.19     PB-212       
  74.81   102.40 *     17   1.26   10.53     13296.21      1.19     PB-214       
  74.81   102.40 *     17   1.26   10.53     13296.21      1.19     TL-208       
  77.09   105.51 *     17   1.27   10.63     20522.99      1.02     BI-214       
  77.09   105.51 *     17   1.27   10.63     20522.99      1.02     PB-212       
  77.09   105.51 *     17   1.27   10.63     20522.99      1.02     PB-214       
  87.17   119.26 *     18   1.38   10.91      8033.26      1.91     PB-212       
  87.17   119.26 *     18   1.38   10.91      8033.26      1.91     PB-214       
  89.85   122.92 *     18   1.39   10.95      2552.86      3.06     BI-214       
  89.85   122.92 *     18   1.39   10.95      2552.86      3.06     PB-212       
 115.18   157.48       10   1.08   10.90       735.35     18.21     PB-212       
 238.64   325.97       16   1.29    7.94     48152.86      0.69     PB-212       
 252.56   344.97       12   1.50    7.63       218.30     29.65     TL-208       
 277.34   378.79       13   1.27    7.12      1819.45      4.84     TL-208       
 288.22   393.63       13   1.45    6.91       365.60     18.73     BI-212       
 295.20   403.17 *     20   1.29    6.78       304.67     12.08     PB-214       
 300.14   409.90 *     20   1.29    6.70      2613.09      3.76     PB-212       
 327.85   447.73       17   1.10    6.23       141.65     39.76     BI-212       
 351.88   480.54       12   1.63    5.87       506.43     12.69     PB-214       
 376.98   514.79       13   0.91    5.53        83.10     63.96     PB212XR2     
 452.74   618.23        7   1.46    4.69       248.51     19.03     BI-212       
 477.57   652.11       14   1.45    4.46     16754.71      1.17     BE-7         
 510.74   697.40       19   1.82    4.19      5427.17      2.23     TL-208       
 583.15   796.27       16   1.55    3.69     14879.86      1.23     TL-208       
 609.32   832.00       15   1.50    3.54       517.00      9.56     BI-214       
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 632.05   863.05        8   0.94    3.42        38.95     52.01               1  
 727.27   993.07       20   1.65    2.99      3112.30      2.87     BI-212       
 763.17  1042.08        9   1.38    2.85       204.89     16.91     TL-208       
 785.49  1072.57       17   1.50    2.77       427.03      9.83     BI-212       
 785.49  1072.57       17   1.50    2.77       427.03      9.83     BI-214       
 785.49  1072.57       17   1.50    2.77       427.03      9.83     PB-214       
 860.52  1175.04       16   1.75    2.54      1844.78      3.86     TL-208       
 893.42  1219.97        9   1.38    2.45       135.41     21.62     BI-212       
 969.07  1323.30       14   1.37    2.28        75.00     33.43               2  
1078.77  1473.12       16   1.97    2.06       169.47     18.85     BI-212       
1093.75  1493.59       10   1.63    2.04       210.22     15.59     TL-208       
1120.07  1529.55       17   1.89    2.00       104.85     27.66     BI-214       
1460.72  1994.87       17   2.09    1.59      2723.17      3.05     K-40         
1512.82  2066.05        9   1.33    1.55        52.45     34.54     BI-212       
1592.29  2174.60       15   2.31    1.49       422.88      9.31     TL-208       
1620.66  2213.35       13   2.19    1.47       410.39      9.37     BI-212       
1764.53  2409.89       20   3.17    1.38       126.28     22.08     BI-214       
2103.43  2872.81       26   3.34    1.23       697.81      7.06     TL-208       
2614.52  3570.69       24   2.68    1.10      5048.52      2.13     TL-208       
 
 
PEAK SEARCH NOTES===================================================== 
 
NOTE 1: 
Date Entered: 1997/03/17 11:56:53 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/17 11:58:14 
Analyst: dwilliam 







Energy vs. Channel 
 
 E(c) = -0.2407 + 0.733*c - 4.522E-07*c^2 + 7.292E-11*c^3 
 
  E = energy (keV) 
  c = channel number 
 
 
Resolution vs. Energy 
 
 FWHM(E) = 0.89 + 0.03064*SQRT(E) 
 
  FWHM = Full Width Half Max (keV) 
  E = energy (keV) 
 
 
Efficiency vs. Energy 
 
 e(E) = exp { -3.776 + 0.9255*ln(962.1/E) + 0.1003*[ln(962.1/E)]^2 
  - 0.0896*[ln(962.1/E)]^3 }  
 
  e = efficiency (counts/gamma) 
  E = energy (keV) 
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                 ATMOSPHERIC RADIONUCLIDE MEASUREMENT REPORT 




Station ID:         CA002               Detector ID:        CAA2                 
Station Type:       ISAR2               Detector Type:                           
 
Station Location: Vancouver, Canada                                  
Detector Description: Detector A in Vancouver, Canada                    
 
Sample ID:             0022635          Sample Geometry:    DISK       
Sample Quantity:      24461.00 m3       Sample Type:        Filter               
 
 
Collection Start:   1997/03/14 18:41    Sampling Time:        24.95 hours 
Collection Stop:    1997/03/15 19:38    Decay Time:            4.23 hours 
Acquisition Start:  1997/03/15 23:52    Acquisition Time:     19.50 hours 
Acquisition Stop:   1997/03/16 19:22    Avg Flow Rate:       980.40 m3/hr     
 
Collection Station Comments: 
goshka - Detector 1 Ranger (15-MAR-1997)  
 
IDC Analysis General Comments: 
This spectrum contains the following activation products: Bi-204, Po-206, 
Po-207 and At-209. These nuclides have contributed to the net peak areas 
associated with AC-228 in this spectrum; therefore, the presence of AC-228 is 
overestimated. A potential source of their injection is a medical facility 
(accelerator) near the IMS station. Leonid Vladimirski 3/20/97  
 
I-123 is present in this spectrum and is seen at this site on occasion.  
 











Level 1  =  Normal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 2  =  Abnormal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 3  =  Normal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
Level 4  =  Abnormal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
 




Name       Category   Categorization Comment 
----       --------   ---------------------- 














Nuclide            Half-Life            Conc(uBq/m3)        %RelErr        
Notes          
 
BE-7               53.3 D                  2.5E+03          2.58 










MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION FOR KEY NUCLIDES======================== 
 
Nuclide            Half-Life               MDC(uBq/m3)          
 
BA-140             12.75 D                     12.32 
CE-143             1.4 D                        9.34 
CS-134             2.06135 Y                    3.18 
CS-136             13.16 D                      3.30 
CS-137             30.0197 Y                    3.50 
I-131              8.04 D                       3.80 
I-133              20.8 H                       7.27 
MO-99              65.94 H                     33.81 
NB-95              35.15 D                      3.47 
RU-103             39.26 D                      2.99 
TE-132             78.2 H                       3.38 
ZR-95              64.02 D                      5.35 
ZR-97              17 H                         6.85 
 
 
PEAK SEARCH RESULTS====================================================== 
 
      55 peaks found in spectrum by automated peak search.   
      45 peaks associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
      10 peaks not associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
      82 percent of peaks were associated with nuclides.     
 
 Note: "*" indicates that a peak was a component of a multiplet. 
 
 Energy   Centroid   Width  FWHM    %Eff    Net Area     %RelErr   Nuclide  Nts      
 
  74.85   102.39 *     17   1.26   10.53     17979.61      1.03     PB-212       
  74.85   102.39 *     17   1.26   10.53     17979.61      1.03     PB-214       
  74.85   102.39 *     17   1.26   10.53     17979.61      1.03     TL-208       
  77.13   105.50 *     17   1.26   10.63     26988.13      0.89     BI-214       
  77.13   105.50 *     17   1.26   10.63     26988.13      0.89     PB-212       
  77.13   105.50 *     17   1.26   10.63     26988.13      0.89     PB-214       
  84.93   116.14 *     19   1.36   10.86       662.79     10.14     TL-208       
  87.23   119.28 *     19   1.36   10.91      9953.69      1.74     PB-212       
  87.23   119.28 *     19   1.36   10.91      9953.69      1.74     PB-214       
  89.93   122.97 *     19   1.37   10.95      3353.40      2.69     AC-228       
  89.93   122.97 *     19   1.37   10.95      3353.40      2.69     BI-214       
  89.93   122.97 *     19   1.37   10.95      3353.40      2.69     PB-212       
 115.24   157.50       10   0.93   10.90       696.16     38.34     PB-212       
 159.04   217.28       13   1.19    9.95      1429.38      7.44     I-123     1  
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 159.04   217.28       13   1.19    9.95      1429.38      7.44     TE-123M   2  
 238.65   325.95       16   1.29    7.94     57815.91      0.63     PB-212       
 269.85   368.54       11   0.36    7.27     27917.27      0.64     AC-228    3  
 277.35   378.78       13   1.40    7.12      2104.42      4.78     TL-208       
 287.42   392.52       13   3.20    6.93       929.41     12.02     BI-212    4  
 295.39   403.39 *     20   1.33    6.78       200.90     19.80     PB-214       
 300.12   409.86 *     20   1.34    6.70      3174.46      3.49     PB-212       
 328.09   448.04       13   1.43    6.23       221.61     27.99     AC-228       
 328.09   448.04       13   1.43    6.23       221.61     27.99     BI-212       
 338.42   462.13       13   1.63    6.07       490.44     14.67     AC-228    5  
 351.90   480.53       10   1.53    5.87       508.99     13.79     PB-214       
 374.81   511.81       14   1.48    5.56      1773.45      4.99     PB212XR1  6  
 452.74   618.20       14   1.52    4.69       307.36     18.02     BI-212       
 477.56   652.07       18   1.46    4.46     19755.57      1.08     AC-228       
 477.56   652.07       18   1.46    4.46     19755.57      1.08     BE-7         
 510.79   697.44       17   1.79    4.19      6572.18      2.04     TL-208       
 522.45   713.36        9   1.75    4.10       229.87     22.47     AC-228    7  
 545.10   744.28        7   1.58    3.94       270.94     17.80               8  
 583.15   796.22       19   1.55    3.69     17731.93      1.13     AC-228       
 583.15   796.22       19   1.55    3.69     17731.93      1.13     TL-208       
 609.32   831.96       13   1.57    3.54       473.48     11.09     BI-214       
 670.28   915.19       12   1.89    3.23       152.36     28.83     TL208XR4  9  
 727.28   993.01       10   1.65    2.99      3714.63      2.67     AC-228       
 727.28   993.01       10   1.65    2.99      3714.63      2.67     BI-212       
 742.76  1014.15       12   1.89    2.93       186.64     21.73     BI-214   10  
 742.76  1014.15       12   1.89    2.93       186.64     21.73     ZR-97    11  
 763.20  1042.05        9   1.47    2.85       236.37     17.12     TL-208       
 781.85  1067.51 *     21   1.77    2.79       184.92     13.68     AC-228   12  
 785.50  1072.50 *     21   1.77    2.77       507.90      8.64     BI-212       
 785.50  1072.50 *     21   1.77    2.77       507.90      8.64     BI-214       
 785.50  1072.50 *     21   1.77    2.77       507.90      8.64     PB-214       
 790.30  1079.05 *     21   1.78    2.76       172.50     14.01              13  
 803.06  1096.48 *     22   1.48    2.72       125.42     19.47     UNKNAT01     
 807.50  1102.53 *     22   1.49    2.70       209.05     16.19              14  
 860.52  1174.94       12   1.73    2.54      2227.36      3.53     TL-208       
 884.00  1206.99       14   1.61    2.48        94.09     33.66              15  
 893.51  1219.98 *     16   1.75    2.45       162.74     13.32     BI-212       
 899.12  1227.64 *     16   1.76    2.44       921.77      6.18              16  
 911.56  1244.62 *     17   2.01    2.41       450.13     10.06     AC-228   17  
 918.27  1253.79 *     17   2.01    2.39       101.14     20.46              18  
 951.03  1298.52       12   3.17    2.32       102.18     28.21              19  
 969.29  1323.45        8   0.54    2.27        43.84    403.74     AC-228       
 983.93  1343.45       14   1.95    2.24       480.85      9.58              20  
 992.39  1355.00       13   1.67    2.23       277.76     13.87              21  
1032.39  1409.62       10   1.81    2.15       236.46     16.04              22  
1078.93  1473.17       12   1.86    2.06       215.72     16.63     BI-212       
1093.74  1493.39       15   2.17    2.04       337.15     12.28     TL-208       
1120.53  1529.98       14   1.03    1.99        67.77     28.15     BI-214       
1368.50  1868.62       16   1.32    1.68        79.62     30.88     NA-24        
1460.88  1994.79       16   2.13    1.59      2588.85      3.22     K-40         
1512.68  2065.53       14   2.76    1.55       157.60     19.91     BI-212       
1592.76  2174.90       12   2.14    1.49       455.27      9.02     TL-208       
1620.82  2213.23       17   2.22    1.47       501.89      8.52     BI-212       
1764.57  2409.58       16   2.50    1.38       108.96     25.38     BI-214       
2103.57  2872.62       23   3.39    1.23       827.65      6.46     TL-208       
2614.48  3570.48       13   2.67    1.10      6157.97      1.89     TL-208       
 
 
PEAK SEARCH NOTES===================================================== 
 
NOTE 1: 
Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:17:06 
Analyst: dwilliam 
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Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:16:20 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This nuclide was removed from the Activity Summary section because in the 
analyst's judgment the nuclide was not present; some nuclides may be removed 
because their activity calculations are not meaningful (they are identified, 
not quantified).  
 
Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:16:53 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:48:23 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak may be associated with the 270.0 keV gamma line of Po-204 and the 





Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:42:52 
Analyst: dwilliam 
The actual centroid of this peak appears to be slightly different than the 
centroid calculated by the automated spectral processing application. 





Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:44:34 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak may be associated with the 338.4 keV gamma line of Po-206 and the 





Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:51:35 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:46:01 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak may be associated with the 522.4 keV gamma line of Po-206 and the 





Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:30:27 
Analyst: dwilliam 






Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:52:38 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:20:31 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:18:40 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This nuclide was removed from the Activity Summary section because in the 
analyst's judgment the nuclide was not present; some nuclides may be removed 
because their activity calculations are not meaningful (they are identified, 
not quantified).  
 
Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:20:31 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:35:29 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak may be associated with the 781.9 keV gamma line of At-209 and the 





Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:36:19 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:46:44 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:49:30 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:53:05 
Analyst: dwilliam 






Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:27:18 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak is likely associated with the 911.2 keV gamma line of Ac-228, the 





Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:53:40 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:56:02 
Analyst: dwilliam 
The actual centroid of this peak appears to be slightly different than the 
centroid calculated by the automated spectral processing application. 





Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:54:06 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:28:53 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/19 17:47:14 
Analyst: dwilliam 







Energy vs. Channel 
 
 E(c) = -0.169 + 0.7328*c - 2.024E-07*c^2 + 2.111E-11*c^3 
 
  E = energy (keV) 
  c = channel number 
 
 
Resolution vs. Energy 
 
 FWHM(E) = 0.89 + 0.03064*SQRT(E) 
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  FWHM = Full Width Half Max (keV) 
  E = energy (keV) 
 
 
Efficiency vs. Energy 
 
 e(E) = exp { -3.776 + 0.9255*ln(962.1/E) + 0.1003*[ln(962.1/E)]^2 
  - 0.0896*[ln(962.1/E)]^3 }  
 
  e = efficiency (counts/gamma) 




                 ATMOSPHERIC RADIONUCLIDE MEASUREMENT REPORT 




Station ID:         CA002               Detector ID:        CAA2                 
Station Type:       ISAR2               Detector Type:                           
 
Station Location: Vancouver, Canada                                  
Detector Description: Detector A in Vancouver, Canada                    
 
Sample ID:             0022677          Sample Geometry:    DISK       
Sample Quantity:      21661.00 m3       Sample Type:        Filter               
 
 
Collection Start:   1997/03/15 19:40    Sampling Time:        23.83 hours 
Collection Stop:    1997/03/16 19:30    Decay Time:            4.25 hours 
Acquisition Start:  1997/03/16 23:44    Acquisition Time:     19.50 hours 
Acquisition Stop:   1997/03/17 19:14    Avg Flow Rate:       908.98 m3/hr     
 
Collection Station Comments: 
goshka - Detector 1 Ranger (16-MAR-1997)  
 
IDC Analysis General Comments: 











Level 1  =  Normal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 2  =  Abnormal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 3  =  Normal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
Level 4  =  Abnormal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
 












Nuclide            Half-Life            Conc(uBq/m3)        %RelErr        
Notes          
 
BE-7               53.3 D                  2.1E+03          2.65 











MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION FOR KEY NUCLIDES======================== 
 
Nuclide            Half-Life               MDC(uBq/m3)          
 
BA-140             12.75 D                     10.54 
CE-143             1.4 D                        8.40 
CS-134             2.06135 Y                    2.99 
CS-136             13.16 D                      2.96 
CS-137             30.0197 Y                    3.01 
I-131              8.04 D                       3.27 
I-133              20.8 H                       6.08 
MO-99              65.94 H                     26.13 
NB-95              35.15 D                      2.97 
RU-103             39.26 D                      2.59 
TE-132             78.2 H                       2.90 
ZR-95              64.02 D                      4.71 
ZR-97              17 H                         7.21 
 
 
PEAK SEARCH RESULTS====================================================== 
 
      36 peaks found in spectrum by automated peak search.   
      35 peaks associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
       1 peaks not associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
      97 percent of peaks were associated with nuclides.     
 
 Note: "*" indicates that a peak was a component of a multiplet. 
 
 Energy   Centroid   Width  FWHM    %Eff    Net Area     %RelErr   Nuclide  Nts      
 
  74.84   102.36 *     17   1.27   10.53      8740.16      1.49     PB-212       
  74.84   102.36 *     17   1.27   10.53      8740.16      1.49     PB-214       
  74.84   102.36 *     17   1.27   10.53      8740.16      1.49     TL-208       
  77.14   105.50 *     17   1.27   10.63     13070.77      1.29     BI-214       
  77.14   105.50 *     17   1.27   10.63     13070.77      1.29     PB-212       
  77.14   105.50 *     17   1.27   10.63     13070.77      1.29     PB-214       
  87.20   119.23 *     18   1.41   10.91      5004.23      2.50     PB-212       
  87.20   119.23 *     18   1.41   10.91      5004.23      2.50     PB-214       
  89.89   122.90 *     18   1.42   10.95      1637.66      3.99     AC-228       
  89.89   122.90 *     18   1.42   10.95      1637.66      3.99     BI-214       
  89.89   122.90 *     18   1.42   10.95      1637.66      3.99     PB-212       
 115.23   157.48       10   0.62   10.90       399.59    123.48     PB-212       
 238.65   325.96       14   1.30    7.94     31101.53      0.87     PB-212       
 277.40   378.86       13   1.36    7.12      1158.33      6.53     TL-208       
 287.79   393.04        8   1.99    6.92       269.23     24.94     BI-212       
 295.19   403.15 *     16   1.26    6.78       250.80     13.16     PB-214       
 300.11   409.86 *     16   1.27    6.70      1596.01      5.03     PB-212       
 338.21   461.87       12   1.39    6.07       155.55     31.04     AC-228       
 351.91   480.58       10   1.30    5.87       465.74     12.62     PB-214       
 452.96   618.53       12   1.26    4.69       147.77     29.53     BI-212       
 477.54   652.09       15   1.48    4.46     14626.85      1.25     BE-7         
 510.73   697.40       19   1.84    4.19      3648.85      2.79     TL-208       
 569.33   777.41       13   0.53    3.78        95.24    226.93               1  
 583.12   796.25       15   1.53    3.69      9445.24      1.58     AC-228       
 583.12   796.25       15   1.53    3.69      9445.24      1.58     TL-208       
 609.16   831.79       14   1.70    3.54       423.55     10.99     BI-214       
 727.25   993.03       15   1.63    2.99      1932.37      3.75     AC-228       
 727.25   993.03       15   1.63    2.99      1932.37      3.75     BI-212       
 763.06  1041.93        8   1.86    2.85       152.27     21.13     TL-208       
 785.49  1072.56       17   1.71    2.77       306.18     12.50     BI-212       
 261
 785.49  1072.56       17   1.71    2.77       306.18     12.50     BI-214       
 785.49  1072.56       17   1.71    2.77       306.18     12.50     PB-214       
 860.49  1174.97       13   1.62    2.54      1185.05      5.12     TL-208       
 911.36  1244.43       13   1.85    2.41       132.48     21.59     AC-228       
 952.14  1300.12       16   1.42    2.31        62.18     36.07     BI-212       
 969.22  1323.44        7   0.96    2.28        44.04    109.99     AC-228       
1078.90  1473.22        9   2.26    2.06        98.25     30.44     BI-212       
1093.64  1493.34       17   1.80    2.04       154.30     18.76     TL-208       
1120.44  1529.95       11   1.28    1.99        64.64     32.35     BI-214       
1368.50  1868.71       11   1.57    1.68        47.37     40.15     NA-24        
1460.86  1994.86       14   2.07    1.59      2607.43      3.11     K-40         
1512.98  2066.04       10   2.11    1.55        61.35     33.31     BI-212       
1592.55  2174.71       14   2.10    1.49       251.63     12.57     TL-208       
1620.77  2213.25       14   1.89    1.47       267.80     11.55     BI-212       
1764.31  2409.30       10   1.43    1.38        55.40     35.02     BI-214       
2103.45  2872.51       23   3.42    1.23       421.47      9.31     TL-208       
2614.52  3570.53       22   2.65    1.10      3160.19      2.74     TL-208       
 
 
PEAK SEARCH NOTES===================================================== 
 
NOTE 1: 
Date Entered: 1997/03/20 09:21:43 
Analyst: dwilliam 







Energy vs. Channel 
 
 E(c) = -0.1532 + 0.7327*c - 1.764E-07*c^2 + 2.041E-11*c^3 
 
  E = energy (keV) 
  c = channel number 
 
 
Resolution vs. Energy 
 
 FWHM(E) = 0.89 + 0.03064*SQRT(E) 
 
  FWHM = Full Width Half Max (keV) 
  E = energy (keV) 
 
 
Efficiency vs. Energy 
 
 e(E) = exp { -3.776 + 0.9255*ln(962.1/E) + 0.1003*[ln(962.1/E)]^2 
  - 0.0896*[ln(962.1/E)]^3 }  
 
  e = efficiency (counts/gamma) 





                 ATMOSPHERIC RADIONUCLIDE MEASUREMENT REPORT 




Station ID:         CA002               Detector ID:        CAA2                 
Station Type:       ISAR2               Detector Type:                           
 
Station Location: Vancouver, Canada                                  
Detector Description: Detector A in Vancouver, Canada                    
 
Sample ID:             0022792          Sample Geometry:    DISK       
Sample Quantity:      23572.00 m3       Sample Type:        Filter               
 
 
Collection Start:   1997/03/16 19:31    Sampling Time:        24.16 hours 
Collection Stop:    1997/03/17 19:41    Decay Time:            4.27 hours 
Acquisition Start:  1997/03/17 23:57    Acquisition Time:     19.50 hours 
Acquisition Stop:   1997/03/18 19:27    Avg Flow Rate:       975.66 m3/hr     
 
Collection Station Comments: 
goshka - Detector 1 Ranger (17-MAR-1997)  
 
IDC Analysis General Comments: 
This spectrum contains the following activation products: Bi-204, Bi-206, 
Po-206, Po-207 and At-209. These nuclides have contributed to the net peak 
areas associated with AC-228 in this spectrum; therefore, the presence of 
AC-228 is overestimated. A potential source of their injection is a medical 
facility (accelerator) near the IMS station. Leonid Vladimirski 3/20/97  
 
I-123 is present in this spectrum and is seen at this site on occasion.  
 











Level 1  =  Normal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 2  =  Abnormal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 3  =  Normal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
Level 4  =  Abnormal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
 




Name       Category   Categorization Comment 
----       --------   ---------------------- 














Nuclide            Half-Life            Conc(uBq/m3)        %RelErr        
Notes          
 
BE-7               53.3 D                  3.8E+03          2.51 










MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION FOR KEY NUCLIDES======================== 
 
Nuclide            Half-Life               MDC(uBq/m3)          
 
BA-140             12.75 D                      7.27 
CE-143             1.4 D                        9.36 
CS-134             2.06135 Y                    3.03 
CS-136             13.16 D                      3.09 
CS-137             30.0197 Y                    3.27 
I-131              8.04 D                       3.48 
I-133              20.8 H                       6.34 
MO-99              65.94 H                     31.82 
NB-95              35.15 D                      3.17 
RU-103             39.26 D                      2.64 
TE-132             78.2 H                       3.12 
ZR-95              64.02 D                      5.05 
ZR-97              17 H                         6.50 
 
 
PEAK SEARCH RESULTS====================================================== 
 
      48 peaks found in spectrum by automated peak search.   
      38 peaks associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
      10 peaks not associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
      79 percent of peaks were associated with nuclides.     
 
 Note: "*" indicates that a peak was a component of a multiplet. 
 
 Energy   Centroid   Width  FWHM    %Eff    Net Area     %RelErr   Nuclide  Nts      
 
  74.85   102.42 *     16   1.26   10.53     11885.74      1.29     PB-212       
  74.85   102.42 *     16   1.26   10.53     11885.74      1.29     PB-214       
  74.85   102.42 *     16   1.26   10.53     11885.74      1.29     TL-208       
  77.11   105.50 *     16   1.26   10.63     16855.96      1.14     BI-214       
  77.11   105.50 *     16   1.26   10.63     16855.96      1.14     PB-212       
  77.11   105.50 *     16   1.26   10.63     16855.96      1.14     PB-214       
  84.86   116.07 *     19   1.35   10.86       746.13      7.71     TH-228       
  84.86   116.07 *     19   1.35   10.86       746.13      7.71     TL-208       
  87.21   119.29 *     19   1.35   10.91      6763.09      2.11     PB-212       
  87.21   119.29 *     19   1.35   10.91      6763.09      2.11     PB-214       
  89.86   122.90 *     19   1.35   10.95      2206.79      3.35     AC-228       
  89.86   122.90 *     19   1.35   10.95      2206.79      3.35     BI-214       
  89.86   122.90 *     19   1.35   10.95      2206.79      3.35     PB-212       
 115.23   157.52       12   0.86   10.90       429.60     82.20     PB-212       
 264
 140.26   191.69       14   0.75   10.42       232.96    168.87     GE-75M       
 140.26   191.69       14   0.75   10.42       232.96    168.87     TC-99M    1  
 159.09   217.38        7   1.03    9.95       583.03     21.43     I-123     2  
 159.09   217.38        7   1.03    9.95       583.03     21.43     TE-123M   3  
 238.65   325.96       16   1.31    7.94     35182.75      0.82     PB-212       
 277.37   378.81       12   1.35    7.12      1272.28      6.72     TL-208       
 286.50   391.28       13   1.53    6.94       764.75     10.70               4  
 295.16   403.10 *     20   1.30    6.79       226.64     17.13     PB-214       
 300.09   409.83 *     20   1.31    6.70      1871.05      4.93     PB-212       
 311.60   425.54        7   0.52    6.50       201.67    223.06               5  
 338.45   462.19       13   1.31    6.07       589.65     11.02     AC-228    6  
 351.80   480.42       13   1.46    5.87       426.27     14.82     PB-214       
 374.74   511.73       13   1.41    5.56      1426.52      5.52     PB212XR1  7  
 452.91   618.44        9   1.12    4.69       143.77     40.73     BI-212       
 477.57   652.09       14   1.46    4.46     28327.91      0.89     AC-228       
 477.57   652.09       14   1.46    4.46     28327.91      0.89     BE-7         
 510.83   697.51 *     35   1.93    4.19      4454.38      2.50     TL-208       
 516.24   704.89 *     35   1.14    4.15        88.96     21.47               8  
 522.42   713.33 *     35   1.15    4.10       205.44     11.21     AC-228    9  
 537.49   733.91        8   1.14    3.99        93.60     31.96     BA-140   10  
 583.14   796.22       19   1.54    3.69     10827.94      1.47     AC-228       
 583.14   796.22       19   1.54    3.69     10827.94      1.47     TL-208       
 609.23   831.84       15   1.83    3.54       445.31     11.54     BI-214       
 727.25   992.99       19   1.59    2.99      2217.60      3.56     AC-228       
 727.25   992.99       19   1.59    2.99      2217.60      3.56     BI-212       
 742.59  1013.93       14   1.51    2.93       112.27     29.70     BI-214   11  
 742.59  1013.93       14   1.51    2.93       112.27     29.70     ZR-97    12  
 763.26  1042.15       13   1.66    2.85       173.36     21.15     TL-208       
 785.60  1072.65       10   1.70    2.77       273.07     15.08     BI-212       
 785.60  1072.65       10   1.70    2.77       273.07     15.08     BI-214       
 785.60  1072.65       10   1.70    2.77       273.07     15.08     PB-214       
 803.03  1096.46 *     18   1.72    2.72       199.60     13.16     UNKNAT01 13  
 807.48  1102.53 *     18   1.72    2.70       305.91     11.26              14  
 860.55  1175.00       17   1.81    2.54      1368.15      4.77     TL-208       
 881.05  1202.99       16   1.39    2.49       115.16     25.38              15  
 899.22  1227.80       14   1.66    2.44       789.10      6.78              16  
 911.78  1244.95 *     20   1.83    2.41       356.75     11.01     AC-228   17  
 918.29  1253.84 *     20   1.84    2.39       114.63     17.69              18  
 968.80  1322.81       10   1.38    2.28        60.72     41.06     AC-228       
 983.80  1343.31 *     25   1.91    2.24       360.93     10.09              19  
 992.07  1354.60 *     25   1.92    2.23       243.15     11.59              20  
1032.35  1409.61       10   1.96    2.15       347.62     11.52              21  
1093.73  1493.42       13   2.05    2.04       182.09     18.25     TL-208       
1120.15  1529.50       13   1.49    2.00        93.63     29.68     BI-214       
1460.84  1994.81       11   2.04    1.59      2739.09      3.02     K-40         
1512.64  2065.56       13   2.19    1.55        78.22     30.20     BI-212       
1592.50  2174.64       10   2.03    1.49       263.97     12.17     TL-208       
1620.83  2213.33       13   2.12    1.47       270.45     11.93     BI-212       
2103.59  2872.73       21   3.21    1.23       456.23      9.01     TL-208       
2614.49  3570.53       22   2.67    1.10      3617.52      2.51     TL-208       
 
 
PEAK SEARCH NOTES===================================================== 
 
NOTE 1: 
Date Entered: 1997/03/20 10:05:08 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This nuclide was removed from the Activity Summary section because in the 
analyst's judgment the nuclide was not present; some nuclides may be removed 
because their activity calculations are not meaningful (they are identified, 
not quantified).  
 
Date Entered: 1997/03/20 10:06:41 
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Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 09:34:40 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 09:31:55 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This nuclide was removed from the Activity Summary section because in the 
analyst's judgment the nuclide was not present; some nuclides may be removed 
because their activity calculations are not meaningful (they are identified, 
not quantified).  
 
Date Entered: 1997/03/20 09:33:48 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 09:56:09 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 09:57:23 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 09:58:00 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak may be associated with the 338.4 keV gamma line of Po-206 and the 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 09:48:37 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 09:52:48 
Analyst: dwilliam 






Date Entered: 1997/03/20 10:00:39 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak is likely associated with the 522.4 keV gamma line of Po-206 and may 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 09:53:16 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak may be associated with the 537.4 keV gamma line of Bi-206.  
 
Date Entered: 1997/03/20 10:07:21 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This nuclide was removed from the Activity Summary section because in the 
analyst's judgment the nuclide was not present; some nuclides may be removed 
because their activity calculations are not meaningful (they are identified, 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 10:04:40 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 10:04:16 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This nuclide was removed from the Activity Summary section because in the 
analyst's judgment the nuclide was not present; some nuclides may be removed 
because their activity calculations are not meaningful (they are identified, 
not quantified).  
 
Date Entered: 1997/03/20 10:04:40 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 09:54:01 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 10:01:30 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 09:54:30 
Analyst: dwilliam 






Date Entered: 1997/03/20 09:49:20 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 09:50:29 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak is likely associated with the 911.2 keV gamma line of Ac-228, the 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 09:50:49 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 09:51:27 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 10:03:41 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 10:02:10 
Analyst: dwilliam 







Energy vs. Channel 
 
 E(c) = -0.2001 + 0.7328*c - 2.733E-07*c^2 + 3.489E-11*c^3 
 
  E = energy (keV) 
  c = channel number 
 
 
Resolution vs. Energy 
 
 FWHM(E) = 0.89 + 0.03064*SQRT(E) 
 
  FWHM = Full Width Half Max (keV) 
  E = energy (keV) 
 
 
Efficiency vs. Energy 
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 e(E) = exp { -3.776 + 0.9255*ln(962.1/E) + 0.1003*[ln(962.1/E)]^2 
  - 0.0896*[ln(962.1/E)]^3 }  
 
  e = efficiency (counts/gamma) 





                 ATMOSPHERIC RADIONUCLIDE MEASUREMENT REPORT 




Station ID:         CA002               Detector ID:        CAA2                 
Station Type:       ISAR2               Detector Type:                           
 
Station Location: Vancouver, Canada                                  
Detector Description: Detector A in Vancouver, Canada                    
 
Sample ID:             0022872          Sample Geometry:    DISK       
Sample Quantity:      22735.00 m3       Sample Type:        Filter               
 
 
Collection Start:   1997/03/17 19:45    Sampling Time:        23.78 hours 
Collection Stop:    1997/03/18 19:32    Decay Time:            4.24 hours 
Acquisition Start:  1997/03/18 23:46    Acquisition Time:     18.21 hours 
Acquisition Stop:   1997/03/19 17:59    Avg Flow Rate:       956.06 m3/hr     
 
Collection Station Comments: 
goshka - Detector 1 Ranger (18-MAR-1997)  
 
IDC Analysis General Comments: 
This spectrum contains the following activation products: Bi-204, Bi-206 
(weak), Po-206 (weak), Po-207 and At-209. A potential source of their injection 
is a medical facility (accelerator) near the IMS station. Leonid Vladimirski. 
03/20/97.  
 
I-123 is present in this spectrum and is seen at this site on occasion.  
 











Level 1  =  Normal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 2  =  Abnormal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 3  =  Normal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
Level 4  =  Abnormal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
 




Name       Category   Categorization Comment 
----       --------   ---------------------- 













Nuclide            Half-Life            Conc(uBq/m3)        %RelErr        
Notes          
 
BE-7               53.3 D                  3.5E+03          2.54 










MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION FOR KEY NUCLIDES======================== 
 
Nuclide            Half-Life               MDC(uBq/m3)          
 
BA-140             12.75 D                      9.96 
CE-143             1.4 D                        9.00 
CS-134             2.06135 Y                    2.97 
CS-136             13.16 D                      3.05 
CS-137             30.0197 Y                    3.07 
I-131              8.04 D                       3.25 
I-133              20.8 H                       6.07 
MO-99              65.94 H                     29.57 
NB-95              35.15 D                      3.00 
RU-103             39.26 D                      2.51 
TE-132             78.2 H                       2.91 
ZR-95              64.02 D                      4.83 
ZR-97              17 H                         7.78 
 
 
PEAK SEARCH RESULTS====================================================== 
 
      41 peaks found in spectrum by automated peak search.   
      31 peaks associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
      10 peaks not associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
      76 percent of peaks were associated with nuclides.     
 
 Note: "*" indicates that a peak was a component of a multiplet. 
 
 Energy   Centroid   Width  FWHM    %Eff    Net Area     %RelErr   Nuclide  Nts      
 
  74.87   102.38 *     17   1.29   10.53      6193.22      1.82     PB-212       
  74.87   102.38 *     17   1.29   10.53      6193.22      1.82     PB-214       
  74.87   102.38 *     17   1.29   10.53      6193.22      1.82     TL-208       
  77.15   105.49 *     17   1.29   10.63      9413.60      1.56     BI-214       
  77.15   105.49 *     17   1.29   10.63      9413.60      1.56     PB-212       
  77.15   105.49 *     17   1.29   10.63      9413.60      1.56     PB-214       
  87.22   119.25 *     22   1.30   10.91      3409.03      3.15     PB-212       
  87.22   119.25 *     22   1.30   10.91      3409.03      3.15     PB-214       
  89.91   122.92 *     22   1.31   10.95      1255.25      4.75     BI-214       
  89.91   122.92 *     22   1.31   10.95      1255.25      4.75     PB-212       
  93.02   127.16 *     22   1.31   10.98       187.88     20.69               1  
 115.10   157.30        9   1.24   10.90       302.47     24.98     PB-212       
 159.06   217.31       15   1.23    9.95      3600.22      3.19     I-123     2  
 159.06   217.31       15   1.23    9.95      3600.22      3.19     TE-123M   3  
 238.66   325.95       16   1.32    7.94     19746.24      1.11     PB-212       
 277.44   378.89       14   1.44    7.12       852.71      8.58     TL-208       
 295.32   403.30 *     16   1.32    6.78       206.25     17.28     PB-214       
 271
 300.12   409.86 *     16   1.32    6.70      1053.46      7.13     PB-212       
 338.42   462.14        7   1.25    6.07       181.26     25.21               4  
 351.97   480.64       12   1.59    5.87       436.45     13.11     PB-214       
 374.76   511.75       15   1.54    5.56       563.86     10.46     PB212XR1  5  
 477.56   652.10       14   1.47    4.46     23591.65      0.97     BE-7         
 510.78   697.45       19   2.03    4.19      2761.60      3.28     TL-208       
 544.95   744.11       11   1.57    3.94       181.61     21.43               6  
 583.13   796.23       15   1.54    3.69      5977.21      2.00     TL-208       
 609.26   831.90        9   1.75    3.54       408.48     11.36     BI-214       
 727.25   993.00       10   1.63    2.99      1344.73      4.76     BI-212       
 763.12  1041.99       10   1.78    2.85       103.86     29.46     TL-208       
 781.85  1067.56 *     26   1.83    2.79       147.54     14.97               7  
 785.52  1072.57 *     26   1.83    2.77       216.93     12.69     BI-212       
 785.52  1072.57 *     26   1.83    2.77       216.93     12.69     BI-214       
 785.52  1072.57 *     26   1.83    2.77       216.93     12.69     PB-214       
 790.23  1079.00 *     26   1.83    2.76       140.11     14.63               8  
 839.70  1146.55        6   0.45    2.60     33074.20      0.01     PB-214       
 860.58  1175.07        9   1.76    2.54       782.97      6.71     TL-208       
 899.15  1227.73       15   1.77    2.44       320.35     11.89               9  
 911.45  1244.53       13   2.05    2.41       214.52     16.55              10  
 984.05  1343.66        9   2.00    2.24       143.70     20.40              11  
 992.38  1355.05       18   1.09    2.23        81.40     23.53              12  
1094.09  1493.94       11   1.51    2.04        77.21     30.45     TL-208       
1119.92  1529.22        7   1.52    2.00        73.53     30.46     BI-214       
1368.45  1868.63       10   1.68    1.68        51.22     38.30     NA-24        
1460.85  1994.83       15   2.10    1.59      2532.16      3.17     K-40         
1512.74  2065.69       10   1.85    1.55        68.37     27.60     BI-212       
1592.44  2174.54       12   2.08    1.49       160.25     15.95     TL-208       
1620.67  2213.10        9   2.03    1.47       145.14     16.90     BI-212       
1718.30  2346.45        6   0.57    1.41        21.35     28.48              13  
1764.54  2409.60       11   2.14    1.38        83.74     24.01     BI-214       
2103.54  2872.63       16   3.25    1.23       252.73     12.33     TL-208       
2614.50  3570.50       13   2.64    1.10      1982.01      3.48     TL-208       
 
 
PEAK SEARCH NOTES===================================================== 
 
NOTE 1: 
Date Entered: 1997/03/20 15:24:25 
Analyst: dwilliam 
Many radionuclides emit gamma rays with energies similar to this one. 
Therefore, this peak may be due to natural radiation or one of the noted 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 10:29:12 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 10:28:59 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This nuclide was removed from the Activity Summary section because in the 
analyst's judgment the nuclide was not present; some nuclides may be removed 
because their activity calculations are not meaningful (they are identified, 
not quantified).  
 
Date Entered: 1997/03/20 10:29:40 
Analyst: dwilliam 
 272





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 14:40:30 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 14:32:00 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 14:44:06 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 14:45:02 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 14:47:53 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 14:32:42 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 14:36:46 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak is likely associated with the 911.8 keV gamma line of Bi-204. It may 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 14:37:47 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 14:43:26 
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Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 14:48:22 
Analyst: dwilliam 







Energy vs. Channel 
 
 E(c) = -0.1455 + 0.7327*c - 1.946E-07*c^2 + 2.317E-11*c^3 
 
  E = energy (keV) 
  c = channel number 
 
 
Resolution vs. Energy 
 
 FWHM(E) = 0.89 + 0.03064*SQRT(E) 
 
  FWHM = Full Width Half Max (keV) 
  E = energy (keV) 
 
 
Efficiency vs. Energy 
 
 e(E) = exp { -3.776 + 0.9255*ln(962.1/E) + 0.1003*[ln(962.1/E)]^2 
  - 0.0896*[ln(962.1/E)]^3 }  
 
  e = efficiency (counts/gamma) 





                 ATMOSPHERIC RADIONUCLIDE MEASUREMENT REPORT 




Station ID:         CA002               Detector ID:        CAA2                 
Station Type:       ISAR2               Detector Type:                           
 
Station Location: Vancouver, Canada                                  
Detector Description: Detector A in Vancouver, Canada                    
 
Sample ID:             0022910          Sample Geometry:    DISK       
Sample Quantity:      21336.00 m3       Sample Type:        Filter               
 
 
Collection Start:   1997/03/18 19:35    Sampling Time:        22.42 hours 
Collection Stop:    1997/03/19 18:00    Decay Time:            4.26 hours 
Acquisition Start:  1997/03/19 22:15    Acquisition Time:     19.50 hours 
Acquisition Stop:   1997/03/20 17:45    Avg Flow Rate:       951.65 m3/hr     
 
Collection Station Comments: 
goshka - Detector 1 Ranger (19-MAR-1997)  
 
IDC Analysis General Comments: 
This spectrum contains the following activation products: Bi-203, Bi-204, 
Po-204, Bi-206, Po-206, Po-207 and At-209. A potential source of their 
injection is a medical facility (accelerator) near the IMS station. Leonid 
Vladimirski. 03/20/97.  
 
I-123 is present in this spectrum and is seen at this site on occasion.  
 











Level 1  =  Normal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 2  =  Abnormal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 3  =  Normal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
Level 4  =  Abnormal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
 




Name       Category   Categorization Comment 
----       --------   ---------------------- 














Nuclide            Half-Life            Conc(uBq/m3)        %RelErr        
Notes          
 
BE-7               53.3 D                  1.1E+03          2.96 










MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION FOR KEY NUCLIDES======================== 
 
Nuclide            Half-Life               MDC(uBq/m3)          
 
BA-140             12.75 D                     11.52 
CE-143             1.4 D                        7.99 
CS-134             2.06135 Y                    3.21 
CS-136             13.16 D                      3.46 
CS-137             30.0197 Y                    3.59 
I-131              8.04 D                       3.18 
I-133              20.8 H                       6.52 
MO-99              65.94 H                     35.32 
NB-95              35.15 D                      3.34 
RU-103             39.26 D                      2.74 
TE-132             78.2 H                       2.67 
ZR-95              64.02 D                      5.41 
ZR-97              17 H                         6.78 
 
 
PEAK SEARCH RESULTS====================================================== 
 
      49 peaks found in spectrum by automated peak search.   
      33 peaks associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
      16 peaks not associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
      67 percent of peaks were associated with nuclides.     
 
 Note: "*" indicates that a peak was a component of a multiplet. 
 
 Energy   Centroid   Width  FWHM    %Eff    Net Area     %RelErr   Nuclide  Nts      
 
  72.75    99.62 *     17   1.27   10.43      1427.71      4.19     TL-208       
  74.81   102.42 *     17   1.27   10.53      6954.14      1.71     PB-212       
  74.81   102.42 *     17   1.27   10.53      6954.14      1.71     PB-214       
  74.81   102.42 *     17   1.27   10.53      6954.14      1.71     TL-208       
  77.07   105.51 *     17   1.27   10.63      8642.87      1.58     BI-214       
  77.07   105.51 *     17   1.27   10.63      8642.87      1.58     PB-212       
  77.07   105.51 *     17   1.27   10.63      8642.87      1.58     PB-214       
  84.81   116.07 *     19   1.31   10.86       414.18     11.55     TH-228       
  84.81   116.07 *     19   1.31   10.86       414.18     11.55     TL-208       
  87.17   119.29 *     19   1.31   10.91      3342.28      3.17     PB-212       
  87.17   119.29 *     19   1.31   10.91      3342.28      3.17     PB-214       
  89.79   122.86 *     19   1.32   10.95      1088.47      5.03     BI-214       
  89.79   122.86 *     19   1.32   10.95      1088.47      5.03     PB-212       
 137.06   187.38        9   0.48   10.49       152.59    289.67               1  
 158.99   217.30       15   1.22    9.95      1225.75      6.80     I-123     2  
 158.99   217.30       15   1.22    9.95      1225.75      6.80     TE-123M   3  
 276
 238.62   325.98       16   1.30    7.94     16357.48      1.23     PB-212       
 277.37   378.87       11   1.41    7.12       670.69      9.63     TL-208       
 287.04   392.07       13   3.83    6.93       372.96     23.53               4  
 295.20   403.20 *     20   1.25    6.78       181.77     17.36     PB-214       
 300.10   409.89 *     20   1.25    6.70       790.49      7.75     PB-212       
 338.41   462.18       13   1.43    6.07       279.04     18.56               5  
 351.92   480.62        8   1.43    5.87       400.47     13.86     PB-214       
 374.74   511.77       17   1.42    5.56      1777.50      4.47     PB212XR1  6  
 477.56   652.12       14   1.47    4.46      7477.52      1.80     BE-7         
 510.84   697.56       19   2.09    4.19      2592.58      3.44     TL-208       
 545.07   744.29        9   1.55    3.94       278.08     15.52               7  
 583.14   796.27       19   1.58    3.69      4952.36      2.26     TL-208       
 609.29   831.97        9   1.46    3.54       323.12     13.66     BI-214       
 670.61   915.69       10   1.92    3.23       187.40     22.17     TL208XR4     
 727.30   993.09       14   1.67    2.99      1000.65      5.90     BI-212       
 742.67  1014.08       11   1.60    2.93       143.93     24.26     BI-214    8  
 742.67  1014.08       11   1.60    2.93       143.93     24.26     ZR-97     9  
 762.88  1041.67       13   1.68    2.85       136.53     24.68     TL-208       
 781.79  1067.49 *     25   1.72    2.79       134.78     19.38              10  
 785.55  1072.63 *     25   1.72    2.77       121.41     20.14     BI-212       
 785.55  1072.63 *     25   1.72    2.77       121.41     20.14     BI-214       
 785.55  1072.63 *     25   1.72    2.77       121.41     20.14     PB-214       
 790.36  1079.19 *     25   1.72    2.76       127.22     19.31              11  
 803.29  1096.85 *     20   1.50    2.71        90.85     25.18     UNKNAT01 12  
 807.32  1102.36 *     20   1.50    2.70       114.91     23.49              13  
 820.11  1119.82        9   1.32    2.66        62.80     41.48              14  
 860.52  1174.99       20   1.81    2.54       696.67      7.32     TL-208     
 883.97  1207.01       12   1.32    2.48        77.65     31.39              15  
 899.16  1227.76       12   1.78    2.44      1090.66      5.50              16  
 911.66  1244.83 *     20   1.81    2.41       465.17      9.23              17  
 918.01  1253.50 *     20   1.81    2.39       117.19     16.75              18  
 983.91  1343.50       14   1.79    2.24       509.58      8.71              19  
 992.33  1354.99       12   1.60    2.23       225.27     15.58              20  
1016.20  1387.58       11   1.54    2.18       112.05     24.48              21  
1032.54  1409.90       13   1.99    2.15       144.62     21.81              22  
1078.34  1472.45       10   1.06    2.06        44.71     77.18     BI-212       
1093.81  1493.58        8   1.64    2.04        87.97     30.91     TL-208       
1120.39  1529.87       11   1.47    1.99        55.60     43.36     BI-214       
1273.92  1739.56       14   2.65    1.78       112.45     26.35     NA-22        
1460.88  1994.92       19   2.09    1.59      2744.67      3.04     K-40         
1620.79  2213.34       15   2.85    1.47       152.82     16.56     BI-212       
1764.77  2410.01       14   2.71    1.38        79.50     27.63     BI-214       
2103.69  2872.96       15   2.86    1.23       208.72     13.49     TL-208       
2614.54  3570.72       19   2.72    1.10      1738.10      3.68     TL-208       
 
 
PEAK SEARCH NOTES===================================================== 
 
NOTE 1: 
Date Entered: 1997/03/21 15:55:20 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/20 16:02:17 
Analyst: dwilliam 






Date Entered: 1997/03/20 16:01:08 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This nuclide was removed from the Activity Summary section because in the 
analyst's judgment the nuclide was not present; some nuclides may be removed 
because their activity calculations are not meaningful (they are identified, 
not quantified).  
 
Date Entered: 1997/03/20 16:02:02 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/21 15:56:13 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:03:31 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak is likely associated with the 338.4 keV gamma line of Po-206. It may 





Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:04:04 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:16:20 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:05:48 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:05:48 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak is likely associated with the 742.6 keV gamma line of Po-207.  
 
Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:05:53 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This nuclide was removed from the Activity Summary section because in the 
analyst's judgment the nuclide was not present; some nuclides may be removed 
because their activity calculations are not meaningful (they are identified, 






Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:16:40 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:17:05 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:06:27 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:06:49 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:09:06 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:10:11 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:10:37 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:13:05 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak is likely associated with the 911.8 keV gamma line of Po-207, the 





Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:13:50 
Analyst: dwilliam 






Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:14:16 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:14:28 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:18:40 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/21 16:14:55 
Analyst: dwilliam 







Energy vs. Channel 
 
 E(c) = -0.249 + 0.7329*c - 2.962E-07*c^2 + 3.723E-11*c^3 
 
  E = energy (keV) 
  c = channel number 
 
 
Resolution vs. Energy 
 
 FWHM(E) = 0.89 + 0.03064*SQRT(E) 
 
  FWHM = Full Width Half Max (keV) 
  E = energy (keV) 
 
 
Efficiency vs. Energy 
 
 e(E) = exp { -3.776 + 0.9255*ln(962.1/E) + 0.1003*[ln(962.1/E)]^2 
  - 0.0896*[ln(962.1/E)]^3 }  
 
  e = efficiency (counts/gamma) 





                 ATMOSPHERIC RADIONUCLIDE MEASUREMENT REPORT 




Station ID:         CA002               Detector ID:        CAA2                 
Station Type:       ISAR2               Detector Type:                           
 
Station Location: Vancouver, Canada                                  
Detector Description: Detector A in Vancouver, Canada                    
 
Sample ID:             0022953          Sample Geometry:    DISK       
Sample Quantity:      16909.00 m3       Sample Type:        Filter               
 
 
Collection Start:   1997/03/19 18:02    Sampling Time:        28.28 hours 
Collection Stop:    1997/03/20 22:19    Decay Time:            4.24 hours 
Acquisition Start:  1997/03/21 02:33    Acquisition Time:     17.23 hours 
Acquisition Stop:   1997/03/21 19:47    Avg Flow Rate:       597.91 m3/hr     
 
Collection Station Comments: 
goshka - Detector 1 Ranger (20-MAR-1997)  
 
IDC Analysis General Comments: 
This spectrum contains the following activation products: Bi-204 and Po-206. 
These nuclides have contributed to the net peak areas associated with AC-228 in 
this spectrum; therefore, the presence of AC-228 is overestimated. A probable 
source of their injection is an accelerator near the IMS station. Leonid 
Vladimirski. 03/26/97.  
 











Level 1  =  Normal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 2  =  Abnormal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 3  =  Normal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
Level 4  =  Abnormal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
 












Nuclide            Half-Life            Conc(uBq/m3)        %RelErr        
Notes          
 
BE-7               53.3 D                  2.9E+03          2.67 











MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION FOR KEY NUCLIDES======================== 
 
Nuclide            Half-Life               MDC(uBq/m3)          
 
BA-140             12.75 D                     12.67 
CE-143             1.4 D                       10.93 
CS-134             2.06135 Y                    3.73 
CS-136             13.16 D                      3.93 
CS-137             30.0197 Y                    3.63 
I-131              8.04 D                       3.87 
I-133              20.8 H                       7.62 
MO-99              65.94 H                     36.40 
NB-95              35.15 D                      3.62 
RU-103             39.26 D                      3.05 
TE-132             78.2 H                       3.37 
ZR-95              64.02 D                      5.79 
ZR-97              17 H                        10.05 
 
 
PEAK SEARCH RESULTS====================================================== 
 
      30 peaks found in spectrum by automated peak search.   
      26 peaks associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
       4 peaks not associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
      87 percent of peaks were associated with nuclides.     
 
 Note: "*" indicates that a peak was a component of a multiplet. 
 
 Energy   Centroid   Width  FWHM    %Eff    Net Area     %RelErr   Nuclide  Nts      
 
  74.75   102.36 *     17   1.28   10.53      3680.83      2.40     PB-212       
  74.75   102.36 *     17   1.28   10.53      3680.83      2.40     PB-214       
  74.75   102.36 *     17   1.28   10.53      3680.83      2.40     TL-208       
  77.06   105.51 *     17   1.28   10.63      4758.72      2.20     BI-214       
  77.06   105.51 *     17   1.28   10.63      4758.72      2.20     PB-212       
  77.06   105.51 *     17   1.28   10.63      4758.72      2.20     PB-214       
  87.11   119.23 *     18   1.33   10.90      2022.18      4.19     PB-212       
  87.11   119.23 *     18   1.33   10.90      2022.18      4.19     PB-214       
  89.86   122.98 *     18   1.33   10.95       572.54      7.47     AC-228       
  89.86   122.98 *     18   1.33   10.95       572.54      7.47     BI-214       
  89.86   122.98 *     18   1.33   10.95       572.54      7.47     PB-212       
 238.61   325.99       16   1.31    7.94     10158.14      1.58     PB-212       
 277.40   378.95       16   1.40    7.12       415.43     13.50     TL-208       
 295.25   403.30 *     17   1.47    6.78       214.62     15.65     PB-214       
 300.12   409.96 *     17   1.48    6.70       660.70      9.11     PB-212       
 338.52   462.37        6   1.06    6.07       142.39     38.90     AC-228    1  
 351.91   480.65 *     13   1.44    5.87       402.76     11.98     PB-214      
 355.65   485.75 *     13   1.45    5.82        63.25     34.93               2  
 374.66   511.70       12   1.63    5.56       563.33      9.44     PB212XR1  3  
 477.54   652.15        9   1.44    4.46     13774.68      1.27     BE-7         
 510.79   697.55       19   1.98    4.19      1856.83      4.09     TL-208       
 583.11   796.30       15   1.57    3.69      3097.14      2.93     AC-228       
 583.11   796.30       15   1.57    3.69      3097.14      2.93     TL-208       
 609.21   831.92        9   1.58    3.54       258.57     15.01     BI-214       
 282
 727.30   993.18       18   1.57    2.99       656.47      7.33     AC-228       
 727.30   993.18       18   1.57    2.99       656.47      7.33     BI-212       
 785.44  1072.57        9   1.45    2.77        66.86     37.10     BI-212       
 785.44  1072.57        9   1.45    2.77        66.86     37.10     BI-214       
 785.44  1072.57        9   1.45    2.77        66.86     37.10     PB-214       
 802.85  1096.34       14   1.05    2.72        62.63     47.54     UNKNAT01     
 860.57  1175.17        9   1.68    2.54       352.56     10.75     TL-208       
 899.16  1227.87       13   1.56    2.44       280.66     12.44               4  
 911.39  1244.57       10   1.72    2.41       196.23     15.04     AC-228    5  
 969.21  1323.54       10   0.55    2.28        67.88    210.37     AC-228       
 984.04  1343.78       19   1.45    2.24       143.07     17.74               6  
1032.32  1409.73       11   1.46    2.15        71.45     30.60               7  
1460.84  1995.03       22   2.04    1.59      2279.24      3.27     K-40         
1592.42  2174.77       10   2.11    1.49        75.58     25.07     TL-208       
1620.61  2213.28       18   2.10    1.47        79.17     24.93     BI-212       
2103.53  2872.92       18   3.02    1.23       137.25     17.54     TL-208       
2614.58  3570.88       17   2.55    1.10      1043.93      4.88     TL-208       
 
 
PEAK SEARCH NOTES===================================================== 
 
NOTE 1: 
Date Entered: 1997/03/24 14:21:15 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak is likely associated with the 338.4 keV gamma line of Po-206 and the 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 11:20:33 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 14:19:07 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 10:42:44 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 14:20:09 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak is likely associated with the 911.2 keV gamma line of Ac-228 and the 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 10:41:51 
Analyst: dwilliam 






Date Entered: 1997/03/24 10:42:24 
Analyst: dwilliam 







Energy vs. Channel 
 
 E(c) = -0.2624 + 0.7329*c - 3.425E-07*c^2 + 5.004E-11*c^3 
 
  E = energy (keV) 
  c = channel number 
 
 
Resolution vs. Energy 
 
 FWHM(E) = 0.89 + 0.03064*SQRT(E) 
 
  FWHM = Full Width Half Max (keV) 
  E = energy (keV) 
 
 
Efficiency vs. Energy 
 
 e(E) = exp { -3.776 + 0.9255*ln(962.1/E) + 0.1003*[ln(962.1/E)]^2 
  - 0.0896*[ln(962.1/E)]^3 }  
 
  e = efficiency (counts/gamma) 





                 ATMOSPHERIC RADIONUCLIDE MEASUREMENT REPORT 




Station ID:         CA002               Detector ID:        CAA2                 
Station Type:       ISAR2               Detector Type:                           
 
Station Location: Vancouver, Canada                                  
Detector Description: Detector A in Vancouver, Canada                    
 
Sample ID:             0022978          Sample Geometry:    DISK       
Sample Quantity:      20936.00 m3       Sample Type:        Filter               
 
 
Collection Start:   1997/03/20 22:21    Sampling Time:        21.48 hours 
Collection Stop:    1997/03/21 19:49    Decay Time:            4.25 hours 
Acquisition Start:  1997/03/22 00:04    Acquisition Time:     18.00 hours 
Acquisition Stop:   1997/03/22 18:04    Avg Flow Rate:       974.67 m3/hr     
 
Collection Station Comments: 
goshka - Detector 1 Ranger (21-MAR-1997)  
 
IDC Analysis General Comments: 
This spectrum contains the following activation products: Bi-204, Po-206 and 
Po-207.. A probable source of their injection is an accelerator near the IMS 
station. Leonid Vladimirski. 03/26/97.  
 











Level 1  =  Normal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 2  =  Abnormal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 3  =  Normal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
Level 4  =  Abnormal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
 












Nuclide            Half-Life            Conc(uBq/m3)        %RelErr        
Notes          
 
BE-7               53.3 D                  3.4E+03          2.56 











MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION FOR KEY NUCLIDES======================== 
 
Nuclide            Half-Life               MDC(uBq/m3)          
 
BA-140             12.75 D                     11.84 
CE-143             1.4 D                        9.71 
CS-134             2.06135 Y                    3.17 
CS-136             13.16 D                      3.25 
CS-137             30.0197 Y                    3.47 
I-131              8.04 D                       3.72 
I-133              20.8 H                       6.73 
MO-99              65.94 H                     31.48 
NB-95              35.15 D                      3.41 
RU-103             39.26 D                      2.92 
TE-132             78.2 H                       3.37 
ZR-95              64.02 D                      5.32 
ZR-97              17 H                         8.08 
 
 
PEAK SEARCH RESULTS====================================================== 
 
      41 peaks found in spectrum by automated peak search.   
      33 peaks associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
       8 peaks not associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
      80 percent of peaks were associated with nuclides.     
 
 Note: "*" indicates that a peak was a component of a multiplet. 
 
 Energy   Centroid   Width  FWHM    %Eff    Net Area     %RelErr   Nuclide  Nts      
 
  74.74   102.39 *     17   1.26   10.53      9649.79      1.42     PB-212       
  74.74   102.39 *     17   1.26   10.53      9649.79      1.42     PB-214       
  74.74   102.39 *     17   1.26   10.53      9649.79      1.42     TL-208       
  77.02   105.50 *     17   1.27   10.62     14219.20      1.24     BI-214       
  77.02   105.50 *     17   1.27   10.62     14219.20      1.24     PB-212       
  77.02   105.50 *     17   1.27   10.62     14219.20      1.24     PB-214       
  84.83   116.16 *     20   1.32   10.86       545.84      9.42     TL-208       
  87.12   119.27 *     20   1.32   10.90      5286.19      2.42     PB-212       
  87.12   119.27 *     20   1.32   10.90      5286.19      2.42     PB-214       
  89.82   122.96 *     20   1.33   10.95      1698.66      3.91     BI-214       
  89.82   122.96 *     20   1.33   10.95      1698.66      3.91     PB-212       
  92.73   126.93 *     20   1.33   10.98       141.81     29.68               1  
 115.18   157.56       11   0.81   10.90       425.88    107.58     PB-212       
 238.61   325.99       12   1.29    7.94     32689.06      0.84     PB-212       
 277.37   378.87       10   1.39    7.12      1265.18      6.44     TL-208       
 286.55   391.41       16   0.49    6.94       149.06    299.77               2  
 295.14   403.12 *     18   1.27    6.79       181.04     18.76     PB-214       
 300.08   409.87 *     18   1.27    6.70      1692.68      4.97     PB-212       
 338.38   462.15       15   1.11    6.07       224.55     20.16               3  
 351.87   480.56        8   1.29    5.87       315.04     18.80     PB-214       
 374.70   511.71       10   1.26    5.56       569.09     10.18     PB212XR1  4  
 452.91   618.48       13   1.01    4.69       152.26     45.02     BI-212       
 477.56   652.13       14   1.45    4.46     20880.89      1.03     BE-7         
 510.77   697.47       19   1.84    4.19      3834.46      2.71     TL-208       
 583.15   796.30       17   1.57    3.69      9860.33      1.52     TL-208       
 609.30   832.00       19   1.72    3.54       361.23     12.38     BI-214       
 286
 727.29   993.13       11   1.60    2.99      1986.51      3.70     BI-212       
 763.19  1042.15        7   1.32    2.85       135.96     21.68     TL-208       
 785.51  1072.64       10   1.45    2.77       241.47     14.72     BI-212       
 785.51  1072.64       10   1.45    2.77       241.47     14.72     BI-214       
 785.51  1072.64       10   1.45    2.77       241.47     14.72     PB-214       
 802.99  1096.51       10   0.52    2.72        81.45    246.69     UNKNAT01     
 860.51  1175.08       14   1.77    2.54      1344.55      4.56     TL-208       
 893.20  1219.73 *     20   1.88    2.45       106.75     17.21     BI-212       
 898.99  1227.63 *     20   1.89    2.44       326.72     11.50               5  
 911.39  1244.57       11   1.67    2.41       230.83     14.96               6  
 951.95  1299.98       13   1.22    2.31        46.69     40.26     BI-212       
 983.71  1343.35       19   1.74    2.24       127.75     23.14               7  
 992.07  1354.77       14   1.31    2.23        71.58     32.19               8  
1079.00  1473.53       11   1.75    2.06       118.36     22.56     BI-212       
1093.68  1493.58       15   1.81    2.04       167.61     18.05     TL-208       
1120.07  1529.63        7   1.18    2.00        41.63     59.43     BI-214       
1460.72  1995.02       15   2.06    1.59      2307.09      3.31     K-40         
1592.39  2174.91       10   2.25    1.49       314.35     10.69     TL-208       
1620.69  2213.57       16   1.98    1.47       221.13     12.75     BI-212       
1764.56  2410.12        7   1.34    1.38        63.72     27.54     BI-214       
1972.77  2694.55       10   0.57    1.28        25.60     54.43               9  
2103.32  2872.87       16   3.13    1.23       418.77      9.27     TL-208       
2614.54  3570.90       13   2.68    1.10      3293.61      2.66     TL-208       
 
 
PEAK SEARCH NOTES===================================================== 
 
NOTE 1: 
Date Entered: 1997/03/24 11:34:31 
Analyst: dwilliam 
Many radionuclides emit gamma rays with energies similar to this one. 
Therefore, this peak may be due to natural radiation or one of the noted 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 11:25:29 
Analyst: dwilliam 
False peak detection; Type I error in peak processing.  
 
Date Entered: 1997/03/26 14:54:26 
Analyst: dwilliam 
Originally, this peak was thought to be false; however, after further review, 
this peak was found to be real. It is likely a multiplet associated with the 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 11:26:30 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak is likely associated with the 338.4 keV gamma line of Po-206. It may 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 14:29:40 
Analyst: dwilliam 






Date Entered: 1997/03/24 11:26:50 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 11:28:13 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak is likely associated with the 911.8 keV gamma line of Po-207, the 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 11:27:51 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 11:28:02 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 11:29:20 
Analyst: dwilliam 







Energy vs. Channel 
 
 E(c) = -0.3185 + 0.7331*c - 5.907E-07*c^2 + 9.742E-11*c^3 
 
  E = energy (keV) 
  c = channel number 
 
 
Resolution vs. Energy 
 
 FWHM(E) = 0.89 + 0.03064*SQRT(E) 
 
  FWHM = Full Width Half Max (keV) 
  E = energy (keV) 
 
 
Efficiency vs. Energy 
 
 e(E) = exp { -3.776 + 0.9255*ln(962.1/E) + 0.1003*[ln(962.1/E)]^2 
  - 0.0896*[ln(962.1/E)]^3 }  
 
  e = efficiency (counts/gamma) 
  E = energy (keV) 
 288
                 ATMOSPHERIC RADIONUCLIDE MEASUREMENT REPORT 




Station ID:         CA002               Detector ID:        CAA2                 
Station Type:       ISAR2               Detector Type:                           
 
Station Location: Vancouver, Canada                                  
Detector Description: Detector A in Vancouver, Canada                    
 
Sample ID:             0023016          Sample Geometry:    DISK       
Sample Quantity:      21683.00 m3       Sample Type:        Filter               
 
 
Collection Start:   1997/03/21 19:51    Sampling Time:        22.26 hours 
Collection Stop:    1997/03/22 18:06    Decay Time:            4.24 hours 
Acquisition Start:  1997/03/22 22:21    Acquisition Time:     19.50 hours 
Acquisition Stop:   1997/03/23 17:51    Avg Flow Rate:       974.08 m3/hr     
 
Collection Station Comments: 
goshka - Detector 1 Ranger (22-MAR-1997)  
 
IDC Analysis General Comments: 
This spectrum contains the following activation products: Bi-204, Po-204, 
Po-206, Po-207 and At-209. These nuclides have contributed to the net peak 
areas associated with AC-228 in this spectrum; therefore, the presence of 
AC-228 is overestimated. A probable source of their injection is an accelerator 
near the IMS station. Leonid Vladimirski. 03/24/97.  
 
This spectrum indicates the presence of I-123, which is observed from time to 
time at this station. Its source is known. The estimated concentration of I-123 
exceeds the upper bound for this nuclide at this station. The cause of this 
unusual level of I-123 is under investigation. Leonid Vladimirski. 03/24/97.  
 
I-123 is present in this spectrum and is seen at this site on occasion.  
 











Level 1  =  Normal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 2  =  Abnormal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 3  =  Normal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
Level 4  =  Abnormal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
 




Name       Category   Categorization Comment 
----       --------   ---------------------- 













Nuclide            Half-Life            Conc(uBq/m3)        %RelErr        
Notes          
 
BE-7               53.3 D                  3.3E+03          2.55 










MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION FOR KEY NUCLIDES======================== 
 
Nuclide            Half-Life               MDC(uBq/m3)          
 
BA-140             12.75 D                     15.28 
CE-143             1.4 D                       10.69 
CS-134             2.06135 Y                    3.64 
CS-136             13.16 D                      3.83 
CS-137             30.0197 Y                    4.07 
I-131              8.04 D                       4.43 
I-133              20.8 H                      10.08 
MO-99              65.94 H                     40.57 
NB-95              35.15 D                      4.01 
RU-103             39.26 D                      3.44 
TE-132             78.2 H                       3.85 
ZR-95              64.02 D                      6.07 
ZR-97              17 H                         6.38 
 
 
PEAK SEARCH RESULTS====================================================== 
 
      56 peaks found in spectrum by automated peak search.   
      44 peaks associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
      12 peaks not associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
      79 percent of peaks were associated with nuclides.     
 
 Note: "*" indicates that a peak was a component of a multiplet. 
 
 Energy   Centroid   Width  FWHM    %Eff    Net Area     %RelErr   Nuclide  Nts      
 
  74.79   102.39 *     17   1.28   10.53     20282.59      0.98     PB-212       
  74.79   102.39 *     17   1.28   10.53     20282.59      0.98     PB-214       
  74.79   102.39 *     17   1.28   10.53     20282.59      0.98     TL-208       
  77.08   105.51 *     17   1.28   10.63     30344.94      0.85     BI-214       
  77.08   105.51 *     17   1.28   10.63     30344.94      0.85     PB-212       
  77.08   105.51 *     17   1.28   10.63     30344.94      0.85     PB-214       
  84.98   116.29 *     16   1.32   10.86       429.80     17.54     TL-208       
  87.18   119.29 *     16   1.32   10.91     10751.39      1.80     PB-212       
  87.18   119.29 *     16   1.32   10.91     10751.39      1.80     PB-214       
  89.87   122.96 *     16   1.33   10.95      3571.97      2.87     AC-228       
  89.87   122.96 *     16   1.33   10.95      3571.97      2.87     BI-214       
 290
  89.87   122.96 *     16   1.33   10.95      3571.97      2.87     PB-212       
 115.19   157.51       11   0.93   10.90       826.82     45.99     PB-212       
 159.00   217.29       15   1.25    9.95    179387.95      0.35     I-123     1  
 159.00   217.29       15   1.25    9.95    179387.95      0.35     TE-123M   2  
 238.63   325.97       16   1.29    7.94     63092.29      0.61     PB-212       
 270.04   368.84        7   1.26    7.26       308.67     22.29     AC-228    3  
 277.36   378.82       15   1.32    7.12      2327.08      4.50     TL-208       
 287.20   392.26       13   2.82    6.93       997.29     11.04               4  
 295.17   403.13 *     20   1.34    6.78       192.30     21.14     PB-214       
 300.13   409.90 *     20   1.34    6.70      3311.35      3.47     PB-212       
 338.30   462.00        9   1.48    6.07       513.72     14.31     AC-228    5  
 351.86   480.52       13   1.40    5.87       400.35     17.79     PB-214       
 374.77   511.79       13   1.51    5.56      1375.67      6.24     PB212XR1  6  
 405.58   553.84       13   1.33    5.18       190.52     28.95     BI-214       
 440.01   600.85        8   1.29    4.81       476.72     11.73     AC-228    7  
 452.78   618.28       13   1.51    4.69       337.64     16.77     BI-212       
 477.57   652.13       18   1.47    4.46     22872.23      1.00     AC-228       
 477.57   652.13       18   1.47    4.46     22872.23      1.00     BE-7         
 505.39   690.11 *     26   0.99    4.23       204.61      8.89               8  
 510.80   697.49 *     26   1.79    4.19      6912.02      1.25     TL-208       
 522.46   713.42 *     17   1.44    4.10       201.50     14.30     AC-228    9  
 528.92   722.23 *     17   1.44    4.05       876.72      7.19     I-123        
 538.51   735.33 *     24   0.50    3.98        66.41    161.99              10  
 545.21   744.47 *     24   0.51    3.94       214.05    160.09              11  
 583.15   796.27       14   1.55    3.69     18966.65      1.10     AC-228       
 583.15   796.27       14   1.55    3.69     18966.65      1.10     TL-208       
 609.17   831.81       15   1.47    3.54       418.42     12.13     BI-214       
 687.83   939.21        8   1.22    3.15        91.31     37.12              12  
 727.30   993.12       10   1.65    2.99      4016.95      2.57     AC-228       
 727.30   993.12       10   1.65    2.99      4016.95      2.57     BI-212       
 742.71  1014.15       13   1.37    2.93       292.37     14.02     BI-214   13  
 742.71  1014.15       13   1.37    2.93       292.37     14.02     ZR-97    14  
 763.19  1042.12        9   1.84    2.85       267.80     16.83     TL-208       
 781.91  1067.68 *     21   1.68    2.79       217.99     12.01     AC-228   15  
 785.43  1072.50 *     21   1.68    2.77       582.69      7.88     BI-212       
 785.43  1072.50 *     21   1.68    2.77       582.69      7.88     BI-214       
 785.43  1072.50 *     21   1.68    2.77       582.69      7.88     PB-214       
 790.14  1078.93 *     21   1.68    2.76       128.82     17.33              16  
 802.91  1096.37 *     17   1.48    2.72       140.98     17.95     UNKNAT01     
 807.39  1102.48 *     17   1.49    2.70       224.93     15.38              17  
 860.53  1175.05       11   1.75    2.54      2415.05      3.40     TL-208       
 893.42  1219.98 *     23   1.73    2.45       188.15     12.17     BI-212       
 899.15  1227.80 *     23   1.73    2.44       841.17      6.43              18  
 911.63  1244.85 *     23   1.92    2.41       494.10      9.47     AC-228   19  
 918.11  1253.70 *     23   1.92    2.39        95.91     21.21              20  
 968.60  1322.66        7   0.75    2.28        41.13    396.22     AC-228       
 983.84  1343.48       17   1.84    2.24       382.33     11.39              21  
 992.31  1355.04       13   1.68    2.23       509.43      9.06              22  
1032.31  1409.69       12   1.79    2.15       296.76     13.24              23  
1078.73  1473.08       10   1.73    2.06       217.87     16.03     BI-212       
1093.69  1493.53       11   1.96    2.04       384.31     10.80     TL-208       
1120.17  1529.69        9   1.36    2.00        65.76     39.48     BI-214       
1460.79  1995.00       20   2.06    1.59      2618.99      3.15     K-40         
1512.72  2065.94       20   2.70    1.55       168.17     18.16     BI-212       
1592.38  2174.76       12   2.09    1.49       525.74      8.29     TL-208       
1620.66  2213.39       11   2.03    1.47       501.48      8.44     BI-212       
1764.13  2409.39       10   2.28    1.38        81.44     32.42     BI-214       
2103.38  2872.80       16   3.12    1.23       788.54      6.91     TL-208       
2614.50  3570.77       15   2.66    1.10      6386.32      1.89     TL-208       
 
 




Date Entered: 1997/03/24 14:53:34 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 12:11:03 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This nuclide was removed from the Activity Summary section because in the 
analyst's judgment the nuclide was not present; some nuclides may be removed 
because their activity calculations are not meaningful (they are identified, 
not quantified).  
 
Date Entered: 1997/03/24 12:11:30 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 14:59:33 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak is likely associated with the 270.0 keV gamma line of Po-204 and the 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 15:07:27 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 15:08:10 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak is likely associated with the 338.4 keV gamma line of Po-206. It may 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 14:52:54 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 14:49:29 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak is likely associated with the 440.0 keV gamma line of I-123 and the 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 14:45:25 
Analyst: dwilliam 






Date Entered: 1997/03/24 15:10:00 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak is likely associated with the 522.4 keV gamma line of Po-206. It may 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 14:46:34 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak is real and is likely associated with a weak gamma line of I-123 at 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 15:20:36 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 15:27:20 
Analyst: dwilliam 






Date Entered: 1997/03/24 15:10:51 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 11:59:01 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This nuclide was removed from the Activity Summary section because in the 
analyst's judgment the nuclide was not present; some nuclides may be removed 
because their activity calculations are not meaningful (they are identified, 
not quantified).  
 
Date Entered: 1997/03/24 15:10:51 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 15:22:17 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak is likely associated with the 781.9 keV gamma line of At-209. It may 






Date Entered: 1997/03/24 15:20:23 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 15:17:59 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 14:55:26 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 14:56:23 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This peak is likely associated with the 911.8 keV gamma line of Po-207, the 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 14:55:47 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 14:55:58 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 15:19:22 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 15:18:34 
Analyst: dwilliam 







Energy vs. Channel 
 
 E(c) = -0.2539 + 0.733*c - 4.631E-07*c^2 + 7.287E-11*c^3 
 294
 
  E = energy (keV) 
  c = channel number 
 
 
Resolution vs. Energy 
 
 FWHM(E) = 0.89 + 0.03064*SQRT(E) 
 
  FWHM = Full Width Half Max (keV) 
  E = energy (keV) 
 
 
Efficiency vs. Energy 
 
 e(E) = exp { -3.776 + 0.9255*ln(962.1/E) + 0.1003*[ln(962.1/E)]^2 
  - 0.0896*[ln(962.1/E)]^3 }  
 
  e = efficiency (counts/gamma) 
  E = energy (keV) 
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                 ATMOSPHERIC RADIONUCLIDE MEASUREMENT REPORT 




Station ID:         CA002               Detector ID:        CAA2                 
Station Type:       ISAR2               Detector Type:                           
 
Station Location: Vancouver, Canada                                  
Detector Description: Detector A in Vancouver, Canada                    
 
Sample ID:             0023073          Sample Geometry:    DISK       
Sample Quantity:      25277.00 m3       Sample Type:        Filter               
 
 
Collection Start:   1997/03/22 18:07    Sampling Time:        25.96 hours 
Collection Stop:    1997/03/23 20:04    Decay Time:            4.26 hours 
Acquisition Start:  1997/03/24 00:20    Acquisition Time:     18.38 hours 
Acquisition Stop:   1997/03/24 18:43    Avg Flow Rate:       973.69 m3/hr     
 
Collection Station Comments: 
goshka - Detector 1 Ranger (23-MAR-1997)  
 
IDC Analysis General Comments: 
I-123 is present in this spectrum and is seen at this site on occasion.  
 











Level 1  =  Normal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 2  =  Abnormal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 3  =  Normal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
Level 4  =  Abnormal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
 




Name       Category   Categorization Comment 
----       --------   ---------------------- 












Nuclide            Half-Life            Conc(uBq/m3)        %RelErr        
Notes          
 
 296
BE-7               53.3 D                  3.5E+03          2.52 










MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION FOR KEY NUCLIDES======================== 
 
Nuclide            Half-Life               MDC(uBq/m3)          
 
BA-140             12.75 D                      9.69 
CE-143             1.4 D                        8.86 
CS-134             2.06135 Y                    2.63 
CS-136             13.16 D                      2.74 
CS-137             30.0197 Y                    2.75 
I-131              8.04 D                       3.27 
I-133              20.8 H                       6.00 
MO-99              65.94 H                     25.33 
NB-95              35.15 D                      2.83 
RU-103             39.26 D                      2.42 
TE-132             78.2 H                       3.02 
ZR-95              64.02 D                      4.14 
ZR-97              17 H                         7.02 
 
 
PEAK SEARCH RESULTS====================================================== 
 
      37 peaks found in spectrum by automated peak search.   
      36 peaks associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
       1 peaks not associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
      97 percent of peaks were associated with nuclides.     
 
 Note: "*" indicates that a peak was a component of a multiplet. 
 
 Energy   Centroid   Width  FWHM    %Eff    Net Area     %RelErr   Nuclide  Nts      
 
  74.73   102.38 *     17   1.26   10.53     11542.04      1.28     PB-212       
  74.73   102.38 *     17   1.26   10.53     11542.04      1.28     PB-214       
  74.73   102.38 *     17   1.26   10.53     11542.04      1.28     TL-208       
  77.03   105.53 *     17   1.27   10.62     17829.29      1.10     BI-214       
  77.03   105.53 *     17   1.27   10.62     17829.29      1.10     PB-212       
  77.03   105.53 *     17   1.27   10.62     17829.29      1.10     PB-214       
  87.11   119.28 *     18   1.43   10.90      6918.96      2.10     PB-212       
  87.11   119.28 *     18   1.43   10.90      6918.96      2.10     PB-214       
  89.79   122.93 *     18   1.43   10.95      2211.18      3.37     BI-214       
  89.79   122.93 *     18   1.43   10.95      2211.18      3.37     PB-212       
 115.19   157.57        8   1.26   10.90       646.54     15.48     PB-212       
 158.95   217.28       13   1.34    9.95      3166.41      3.78     I-123     1  
 158.95   217.28       13   1.34    9.95      3166.41      3.78     TE-123M   2  
 238.62   325.98       14   1.31    7.94     41333.80      0.75     PB-212       
 252.55   344.99       12   1.56    7.63       227.43     30.09     TL-208       
 277.35   378.84       11   1.28    7.12      1578.88      5.39     TL-208       
 288.03   393.41       13   1.48    6.92       256.27     27.39     BI-212       
 295.16   403.14 *     20   1.31    6.78       173.61     20.74     PB-214       
 300.11   409.90 *     20   1.31    6.70      2222.18      4.33     PB-212       
 328.13   448.13        8   1.12    6.23       144.09     32.02     BI-212       
 351.89   480.57       17   1.23    5.87       345.81     18.49     PB-214       
 452.82   618.34       14   1.39    4.69       216.72     20.97     BI-212       
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 477.57   652.13       16   1.46    4.46     26483.91      0.91     BE-7         
 510.77   697.45       19   1.82    4.19      4654.88      2.43     TL-208       
 583.15   796.28       14   1.56    3.69     12600.73      1.34     TL-208       
 609.24   831.90       16   1.48    3.54       338.58     12.66     BI-214       
 727.29   993.12       12   1.63    2.99      2525.71      3.17     BI-212       
 763.31  1042.31       13   1.74    2.85       208.62     16.86     TL-208       
 785.51  1072.63       21   1.73    2.77       401.72     10.24     BI-212       
 785.51  1072.63       21   1.73    2.77       401.72     10.24     BI-214       
 785.51  1072.63       21   1.73    2.77       401.72     10.24     PB-214       
 803.06  1096.61        9   1.20    2.72        59.20     47.48     UNKNAT01     
 860.48  1175.04       15   1.73    2.54      1464.74      4.35     TL-208       
 893.40  1220.00       12   1.96    2.45       124.19     24.12     BI-212       
 911.07  1244.14       11   1.78    2.41       126.88     22.30               3  
 951.76  1299.72       12   1.62    2.31        68.96     34.03     BI-212       
1078.73  1473.19       13   1.56    2.06       145.35     18.86     BI-212       
1093.63  1493.53       11   1.74    2.04       206.05     15.74     TL-208       
1120.59  1530.37        8   1.22    1.99        51.46     47.05     BI-214       
1368.37  1868.91       10   2.46    1.68        84.03     29.20     NA-24        
1460.62  1994.95       17   2.06    1.59      2404.28      3.26     K-40         
1512.55  2065.91       11   1.82    1.55        86.66     25.78     BI-212       
1592.31  2174.88       10   2.21    1.49       337.30     10.04     TL-208       
1620.63  2213.57       13   2.14    1.47       337.54     10.21     BI-212       
2103.28  2872.90       15   3.32    1.23       559.50      7.91     TL-208       
2614.53  3570.83       18   2.70    1.10      4204.72      2.33     TL-208       
 
 
PEAK SEARCH NOTES===================================================== 
 
NOTE 1: 
Date Entered: 1997/03/24 15:56:00 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 15:55:28 
Analyst: dwilliam 
This nuclide was removed from the Activity Summary section because in the 
analyst's judgment the nuclide was not present; some nuclides may be removed 
because their activity calculations are not meaningful (they are identified, 
not quantified).  
 
Date Entered: 1997/03/24 15:55:52 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/24 16:28:19 
Analyst: dwilliam 







Energy vs. Channel 
 
 E(c) = -0.3356 + 0.7332*c - 7.074E-07*c^2 + 1.226E-10*c^3 
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  E = energy (keV) 
  c = channel number 
 
 
Resolution vs. Energy 
 
 FWHM(E) = 0.89 + 0.03064*SQRT(E) 
 
  FWHM = Full Width Half Max (keV) 
  E = energy (keV) 
 
 
Efficiency vs. Energy 
 
 e(E) = exp { -3.776 + 0.9255*ln(962.1/E) + 0.1003*[ln(962.1/E)]^2 
  - 0.0896*[ln(962.1/E)]^3 }  
 
  e = efficiency (counts/gamma) 







Appendix C:  REPRESENTATIVE CA002 ATMOSPHERIC RADIONUCLIDE 
MONITORING REPORTS DURING BASELINE PERIOD 
                 ATMOSPHERIC RADIONUCLIDE MEASUREMENT REPORT 




Station ID:         CA002               Detector ID:        CAA2                 
Station Type:       ISAR2               Detector Type:                           
 
Station Location: Vancouver, Canada                                  
Detector Description: Detector A in Vancouver, Canada                    
 
Sample ID:             0022467          Sample Geometry:    DISK       
Sample Quantity:      23964.68 m3       Sample Type:        Filter               
 
 
Collection Start:   1997/03/11 17:16    Sampling Time:        24.05 hours 
Collection Stop:    1997/03/12 17:19    Decay Time:            4.42 hours 
Acquisition Start:  1997/03/12 21:45    Acquisition Time:     19.50 hours 
Acquisition Stop:   1997/03/13 17:15    Avg Flow Rate:       996.45 m3/hr     
 
Collection Station Comments: 
goshka - Detector 1 Ranger (12-MAR-1997)  
 
IDC Analysis General Comments: 











Level 1  =  Normal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 2  =  Abnormal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 3  =  Normal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
Level 4  =  Abnormal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
 












Nuclide            Half-Life            Conc(uBq/m3)        %RelErr        
Notes          
 
BE-7               53.3 D                  2.4E+03          2.60 











MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION FOR KEY NUCLIDES======================== 
 
Nuclide            Half-Life               MDC(uBq/m3)          
 
BA-140             12.75 D                      9.11 
CE-143             1.4 D                        7.88 
CS-134             2.06135 Y                    2.56 
CS-136             13.16 D                      2.63 
CS-137             30.0197 Y                    2.68 
I-131              8.04 D                       3.05 
I-133              20.8 H                       5.52 
MO-99              65.94 H                     24.37 
NB-95              35.15 D                      2.65 
RU-103             39.26 D                      2.26 
TE-132             78.2 H                       2.69 
ZR-95              64.02 D                      4.28 
ZR-97              17 H                         6.54 
 
 
PEAK SEARCH RESULTS====================================================== 
 
      32 peaks found in spectrum by automated peak search.   
      31 peaks associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
       1 peaks not associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
      97 percent of peaks were associated with nuclides.     
 
 Note: "*" indicates that a peak was a component of a multiplet. 
 
 Energy   Centroid   Width  FWHM    %Eff    Net Area     %RelErr   Nuclide  Nts      
 
  74.80   102.39 *     17   1.26   10.53      9191.65      1.45     PB-212       
  74.80   102.39 *     17   1.26   10.53      9191.65      1.45     PB-214       
  74.80   102.39 *     17   1.26   10.53      9191.65      1.45     TL-208       
  77.08   105.49 *     17   1.26   10.63     14348.59      1.24     BI-214       
  77.08   105.49 *     17   1.26   10.63     14348.59      1.24     PB-212       
  77.08   105.49 *     17   1.26   10.63     14348.59      1.24     PB-214       
  87.17   119.27 *     18   1.39   10.91      5607.57      2.34     PB-212       
  87.17   119.27 *     18   1.39   10.91      5607.57      2.34     PB-214       
  89.87   122.95 *     18   1.39   10.95      1751.51      3.84     BI-214       
  89.87   122.95 *     18   1.39   10.95      1751.51      3.84     PB-212       
 115.22   157.54       12   0.90   10.90       441.27     52.44     PB-212       
 238.63   325.97       16   1.30    7.94     34091.35      0.82     PB-212       
 252.76   345.26        6   1.06    7.62       138.35     43.32     TL-208       
 277.34   378.80       14   1.39    7.12      1260.87      6.38     TL-208       
 288.21   393.64        7   1.21    6.91       228.83     28.40     BI-212       
 295.21   403.20 *     21   1.26    6.78       162.87     20.21     PB-214       
 300.10   409.87 *     21   1.27    6.70      1820.49      4.69     PB-212       
 351.95   480.64       14   1.41    5.87       388.43     14.77     PB-214       
 452.68   618.16       12   1.53    4.69       180.77     23.34     BI-212       
 477.56   652.12       14   1.44    4.46     17975.68      1.12     BE-7         
 510.73   697.41       19   1.89    4.19      4049.84      2.62     TL-208       
 583.13   796.27       19   1.53    3.69     10457.65      1.48     TL-208       
 609.31   832.01       10   1.39    3.54       331.75     12.69     BI-214       
 727.29   993.11       12   1.62    2.99      2145.65      3.54     BI-212       
 763.29  1042.28       14   1.81    2.85       176.72     18.74     TL-208       
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 785.43  1072.52       17   1.48    2.77       272.55     13.06     BI-212       
 785.43  1072.52       17   1.48    2.77       272.55     13.06     BI-214       
 785.43  1072.52       17   1.48    2.77       272.55     13.06     PB-214       
 860.49  1175.02       13   1.73    2.54      1285.86      4.77     TL-208       
 893.44  1220.03        9   1.38    2.45       102.65     24.14     BI-212       
 911.13  1244.18        9   1.76    2.41       102.92     26.41               1  
1078.68  1473.03        9   1.50    2.06       104.62     23.78     BI-212       
1093.93  1493.86       11   1.73    2.04       149.37     18.55     TL-208       
1120.12  1529.63       13   1.42    2.00        69.15     35.16     BI-214       
1460.71  1994.87       14   2.06    1.59      2409.91      3.23     K-40         
1512.69  2065.87       14   1.96    1.55        74.83     28.21     BI-212       
1592.48  2174.88       11   1.92    1.49       275.23     11.84     TL-208       
1620.72  2213.45       10   2.33    1.47       275.93     11.50     BI-212       
2103.41  2872.76       20   3.31    1.23       464.16      8.68     TL-208       
2614.51  3570.69       24   2.57    1.10      3513.51      2.61     TL-208       
 
 
PEAK SEARCH NOTES===================================================== 
 
NOTE 1: 
Date Entered: 1997/03/14 12:12:12 
Analyst: dwilliam 
Known natural nuclide, but lack of ID due to decay: only strongest line(s) 







Energy vs. Channel 
 
 E(c) = -0.236 + 0.7329*c - 4.158E-07*c^2 + 6.653E-11*c^3 
 
  E = energy (keV) 
  c = channel number 
 
 
Resolution vs. Energy 
 
 FWHM(E) = 0.89 + 0.03064*SQRT(E) 
 
  FWHM = Full Width Half Max (keV) 
  E = energy (keV) 
 
 
Efficiency vs. Energy 
 
 e(E) = exp { -3.776 + 0.9255*ln(962.1/E) + 0.1003*[ln(962.1/E)]^2 
  - 0.0896*[ln(962.1/E)]^3 }  
 
  e = efficiency (counts/gamma) 
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                 ATMOSPHERIC RADIONUCLIDE MEASUREMENT REPORT 




Station ID:         CA002               Detector ID:        CAA2                 
Station Type:       ISAR2               Detector Type:                           
 
Station Location: Vancouver, Canada                                  
Detector Description: Detector A in Vancouver, Canada                    
 
Sample ID:             0023232          Sample Geometry:    DISK       
Sample Quantity:      23261.00 m3       Sample Type:        Filter               
 
 
Collection Start:   1997/03/25 19:22    Sampling Time:        24.20 hours 
Collection Stop:    1997/03/26 19:34    Decay Time:            4.26 hours 
Acquisition Start:  1997/03/26 23:49    Acquisition Time:     17.89 hours 
Acquisition Stop:   1997/03/27 17:43    Avg Flow Rate:       961.20 m3/hr     
 
Collection Station Comments: 
goshka - Detector 1 Ranger (26-MAR-1997)  
 
IDC Analysis General Comments: 











Level 1  =  Normal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 2  =  Abnormal Natural Rad. Meas. 
Level 3  =  Normal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
Level 4  =  Abnormal Anthropogenic Rad. Meas. 
 












Nuclide            Half-Life            Conc(uBq/m3)        %RelErr        
Notes          
 
BE-7               53.3 D                  3.9E+03          2.52 











MINIMUM DETECTABLE CONCENTRATION FOR KEY NUCLIDES======================== 
 
Nuclide            Half-Life               MDC(uBq/m3)          
 
BA-140             12.75 D                     10.95 
CE-143             1.4 D                        9.64 
CS-134             2.06135 Y                    2.98 
CS-136             13.16 D                      2.97 
CS-137             30.0197 Y                    3.17 
I-131              8.04 D                       3.68 
I-133              20.8 H                       6.50 
MO-99              65.94 H                     28.22 
NB-95              35.15 D                      3.19 
RU-103             39.26 D                      2.78 
TE-132             78.2 H                       3.44 
ZR-95              64.02 D                      4.90 
ZR-97              17 H                         7.41 
 
 
PEAK SEARCH RESULTS====================================================== 
 
      31 peaks found in spectrum by automated peak search.   
      29 peaks associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
       2 peaks not associated with nuclides by automated processing. 
      94 percent of peaks were associated with nuclides.     
 
 Note: "*" indicates that a peak was a component of a multiplet. 
 
 Energy   Centroid   Width  FWHM    %Eff    Net Area     %RelErr   Nuclide  Nts      
 
  74.78   102.38 *     17   1.25   10.53     12200.42      1.25     PB-212       
  74.78   102.38 *     17   1.25   10.53     12200.42      1.25     PB-214       
  74.78   102.38 *     17   1.25   10.53     12200.42      1.25     TL-208       
  77.08   105.51 *     17   1.25   10.63     19126.90      1.07     BI-214       
  77.08   105.51 *     17   1.25   10.63     19126.90      1.07     PB-212       
  77.08   105.51 *     17   1.25   10.63     19126.90      1.07     PB-214       
  87.17   119.28 *     18   1.41   10.91      7313.30      2.03     PB-212       
  87.17   119.28 *     18   1.41   10.91      7313.30      2.03     PB-214       
  89.85   122.95 *     18   1.42   10.95      2387.64      3.24     BI-214       
  89.85   122.95 *     18   1.42   10.95      2387.64      3.24     PB-212       
 115.15   157.46       12   1.25   10.90       714.98     14.42     PB-212       
 238.63   325.98       16   1.30    7.94     44693.01      0.72     PB-212       
 277.34   378.82       14   1.42    7.12      1748.61      5.26     TL-208       
 288.13   393.54        9   1.42    6.91       330.35     21.80     BI-212       
 300.11   409.90       21   1.31    6.70      2296.71      4.26     PB-212       
 338.44   462.21        9   1.15    6.07       149.62     34.07               1  
 351.94   480.64       17   1.25    5.87       363.39     16.53     PB-214       
 452.87   618.43       11   1.48    4.69       256.36     18.57     BI-212       
 477.56   652.13       13   1.46    4.46     26360.02      0.91     BE-7         
 510.76   697.45       19   1.79    4.19      4815.73      2.40     TL-208       
 583.15   796.29       12   1.54    3.69     13651.37      1.28     TL-208       
 609.28   831.96       16   1.54    3.54       325.08     13.19     BI-214       
 727.30   993.12        8   1.62    2.99      2874.12      2.97     BI-212       
 763.43  1042.46       15   1.47    2.85       214.46     16.28     TL-208       
 785.42  1072.49       15   1.82    2.77       409.66     10.26     BI-212       
 785.42  1072.49       15   1.82    2.77       409.66     10.26     BI-214       
 785.42  1072.49       15   1.82    2.77       409.66     10.26     PB-214       
 860.51  1175.04       16   1.68    2.54      1766.80      3.86     TL-208       
 893.18  1219.66        8   1.46    2.45        94.93     29.24     BI-212       
 911.39  1244.52       14   1.61    2.41        88.00     30.39               2  
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1078.73  1473.08       10   1.55    2.06       177.79     16.89     BI-212       
1093.81  1493.68       18   1.91    2.04       222.30     14.78     TL-208       
1460.80  1994.98       15   2.12    1.59      2457.92      3.22     K-40         
1512.71  2065.89       13   2.21    1.55        95.87     25.09     BI-212       
1592.40  2174.76       15   2.24    1.49       380.51      9.66     TL-208       
1620.75  2213.48       14   2.04    1.47       354.75     10.06     BI-212       
1764.67  2410.09       14   1.85    1.38        61.49     33.36     BI-214       
2103.41  2872.82       26   3.16    1.23       581.03      7.96     TL-208       
2614.49  3570.83       20   2.61    1.10      4586.25      2.23     TL-208       
 
 
PEAK SEARCH NOTES===================================================== 
 
NOTE 1: 
Date Entered: 1997/03/27 16:48:19 
Analyst: dwilliam 
Known natural nuclide, but lack of ID due to decay: only strongest line(s) 
present, insufficient for ID.  
 
Date Entered: 1997/03/27 16:48:19 
Analyst: dwilliam 





Date Entered: 1997/03/27 16:35:58 
Analyst: dwilliam 
Known natural nuclide, but lack of ID due to decay: only strongest line(s) 







Energy vs. Channel 
 
 E(c) = -0.2519 + 0.7329*c - 4.063E-07*c^2 + 6.025E-11*c^3 
 
  E = energy (keV) 
  c = channel number 
 
 
Resolution vs. Energy 
 
 FWHM(E) = 0.89 + 0.03064*SQRT(E) 
 
  FWHM = Full Width Half Max (keV) 
  E = energy (keV) 
 
 
Efficiency vs. Energy 
 
 e(E) = exp { -3.776 + 0.9255*ln(962.1/E) + 0.1003*[ln(962.1/E)]^2 
  - 0.0896*[ln(962.1/E)]^3 }  
 
  e = efficiency (counts/gamma) 
  E = energy (keV)                  
 
 305
Appendix D:  DISCRIMINATING MINIMAL PEAKS FROM BACKGROUND IN 
GAMMA-RAY SPECTROSCOPY 
Abstract 
The net peak detection threshold (PDTn) is a concept that can be used to determine the 
presence of peaks in gamma-ray spectra where the signal-to-noise ratio is low 
(marginally greater than 1).  This concept has traditionally been considered from a 
theoretical and statistical perspective; however, to date, it has not been empirically 
validated with field data.  This study uses historic gamma-ray spectra that were 
environmentally obtained through the Prototype International Data Center (PIDC) in 
support of the Comprehensive [Nuclear] Test Ban Treaty to validate the PDTn concept.  
Through this study, the PDTn is shown to effectively and reliably identify the existence of 
subtle peaks amid relatively high background counts, even in situations where automated 
analytical tools were unable to identify the peaks and visual inspections were 
inconclusive.  As a result, applying the PDTn concept to the real-world spectra evaluated 
in this study enabled a more thorough evaluation of the spectra and highlighted the 
existence of anthropogenic radionuclides not identified through the PIDC’s automated 
gamma-ray spectral processing system.   
 
Introduction 
Performing gamma-ray spectroscopy on environmentally obtained samples to determine 
the presence of minimally abundant radionuclides can be challenging due to the low peak 
areas encountered and interference caused by background counts.  In fact, the signal-to-
noise ratios can be so low that the presence of peaks is best determined by incorporating 
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statistical methods rather than by direct analytical judgment.  In such cases, when the 
gross number of counts (background + net peak) is on the same order of magnitude as the 
background counts, determining a net peak detection threshold (PDTn) can be helpful in 
evaluating whether the deviation from average background values is most likely due to 
statistical noise or the presence of a peak.  The PDTn represents the minimum number of 
net counts required within a peak atop a set number of background counts in order to 
state with confidence that the peak is real.  The level of confidence is defined in terms of 
the Type I and Type II statistical error rates.1  These and other key features related to the 
PDTn are illustrated in Figure D1.   
 
                                                
1 A Type I error (α) occurs when the number of background counts is so high that they are more likely to mistakenly 
represent the presence of a peak.  Conversely, a Type II error (β) occurs when the gross number of counts (background 
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Figure D1:  Key features related to PDTn determination 
 
Figure D1 shows two related probability distribution functions (PDFs) that would be 
expected when using a radiation detector to count radioactive particles.  The steeper peak 
is representative of a background count distribution, while the lower, wider peak is 
representative of a gross counts (background + net peak) distribution.  Naturally, the 
gross counts PDF is centered at a higher number of counts than the background PDF 
because a background with a net peak is expected to generate more counts than 
background alone.  
 
 308
The PDFs are both Poisson and Normal in nature.   The Poisson attributes result from the 
principle that a large number of radioactive emissions give rise to a relatively small 
number of recorded counts (i.e., p <<1, a defining quality of Poisson distributions).  The 
Normal qualities are the result of the Central Limit Theorem, which states that any 
random distribution tends to approximate a Normal distribution provided that the sample 
size is sufficiently large.  In general, a sample size of 20 recorded counts is considered to 
be sufficiently large.   
 
By definition, the peak of a Normal distribution (which corresponds to the greatest 
probability) occurs at its mean value (µ).  Also, according to the definition of a Poisson 
distribution, the standard deviation equals the square root of the average ( µσ = ).  The 
relative sizes and shapes of the two distributions reflect these features.  
 
The portions of the distributions corresponding to Type I and Type II errors are identified 
by α and β, respectively.  Type I errors occur when the number of background counts are 
much higher than normal.  Although no net peak is present, the number of counts is so 
high that they give the appearance of a “false peak”.  The reason for the “false peak” 
perception is centered upon the critical level – the number of counts that correspond to an 
equal probability for both distributions.2  Correspondingly, Type II errors occur when the 
number of gross counts is so low that they give the appearance of background alone.   
 
                                                
2 At the critical level, the number of counts is just as likely the result of a background count as they are the result of a 
gross count.  All counts that exceed the critical level are more likely to be associated with the combination of 
background with a net peak, while counts that are lower than the critical level are more likely to be associated with 
background alone. 
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The critical level is a value that can be specified according to the level of detection 
confidence that is desired.  As the critical level is increased or decreased, the areas under 
the α and β sections of the respective PDFs are adjusted accordingly, which specify the 
error percentages.  The critical level is usually defined as a function of a constant 
multiplied by the standard deviation (i.e., kσ).  Since the percentage of area under a 
Normal PDF is commonly specified in terms of σ, by specifying the critical level as a 
function of σ, the critical level can be correlated to a percentage of area under the PDF 
curve.  Values for k and corresponding areas under the Normal PDF are shown in Table 
D1. 
 
Table D1:  k Values and Corresponding Confidence Levels and Error Percentages 
k kσ Percentage of Normal PDF Area 
Covered (confidence level) 
Error Percentage 
(α, β, respectively) 
0 0 0.500 0.500 
0.253 0.253σ 0.600 0.400 
0.500 0.5σ 0.692 0.308 
0.524 0.524σ 0.700 0.300 
0.674 0.674σ 0.750 0.250 
0.842 0.842σ 0.800 0.200 
1.000 σ 0.841 0.159 
1.282 1.282σ 0.900 0.100 
1.500 1.5σ 0.933 0.067 
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1.645 1.645σ 0.950 0.050 
1.960 1.96σ 0.975 0.025 
2.000 2σ 0.977 0.023 
2.326 2.326σ 0.990 0.010 
2.500 2.5σ 0.994 0.006 
2.576 2.576σ 0.995 0.005 
3.000 3σ 0.999 0.001 
3.300 3.3σ 1.000 0.000 
 
As Figure D1 shows, the PDTn, which is the minimum number of net counts allowed in a 
reliable peak, is the difference between the average number of gross counts and the 
average number of background counts.  This is expressed mathematically in Equation D1.  
However, in most practical situations, rarely are both average values known.  Therefore, 
expressing the PDTn in terms of one of the average values is more useful.  The derivation 
below will result in an expression for the PDTn in terms of the average number of 
background counts, µB.  
 
BPBnPDT µµ −= +   Equation D1 
 
According to Figure D1, one way to evaluate the average number of gross counts is in 
terms of the standard deviations of the background and gross distributions. 
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PBBBPB kk ++ ++= σσµµ βα  Equation D2 
 
In cases where the Poisson distribution approximates the Normal distribution (i.e., when 
the number of measured counts exceeds 20), xx µσ = , where x represents the 
distribution being evaluated.  Making this substitution, while combining Equations D1 
and D2, results in Equation D3.    
 
PBBn kkPDT ++= µµ βα   Equation D3 
 
Making the same substitution into Equation D2 and rearranging yields Equation D4, 
which is quadratic in terms of the square root of the average number of gross counts 
( PB+µ ). 
 
( ) 0=+−− ++ BBPBPB kk µµµµ αβ   Equation D4 
 









=+   Equation D5 
 
Substituting Equation D5 into Equation D1 results in Equation D6.  This expression for 
the PDTn has eliminated its dependence on µB+P and is a function of µB. 
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  Equation D6 
 
Simplifying and rearranging the Equation D6 produces Equation D7.   
 

















  Equation D7 
 
When evaluating radiation count data, kα and kβ are considered to be equal.3  Setting kα = 
kβ = k within Equation D7 leads to a highly simplified form of the PDTn as a function of 
µB and k. 
 
( ) BBn kkkPDT µµ 2, 2 +=   Equation D8 
 
This equation can be simplified further to hold the form of Equation D1. 
 
( ) ( ) BBBn kkPDT µµµ −+= 2,   Equation D9 
 
Therefore, using Equation D9, the PDTn can be calculated from the average number of 
recorded background counts and the confidence level constant, k.  Furthermore, the form 
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of Equation D9 enables it to be used to determine whether a peak is real without actually 
calculating the PDTn value.  According to Equation D9, for a given number of 
background counts per channel and constant k, if the average gross number of counts per 
channel is at least ( )2kB +µ , then the peak can be stated with confidence to be real.  
Table D2 and Figure D2 show selected background, PDTn, and gross values when k = 
1.645, which corresponds to a 95% confidence level. 
 
Table D2:  Selected Background, PDTn, and Gross Values 
If the number 
of background 
counts per 
channel is x, 
then the PDTn (i.e., the 
required minimum number 
of net counts per channel 
within the peak) is y; 
and the total 
number of gross 
counts per channel 
must be x+y. 
20 17.41935 37.41935 
25 19.15603 44.15603 
30 20.7261 50.7261 
35 22.16993 57.16993 
40 23.51381 63.51381 
45 24.77602 69.77602 
50 25.96984 75.96984 
55 27.10532 82.10532 
60 28.19026 88.19026 
                                                                                                                                            
3 A frequently used k value for kα = kβ = k is 1.645.  According to Table D1, this value for k corresponds to 
a 95% level of confidence (or a 5% error percentage). 
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65 29.23085 94.23085 
70 30.23214 100.2321 
75 31.19826 106.1983 
80 32.13268 112.1327 
85 33.03833 118.0383 
90 33.91771 123.9177 
95 34.77298 129.773 
100 35.60603 135.606 
105 36.41849 141.4185 
110 37.21184 147.2118 
115 37.98734 152.9873 
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Figure D2:  Graphical Depiction of Net and Gross Counts per Channel in Threshold 
Peaks 
Analysis 
Figure D3 is a gamma-ray spectrum that was acquired on 23 March 1997 through 
environmental sampling at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, British 
Columbia, Canada.  This representative spectrum demonstrates the difficulties that can be 
encountered in determining whether trace amounts of certain radionuclides are present.  
For example, in this spectrum, neither Bi-206 (with primary gamma-ray of 803.10 keV, 
which corresponds to channel 1097) nor Po-204 (with primary gamma-ray of 883.96 
keV, which corresponds to channel 1207) is identified by the automated analysis system.  
Even so, as visual analysis will show, it is possible that both of these radionuclides are 
present in trace quantities.   Figures D4a and D4b show enlargements of these two 
Gross Counts per Channel in Peak   
 
Net Counts per Channel in Peak (PDTn)
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regions with estimated baselines included.  Figures D4c through D4j show enlargements 
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Figure D3:  Gamma-Ray Spectrum from Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada 
collected 23 March 1997 Highlighting Regions where Bi-206 and Po-204 
Peaks may be Present 
     


























  Figure D4a:  Bi-206 Region -- 23 March 97    Figure D4b:  Po-204 Region -- 23 March 97    
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 Figure D4c:  Bi-206 Region -- 14 March 97   Figure D4d:  Po-204 Region -- 14 March 97    
   
































 Figure D4e:  Bi-206 Region -- 15 March 97    Figure D4f:  Po-204 Region -- 15 March 97         
   


























 Figure D4g:  Bi-206 Region -- 16 March 97    Figure D4h:  Po-204 Region -- 16 March 97         
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 Figure D4i:  Bi-206 Region -- 21 March 97     Figure D4j:  Po-204 Region -- 21 March 97         
 
Using the criteria described in Equation D9 and shown in Table D2 and Figure D2, the 
following conclusions can be drawn regarding the possible existence of peaks in the Bi-
206 and Po-204 regions in Figures D4a through D4j. 
 














per Channel for 






Visual Inspection of 
Peak Existence 
(estimate based solely 
on figures D4a - D4j 
shown above) 
D4a 29 23.25 20.73 Yes Yes,  Definitely Peak 
D4b 32 10.67 21.32 No No,  Definitely Not 
D4c 36 23.4 22.45 Yes Yes,  Definitely Peak 
D4d 30 8.5 20.73 No No,  Definitely Not 
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D4e 50 43 25.97 Yes Yes,  Definitely Peak 
D4f 42 31.2 24.03 Yes ?,  Probably Peak 
D4g 34 32.25 21.89 Yes Yes,  Definitely Peak 
D4h 26 9 19.48 No No,  Definitely Not 
D4i 33 30.67 21.61 Yes Yes,  Definitely Peak 
D4j 25 19 19.16 No ?,  Probably Not 
 
Conclusions 
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from this study.  The principal outcome 
is that the PDTn is empirically shown to effectively and reliably determine the existence 
of peaks amongst background counts with a prescribed level of confidence.  This study 
also highlights the value of the PDTn in situations where visual inspections are 
inconclusive.  Moreover, because the PDTn concept is based upon an equation rooted in 
statistics, it can be a useful supplement to automated analytical tools that experience 
higher Type II error rates than desired.   
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Armenia, Republic of: Nuclear Power Reactors  
Operational 1 
Shut Down 1 
Annual Electrical Power Production for 2003 
Total Power Production (including Nuclear) Nuclear Power Production 
5136 GWh(e)  1822 GWh(e)  
 
    Capacity (MWe) Date 
Name Type Status Location Net Gross Connected
ARMENIA-1  WWER Shut Down ARMENIA 376 408 1976/12/28
ARMENIA-2  WWER Operational ARMENIA 376 408 1980/01/05
 
Belgium, Kingdom of : Nuclear Power Reactors  
Operational 7 
Shut Down 1 
Annual Electrical Power Production for 2003 
Total Power Production (including Nuclear)
* Estimate 
Nuclear Power Production 
* Estimate 
80435 GWh(e)  44613 GWh(e)  
 
    Capacity (MWe) Date 
Name Type Status Location Net Gross Connected
BR-3  PWR Shut Down BELGIUM-PROVINCE 
D'ANVERS 
11 12 1962/10/10
DOEL-1  PWR Operational FLANDRE 
ORIENTALE 
392 412 1974/08/28
DOEL-2  PWR Operational FLANDRE 
ORIENTALE 
392 412 1975/08/21
DOEL-3  PWR Operational FLANDRE 
ORIENTALE 
1006 1056 1982/06/23




TIHANGE-1  PWR Operational LIEGE 962 1009 1975/03/07
TIHANGE-2  PWR Operational LIEGE 1008 1055 1982/10/13
TIHANGE-3  PWR Operational LIEGE 1015 1065 1985/06/15
 
Bulgaria, Republic of: Nuclear Power Reactors  
Operational 4 
Shut Down 2 
Annual Electrical Power Production for 2003 
Total Power Production (including Nuclear) Nuclear Power Production 
42534 GWh(e)  16040 GWh(e)  
 
    Capacity (MWe) Date 
Name Type Status Location Net Gross Connected
KOZLODUY-1  WWER Shut Down  408 440 1974/07/24
KOZLODUY-2  WWER Shut Down  408 440 1975/09/27
KOZLODUY-3  WWER Operational  408 440 1980/12/17
KOZLODUY-4  WWER Operational  408 440 1982/05/17
KOZLODUY-5  WWER Operational  953 1000 1987/11/29
KOZLODUY-6  WWER Operational  953 1000 1991/08/02
 
Czech Republic: Nuclear Power Reactors  
Operational 6 
Annual Electrical Power Production for 2003 
Total Power Production (including Nuclear) Nuclear Power Production 
83227 GWh(e)  25872 GWh(e)  
 
    Capacity (MWe) Date 
Name Type Status Location Net Gross Connected
DUKOVANY-1  WWER Operational TREBIC 412 440 1985/02/24
DUKOVANY-2  WWER Operational TREBIC 412 440 1986/01/30
DUKOVANY-3  WWER Operational TREBIC 412 440 1986/11/14
DUKOVANY-4  WWER Operational TREBIC 412 440 1987/06/11
TEMELIN-1  WWER Operational SOUTH 950 1000 2000/12/21
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BOHEMIA 




Finland, Republic of: Nuclear Power Reactors  
Operational 4 
Annual Electrical Power Production for 2003 
Total Power Production (including Nuclear) Nuclear Power Production 
79855 GWh(e)  21819 GWh(e)  
 
    Capacity (MWe) Date 
Name Type Status Location Net Gross Connected
LOVIISA-1  WWER Operational  488 510 1977/02/08
LOVIISA-2  WWER Operational  488 510 1980/11/04
OLKILUOTO-1  BWR Operational  840 870 1978/09/02
OLKILUOTO-2  BWR Operational  840 870 1980/02/18
 
France (French Republic): Nuclear Power Reactors  
Operational 59 
Shut Down 11 
Annual Electrical Power Production for 2003 
Total Power Production (including Nuclear) Nuclear Power Production 
541600 GWh(e)  420700 GWh(e)  
 
    Capacity (MWe) Date 
Name Type Status Location Net Gross Connected
BELLEVILLE-1  PWR Operational  1310 1363 1987/10/14
BELLEVILLE-2  PWR Operational  1310 1363 1988/07/06
BLAYAIS-1  PWR Operational GIRONDE 910 951 1981/06/12
BLAYAIS-2  PWR Operational GIRONDE 910 951 1982/07/17
BLAYAIS-3  PWR Operational GIRONDE 910 951 1983/08/17
BLAYAIS-4  PWR Operational GIRONDE 910 945 1983/05/16
BUGEY-1  GCR Shut Down AIN 540 555 1972/04/15
 330
BUGEY-2  PWR Operational AIN 910 945 1978/05/10
BUGEY-3  PWR Operational AIN 910 917 1978/09/21
BUGEY-4  PWR Operational AIN 880 917 1979/03/08
BUGEY-5  PWR Operational AIN 880 937 1979/07/31
CATTENOM-1  PWR Operational MOSELLE 1300 1362 1986/11/13
CATTENOM-2  PWR Operational MOSELLE 1300 1362 1987/09/17
CATTENOM-3  PWR Operational MOSELLE 1300 1362 1990/07/06
CATTENOM-4  PWR Operational MOSELLE 1300 1362 1991/05/27
CHINON-A1  GCR Shut Down CHINON 70 80 1963/06/14
CHINON-A2  GCR Shut Down CHINON 210 230 1965/02/24
CHINON-A3  GCR Shut Down CHINON 480 480 1966/08/04
CHINON-B-1  PWR Operational CHINON 905 969 1982/11/30
CHINON-B-2  PWR Operational CHINON 905 969 1983/11/29
CHINON-B-3  PWR Operational CHINON 905 969 1986/10/20
CHINON-B-4  PWR Operational CHINON 905 969 1987/11/14
CHOOZ-
A(ARDENNES)  
PWR Shut Down ARDENNES 310 320 1967/04/03
CHOOZ-B-1  PWR Operational ARDENNES 1500 1520 1996/08/30
CHOOZ-B-2  PWR Operational ARDENNES 1500 1520 1997/04/10
CIVAUX-1  PWR Operational  1495 1520 1997/12/24
CIVAUX-2  PWR Operational  1495 1520 1999/12/24
CREYS-
MALVILLE  
FBR Shut Down ISERE 1200 1242 1986/01/14
CRUAS-1  PWR Operational ARDECHE 915 956 1983/04/29
CRUAS-2  PWR Operational ARDECHE 915 956 1984/09/06
CRUAS-3  PWR Operational ARDECHE 915 956 1984/05/14
CRUAS-4  PWR Operational ARDECHE 915 956 1984/10/27
DAMPIERRE-1  PWR Operational LOIRET 890 937 1980/03/23
DAMPIERRE-2  PWR Operational LOIRET 890 937 1980/12/10
DAMPIERRE-3  PWR Operational LOIRET 890 937 1981/01/30
DAMPIERRE-4  PWR Operational LOIRET 890 937 1981/08/18
EL-4 (MONTS 
D'ARREE)  
HWGCR Shut Down MONTS 
ARREL 
70 75 1967/07/09
FESSENHEIM-1  PWR Operational HAUT-RHINE 880 920 1977/04/06
FESSENHEIM-2  PWR Operational HAUT-RHINE 880 920 1977/10/07
FLAMANVILLE-1  PWR Operational MANCHE 1330 1382 1985/12/04
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FLAMANVILLE-2  PWR Operational MANCHE 1330 1382 1986/07/18
G-2 (MARCOULE)  GCR Shut Down  38 43 1959/04/22
G-3 (MARCOULE)  GCR Shut Down  38 43 1960/04/04
GOLFECH-1  PWR Operational TARN ET 
GARONNE 
1310 1363 1990/06/07
GOLFECH-2  PWR Operational TARN ET 
GARONNE 
1310 1363 1993/06/18
GRAVELINES-1  PWR Operational DUNKERQUE 910 956 1980/03/13
GRAVELINES-2  PWR Operational DUNKERQUE 910 956 1980/08/26
GRAVELINES-3  PWR Operational DUNKERQUE 910 956 1980/12/12
GRAVELINES-4  PWR Operational DUNKERQUE 910 956 1981/06/14
GRAVELINES-5  PWR Operational DUNKERQUE 910 956 1984/08/28
GRAVELINES-6  PWR Operational DUNKERQUE 910 956 1985/08/01
NOGENT-1  PWR Operational AUBE 1310 1363 1987/10/21
NOGENT-2  PWR Operational AUBE 1310 1363 1988/12/14
PALUEL-1  PWR Operational SEINE 
MARITIME 
1330 1382 1984/06/22
PALUEL-2  PWR Operational SEINE 
MARITIME 
1330 1382 1984/09/14
PALUEL-3  PWR Operational SEINE 
MARITIME 
1330 1382 1985/09/30
PALUEL-4  PWR Operational SEINE 
MARITIME 
1330 1382 1986/04/11
PENLY-1  PWR Operational SEINE 
MARITIME 
1330 1382 1990/05/04
PENLY-2  PWR Operational SEINE 
MARITIME 
1330 1382 1992/02/04
PHENIX  FBR Operational GARD 233 250 1973/12/13
ST. ALBAN-1  PWR Operational ISERE 1335 1381 1985/08/30
ST. ALBAN-2  PWR Operational ISERE 1335 1381 1986/07/03
ST. LAURENT-A1  GCR Shut Down LOIR ET CHER 480 500 1969/03/14
ST. LAURENT-A2  GCR Shut Down LOIR ET CHER 515 530 1971/08/09
ST. LAURENT-B-1  PWR Operational LOIR ET CHER 915 937 1981/01/21
ST. LAURENT-B-2  PWR Operational LOIR ET CHER 915 937 1981/06/01
TRICASTIN-1  PWR Operational DROME 915 920 1980/05/31
TRICASTIN-2  PWR Operational DROME 915 920 1980/08/07
TRICASTIN-3  PWR Operational DROME 915 920 1981/02/10
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TRICASTIN-4  PWR Operational DROME 915 920 1981/06/12
 
Germany, Federal Republic of: Nuclear Power Reactors  
Operational 18 
Shut Down 18 
Annual Electrical Power Production for 2003 
Total Power Production (including Nuclear) Nuclear Power Production 
560300 GWh(e)  157443 GWh(e)  
 
    Capacity (MWe) Date 
Name Type Status Location Net Gross Connected
AVR JUELICH (AVR)  HTGR Shut Down NORDRHEIN-
WESTFALEN 
13 15 1967/12/17
BIBLIS-A (KWB A)  PWR Operational HESSEN 1167 1225 1974/08/25
BIBLIS-B (KWB B)  PWR Operational HESSEN 1240 1300 1976/04/06








EMSLAND (KKE)  PWR Operational NIEDERSACHSEN 1329 1400 1988/04/19
GRAFENRHEINFELD 
(KKG)  
PWR Operational BAYERN 1275 1345 1981/12/21
GREIFSWALD-1(KGR 
1)  
WWER Shut Down  408 440 1973/12/17
GREIFSWALD-2 
(KGR 2)  
WWER Shut Down  408 440 1974/12/23
GREIFSWALD-3 
(KGR 3)  
WWER Shut Down  408 440 1977/10/24
GREIFSWALD-4 
(KGR 4)  
WWER Shut Down  408 440 1979/09/03
GREIFSWALD-5 
(KGR 5)  
WWER Shut Down  408 440 1989/04/24
GROHNDE (KWG)  PWR Operational NIEDERSACHSEN 1360 1430 1984/09/04
GUNDREMMINGEN-
A (KRB A)  
BWR Shut Down BAYERN 237 250 1966/12/01
GUNDREMMINGEN-
B (GUN-B)  
BWR Operational BAYERN 1284 1344 1984/03/16
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GUNDREMMINGEN-
C (GUN-C)  
BWR Operational BAYERN 1288 1344 1984/11/02
HDR 
GROSSWELZHEIM  
BWR Shut Down BAYERN 23 25 1969/10/14
ISAR-1 (KKI 1)  BWR Operational BAYERN 878 912 1977/12/03
ISAR-2 (KKI 2)  PWR Operational BAYERN 1400 1475 1988/01/22
KNK II  FBR Shut Down BADEN-
WUERTTEMBERG
17 21 1978/04/09
KRUEMMEL (KKK)  BWR Operational SCHLESWIG-
HOLSTEIN 
1260 1316 1983/09/28
LINGEN (KWL)  BWR Shut Down NIEDERSACHSEN 250 268 1968/07/01
MUELHEIM-
KAERLICH (KMK)  
PWR Shut Down RHEINLAND-
PFALZ 
1219 1302 1986/03/14















HWGCR Shut Down BAYERN 100 106 1973/01/01













RHEINSBERG (KKR)  PWR Shut Down RHEINSBERG 62 70 1966/05/06
STADE (KKS)  PWR Shut Down NIEDERSACHSEN 640 672 1972/01/29





PWR Operational NIEDERSACHSEN 1345 1410 1978/09/29
VAK KAHL  BWR Shut Down BAYERN 15 16 1961/06/17
WUERGASSEN 
(KWW)  




Spain, Kingdom of: Nuclear Power Reactors  
Operational 9 
 334
Shut Down 1 
Annual Electrical Power Production for 2003 
Total Power Production (including Nuclear) Nuclear Power Production 
251050 GWh(e)  59359 GWh(e)  
 
    Capacity (MWe) Date 
Name Type Status Location Net Gross Connected
ALMARAZ-1  PWR Operational CACERES 947 977 1981/05/01
ALMARAZ-2  PWR Operational CACERES 950 980 1983/10/08
ASCO-1  PWR Operational TARRAGONA 996 1033 1983/08/13
ASCO-2  PWR Operational TARRAGONA 992 1027 1985/10/23
COFRENTES  BWR Operational VALENCIA 1063 1095 1984/10/14
JOSE CABRERA-
1(ZORITA)  
PWR Operational GUADALAJARA 142 150 1968/07/14
SANTA MARIA DE 
GARONA  
BWR Operational BURGOS 446 466 1971/03/02
TRILLO-1  PWR Operational GUADALAJARA 1003 1066 1988/05/23
VANDELLOS-1  GCR Shut Down TARAGONA 480 500 1972/05/06
VANDELLOS-2  PWR Operational TARAGONA 1045 1087 1987/12/12
 
Selected European Research Reactors  
Country Facility Name Thermal 
Power (kW)
Type Status Criticality 
Date 
Austria ASTRA 500.00 POOL SHUT 1960 
Austria TRIGA MARK II 250.00 TRIGA OPER 1962/03/07




MOCKUP OF BR2 
0.50 POOL SHUT 1959/12/01
Belgium BR-1 4,000.00 GRAPHITE OPER 1956/05/11
Belgium BR-2 100,000.00 TANK OPER 1961/06/29
Belgium BR-3 40,900.00 PWR POWER SHUT 1962/08/29
Belgium THETIS RR-BN-1 250.00 POOL OPER 1967/04/07
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Belgium VENUS 0.50 CRIT 
ASSEMBLY 
OPER 1964/04/30
Bulgaria IRT-SOFIA 2,000.00 POOL, IRT SHUT 1961/09/01
Czech 
Republic 
LR-0 5.00 POOL-VAR OPER 1982/12/19
Czech 
Republic 
LWR-15 REZ 10,000.00 TANK WWR OPER 1957/09/24
Czech 
Republic 










VR-1 VRABEC 5.00 POOL OPER 1990/03/12
Denmark DR-1 2.00 HOMOG (L) OPER 1957/08/15
Denmark DR-2 5,000.00 POOL DEC
M 
1958/12/18
Denmark DR-3 10,000.00 HEAVY 
WATER 
SHUT 1960/01/16
Finland FIR-1 250.00 TRIGA 
MARK II 
OPER 1962/03/27
Finland SCA 0.00 SUBCRIT DEC
M 
1963/07/30
France CABRI 25,000.00 POOL OPER 1963/01/01
Greece DEMOKRITOS 
(GRR-1) 







Greece NTU 0.10 SUBCRIT SHUT 1970/10/10
Hungary BUDAPEST RES. 
REACTOR 
10,000.00 TANK WWR OPER 1959/03/25
Hungary NUCL. TRAINING 
REACTOR 
100.00 POOL OPER 1971/01/01





Italy AGN 201 
COSTANZA 
0.02 HOMOG (S) OPER 1960/02/12
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Italy L-54 M 50.00 HOMOG (L) DEC
M 
1959/11/20





Italy RANA 10.00 POOL SHUT 1965/02/15
Italy RB-1 20.00 CRIT 
GRAPHITE 
SHUT 1962/07/01
Italy RB-2 10.00 ARGONAUT SHUT 1963/05/28
Italy RB-3 0.10 ZERO 
POWER D2O 
SHUT 1971/08/09





Italy ROSPO 2 0.20 POOL DEC
M 
1963/01/01
Italy RSV TAPIRO 5.00 FAST 
SOURCE 
OPER 1971/04/04
Italy SM-1 SUBCRITICAL 
ASSEMBLY 















Academisch Medisch Centrum Universiteit van Amsterdam  
Academisch Ziekenhuis Nijmegen St Radboud  
Laurentius Ziekenhuis, Roermond  
Leids Universitair Medisch Centrum  
Mesos Medisch Centrum, Utrecht  
Nederlands Kanker Instituut / Antoni van Leeuwenhoek Ziekenhuis, Amsterdam  
Reinier de Graaf Groep  
St. Antonius Ziekenhuis, Niewegein  
The Digital Hospital  
Westeinde Hospital, The Hague  
Ziekenhuis Centrum Apeldoorn, Nijmegen  
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Ziekenhuis Gelderse Vallei  
Ziekenhuis St. Jansdal, Harderwijk  
   
Norway 
 
Aker University Hospital, Olso  
Harstad Sykehus  
Haukeland Sykehus, Bergen  
Kirkenes Sykehus  
Kongsgard Sykehus, Kristiansand  
Lofoten Sykehus  
Lovisenberg Diakonale Sykehus, Oslo  
Namdal Sykehus, Nord-Trøndelag  
Narvik Sykehus - Narvik Sykehus  
Nordland Sentralsykehus, Bodø  
Rana Sentralsykehus  
Statens Senter for Epilepsi, Sandvika  
National Hospital, Rikshospitalet, Olso  
University Hospital of Trondheim  
   
Poland 
 
Centralny Szpital Kliniczny Wojskowej Akademii Medycznej z Poliklinika  
Kolejowy Szpital Dzieciecy  
Specjalistyczny Szpital Miejski im. Miko³aja Kopernika  
Szpital Damians, Warsaw  
Szpital Kliniczny Wojskowej Akademii Medycznej  
Szpital Wojewodzki, Koszalinie  
Szpital Wojskowy z Przychodnia  
Szpital Wojewodzki im. SW. Lukasza w Tarnowie  
Wojewodzki Szpital Specjalistyczny, Wroclaw  
   
Portugal 
 
Centro Hospitalar de Coimbra  
Hospitais da Universidade de Coimbra  
Hospital de Nossa Senhora da Assuncao, Seia  
Hospital de São João Baptista  
Hospital de Santa Cruz, Carnaxide  
Hospital São Sebastião  
Hospital de São Teotónio de Viseu  
Hospital Distrital de Santarém  
Hospital Geral de Coimbra  
Hospital Ortopédico Sant'Iago - Outão  
Hospital Pediátrico de Coimbra  
Hospital Sobral Cid  
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Maternidade Bissaya Barreto  
Santa Maria Hospital, Lisbon  
   
Sweden 
 
Akademiska Sjukhuset, Uppsala University Hospital, Uppsala  
Halsinglands Sjukhus  
Huddinge Universitetssjukhus  
Karolinska Institutet Danderyds Sjukhus, Stockholm  
Karolinska Institutet, Institutionen Södersjukhuset, Stockholm  
Linkoping University Hospital  
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Appendix G:  SELECTED REPORTS REGARDING SPANISH FACILITY  
RADIONUCLIDE RELEASE 
Legal Void Meant Costly Delay When Spanish Firm Melted Source  
from a September 24, 1998, Nucleonics Week article  
When a cesium-137 source was accidentally melted in a vat of scrap metal bought by the 
Spanish steel firm Acerinox, no regulations existed telling management what to do, a 
senior Spanish safety official said last week.  
''This industrial activity is totally unregulated,'' said Jose Azuara, a commissioner of 
Spain's Nuclear Safety Council (CSN). ''There was no legal responsibility for the 
company in the aftermath of the accident.'' The legal void, he said, eventually cost $25-
million and led to a four-fold increase in the amount of contaminated material on one site 
before it was finally isolated.  
 
At an IAEA-cosponsored conference on security of nuclear materials last week in Dijon, 
France (NW, 17 Sept., 1), Azuara recalled that, on May 30, an electric furnace at the 
firm's works near Cadiz melted down a Cs-137 source, venting radioactive emissions via 
the plant stack. The filtering system retained some matter, resulting in contamination of 
270 metric tons (MT) of dust produced by the melting of the scrap. Azuara said that 
Acerinox, not realizing it had melted a source, moved 150 MT of the dust to another 
factory in Huelva, several hundred kilometers away. There, he said, the dust was 
unwittingly mixed with cement and sand into a ''dough,'' which was then ''spread out in 
layers'' over a marshland, a process designed for conditioning conventional waste. That 
process increased the amount of contaminated material to 500 MT.  
 
The first warning that the dust was contaminated came only on June 2, three days after 
the melting. Radioactivity was detected by a gate monitor at the Huelva factory as the 
truck that had brought the waste left the facility. CSN got the news only on June 9, 
Azuara said. The following day, the safety agency sent an inspection team to Acerinox. 
By June 12, CSN had cordoned off contaminated parts of the plant and begun checking 
for possible contamination of workers. It also reported the incident to the IAEA and 
counterpart agencies (NW, 18 June, 21).  
 
On June 11, radiation monitors in southern France and northern Italy had begun detecting 
atmospheric Cs-137 levels up to 2,000 times higher than normal (2,000 microbecquerels 
per cubic meter compared to 2 Bq/m3). Because the isotopes were identical, the French 
and Italian findings were assumed to have originated in Acerinox.  
 
Azuara said six people at the Spanish companies involved were slightly contaminated by 
the Cs-137 and the radiological impact of atmospheric Cs-137 was negligible. But 
because of the lack of rules and infrastructure, the environmental impact of the incident 
in Spain was ''important,'' Azuara said. Ignorance of the presence of radioactivity in the 
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dust led to actions which increased the volume of the contaminated material by 400% at 
Huelva and irrevocably contaminated the marshland with cesium.  
 
Economic damage caused by the accident was about $25-million, he said, due mostly to 
interruption of the factories' activities, but including $3-million for cleanup and $3-
million for storage of the waste.  
Spain was criticized for delays in reporting the contamination to both national and 
international bodies and in isolating the radioactive material. Azuara said delays arose 
because ''neither scrap trade activities nor industrial processes using this material are 
submitted to any specific regulation to cope with the presence of improper active 
material.'' World trade in scrap metal is 400-million MT/year, the CSN official said. 
Spain alone buys and sells about 12-million MT/y, he said, about half of it imported.  
 
What's more, under Spanish rules, Acerinox ''is not obliged to have any systems installed 
to detect the presence of (such material) nor to make an early report of the incident to 
CSN.'' But the nine-day delay in reporting ''was the cause of the main negative 
consequences'' of the incident, he said. Underscoring the legal void, Azuara said, an 
investigation has concluded that Acerinox ''should not have to face any legal 
responsibility'' for its actions.  
 
Azuara said that, since June, CSN has met with the Ministry of Industry and the National 
Scrap Traders Association and steel industry to seek a solution. But industry, he said, has 
ruled out continuous monitoring of steel production, analogous to monitoring conducted 
at nuclear installations, as inappropriate. Instead, he said, ''control of key points in the 
process is equally effective'' and ''would not unduly increase burdens on enterprises.''  
 
Spain is expected to accept rules that concentrate on detecting sources at final 
destinations as well as controlling trade from point of origin.  
 
Spain's industry has agreed to install detection systems at factory entrances to check 
incoming loads of scrap, although this approach will be less effective for sealed sources. 
Azuara said controls are expected to be set up at about 90 different destinations in Spain.  
 
Right now, installation of detectors is voluntary, but the Ministry of Industry is 
considering making it compulsory. The work is being supported by Spanish radiation 
monitoring experts and will include programs to train steel company employees. 
Separately, studies are being done to define compulsory procedures to be followed when 
radioactive material is detected at a scrap metal-handling plant.  
 
Spain can do little on its own to control radioactive sources at their origins. CSN 
Chairman Juan Manuel Kindelan said in July that his agency will lobby the European 
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Union for a new directive setting requirements for control of imported sources (NW, 30 
July, 13). At the least, Azuara said last week, a system must be organized to alert foreign 
firms and authorities when sources are discovered stolen or missing. In addition, he 
argued, the world's steel industry must be familiarized with the characteristics of 





Recently the Council of Seguridad Nuclear (CSN) recognized that still they are left 1700 
tons of radioactive ashes in the ACERINOX plant, where took place the fusion of a 
source of Cs-137 the 30 of May of 1988. According to Ecologists in Action this fact 
confirms that the decontamination of the plant was imperfect. 
 
The initial process of decontamination of the factory of ACERINOX, dice by finalized by 
the CSN already was denounced like imperfect by Ecologists in Action. This 
organization esteem that radioactive doses m · ximas guaranteed for the workers was too 
high. The fact that in ACERINOX they are left still 1700 tons of radioactive ashes, with 
an average activity of 70 Bq/gr. (that is to say, 70 disintegrations per second and gram) it 
comes to confirm this asseveration. The CSN has been forced to review their 
appreciations and to evacuate these ashes. The radioactivity that contains comes to be 
between the 2 and 3% of the released one to the medio.ambiente in the fusion of the 
source of Cs-137. The own CSN still maintains in the factory a carp with the sign of the 
radioactivity, which sample that the decontamination has not been finalized. 
 
On the other hand, the CSN tries to treat like inert these remainders, which is 
inadmissible. Ecologists in Action want to denounce in addition that a legal emptiness 
exists on the limits below which a remainder happens to be considered like inert instead 
of radioactive. This consideration allows the CSN to treat the remainders without no 
special precaution and to deposit them in some garbage dump of inert. Still the place of 
destiny of these substances has not been determined that happened to contaminate the 






At the end of May of 1998 a Cs-137 source was melted accidentally in one of the 
stainless steel production plant furnaces that the Acerinox company has in Cadiz (Spain). 
Once the presence of radioactive contamination was detected, a number of organizations 
provided assistance. These included LAINSA, an expert company in decontamination 
and dismantling of radioactive and nuclear facilities with experience in radioactive 
emergencies, the regulatory body, CSN, and the waste management utility, ENRESA. 
They have evaluated the situation and implemented first radiological protection 
measures: 
- Evaluation of the contamination in the plant 
- Control of the access of people, vehicles and materials to the contaminated 
zones 
- Delineation and signing of all areas where radioactivity was detected 
- Control of radiation in the gases extracted by the smoke clearing system. 
The recovery operation for the affected facilities began immediately: even before the 
formal approval from CSN of a Performance Plan, to decontaminate the affected 
facilities. 
Decontamination took 5 months, and 50.000 man-hours were necessary to perform the 
whole work (20% corresponding to radiological protection activities). The total collective 
dose was about 60 man.mSv. 
  
Objectives 
The objectives established in the Performance Plan, previously mentioned, were: 
- To avoid contamination outside the Plant. 
- To guarantee the Radiological protection of the professionally exposed workers, 
the personnel of Acerinox and the public in general 
- To control the decontamination activities according to the Radiological 
Protection standards. 
- To ensure that the generated radioactive waste remained in safe conditions as far 




Since the very beginning the contamination had affected the smoke dust that circulates 
through the conduits of the gas extraction system of the electrical arc furnace nº 1 and to 
the shared clearing system for furnaces no 1 and no 2 (Figure 1). 
Table 1. Levels of initial radiation in the main areas 
SYSTEM Average Dose Rate 
mSv/h 
Maximum Dose Rate 
mSv/h 
Electrical arc furnace no 1 and gas 
ducts extractions 
0.5 1.8 
Natural Cooler and stark arrester 0.02 0.05 
Bag filter nº1 0.05 0.1 
Bag filter nº2 0.02 0.03 
Silos A and B 0.03 0.1 
Table 1 summarises the detected values of radiation in the affected systems. The 
measured activities in samples taken in the smoke dust, before the beginning of the 
decontamination were in the range 800 to 2000 Bq/g. 
  
Radiological Criteria 
According to the Performance Plan approved by the CSN the final state of the facilities 
would be such that: 
- The maximum permissible dose in any zone of the factory did not exceed the 
value 1 mSv in an annual period. 
- The derived values from surface contamination were such that they did not 
exceed 4 Bq.cm-2, in those areas where their measurement was possible. 
Due to the dimensions of the facility and the great number of affected zones it was not 
easy to establish a strict and unique access control. Thus, in the first phase those zones 
with higher dose rates and requiring greater movements of people were identified. The 
measures adopted were based on two general approaches: 
- Immediate Intervention: action to remove radioactive material, decontaminating 
the zone, remove systems, equipment, etc, or. 




The objective established for the final state of the facilities had to fulfil two requirements; 
the production of the Steel Works had to continue and it was necessary to cope with the 
radiological protection principles. 
Therefore, in the first phase decontamination was limited to clearing line no.1, allowing 
normal production to continue on the other clearing line. In that phase most of the very 
low activity contaminated wastes were generated 
Next decontamination of the electrical Furnace no.1 was undertaken, followed by the Bag 
filter no.2 and silos. In these phases, less smoke dust wastes were extracted but metallic 
wastes, refractory bricks of the furnace, etc., were generated. Dry decontamination 
techniques (vacuum cleaning, grinding, etc.) were used to avoid the generation of liquid 
wastes that would have been difficult to treat in that facility. 
Radiological control and ALARA studies 
The main activities of LAINSA were as follow: 
Control of effluents 
Isokinetic samples were taken from the gas evacuation systems. The results showed that 
the values, prior to dispersion and diffusion in the atmosphere, were less than the lower 
limit of detection: 0.6 mBq/l. This monitoring was continuous until the decontamination 
of the smoke clearing systems was completed. 
Radiological control of Decontamination work 
The criteria for radiological protection control of the programme are summarised in the 
Table 2. 
 Table 2. Radiological protection criteria 
Individual dose Constraints:  
0.3 mSv per day; 1 mSv per week; 3 mSv per month 
ALARA studies 
If anticipated collective dose is higher than 10 mmanSv, 
Use of electronic dosimeters 
Works with dose rate greater than 30 µSv/h 
Control of exposed time  
In an ambient dose rate higher than 150 µSv/h. 
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Control of environmental contamination  
Before and during the execution of the works with risk of producing dust. 
With values between 3.75 % and 37.5 % of the LDCA, face mask will be used. 
With values greater than 37.5 % of the LDCA air-fed equipment will be worn the 
ventilation conditions will be improved. 
Control of surface contamination  
Surface contamination limit in zones in which the measurement is feasible < 4 Bq/cm2 
 
The radiological state of areas, equipment or systems were described in the 
corresponding Radiation Work Permit, where a dose estimation was also made. 
  
Controls of access 
RP technicians from the UTPR - a specialised radiation protection company authorised to 
perform radiation protection tasks and provide specific activities such as decontamination 
- monitored the entrance and exit of personnel, materials and wastes, and controlled the 
accesses to the work zones. The controlled zones in the work places and the waste storage 




All the personnel involved in decontamination operations in Acerinox were classified as 
Professionally Exposed Personnel to ionizing radiation and used TLDs. The total 
collective dose was 60 man-mSv. For the 5 months period, the average individual dose 
was 0.6 mSv and the maximum individual dose was 3.5 mSv. 
Table 3 shows the results of the operational dose (electronic dosimeters) for the critical 
tasks. 40 percent of the total collective dose was associated to the operations of 
decontamination of the electrical arc furnace nº 1 and of the gas ducts, where doses rates 
were the highest. The next critical group consists of the individuals dedicated to the 
wastes segregation and preparation ( 23% of the total collective dose). In this case, the 
number of people and the time used were more significant than the dose rates. As far as 
the internal dosimetry was concerned, two programs of monitoring were set up (whole 
body monitoring) , the first a few days after the start of works, to verify the suitability of 
the adopted protection measures. The second at the end of the work to confirm the 
absence of contamination. In the all cases the results were less than the recording level, 
0.5 mSv. 
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 Table 3. Operational doses for critical tasks 
TASK DOSES 
(man-mSv) 
Electrical arc furnace nº1 and gas ducts extractions 16.1 
Natural Coolers 3.1 
Bag filter nº1 5.3 
Bag filter nº2 2.3 
Scaffolding installation and stripping 3.4 
Silos 0.5 
Wastes Handling 9.7 
Total 40.4 
 
   
Waste management 
The wastes produced were put into two types of containers. The smoke dust was put into 
1 m3 big-bags, whereas metallic, plastic wastes, paper, etc., were put into 220 liters 
drums. Each waste was identified, labeled, and measured. The parameters registered for 
each container were the content, weight, size, origin, specific activity, etc. These wastes 
were stored within the facility in a place with the suitable radiological and physical 
security conditions. A significant percentage of the waste was checked with 




The incident in Acerinox in May 1998 did not involve illegal risks of exposure to 
ionizing radiation for the workers, or for the public, nor for the environment. The adopted 
radiological protection measures in the decontamination work were effective (no internal 
contamination). Also, the external doses remained at very low levels, thanks to the strict 
application of the established criteria of radiological protection from the beginning of the 
works. 
Finally we would like to note that the immediate intervention made in Acerinox, has 
demonstrated the capacity of response and co-ordination between companies and 
institutions in an incident without precedent in Spain. 
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Approximately 2000 Ton of low level activity wastes were produced in the 
decontamination operation at Acerinox. (smoke dust 91%, fiber cement panel 4%, 
refractory bricks 2%, compressible waste 2%, metallic waste 1%). 
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Appendix H:  HAND CALCULATIONS USED TO DETERMINE THE 
RADIONUCLIDES PRESENT 
 
Beta decay radionuclides were considered because of their association with gamma-ray 
emissions.  For each mass family, "x" indicates that the family is not seen.  "*" indicates 
the radionuclides within a family that can be seen because of their half-lives, gamma 
emission abundances, etc. 
 
x Z = 72 - 86;  abundance percentages very low (<2.0%), therefore unlikely 
x Z = 87 (2.55%);  t1/2 too short until Rb-87 which emits no gammas 
x Z = 88 (3.57%);  t1/2 too short 
x Z = 89 (4.76%);  t1/2 too short until Sr-89 which emits very low abundance gammas 
(max < 0.01%) which decays into stable Y-89 
x Z = 90 (5.8%); t1/2 too short until Sr-90 which has long t1/2 (29.2 a)  
Z = 91 (5.84%);  t1/2 too short until Sr-91 -> (57.6%) Y-91m & (42.4%) Y-91 -> Zr-91 
 *Sr-91, Y-91m 
x Z = 92 (6.03%);  t1/2 too short 
Z = 93 (6.37%);  t1/2 too short until Y-93 -> Zr-93 which has long t1/2 (1.5E6 a) 
 *Y-93 
x Z = 94 (6.50%);  t1/2 too short 
Z = 95 (6.50%);  t1/2 too short until Zr-95 -> (~100%) Nb-95 -> Mo-95 
 *Zr-95, Nb-95 keyline at 765.78 keV may be Type II partially hidden by 763.4 
keV Tl-208 line 
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x Z = 96 (6.3%);  t1/2 too short until Zr-96 which has long t1/2 (3.56E17 a) 
Z = 97 (5.98%);  t1/2 too short until Zr-97 -> (97.3%) Nb-97m & (2.7%) Nb-97 ->     
Mo-97 
 *Zr-97, Nb-97 
Z = 98 (5.78%);  t1/2 too short until Nb-98 -> Mo-98  
 *Nb-98 keyline at 787.4 keV may be Type II partially hidden by 785.6 keV Bi-
212 line 
Z = 99 (6.1%);  t1/2 too short until Mo-99 -> (87.51%) Tc-99m & (12.29%) Tc-99 ->  
Ru-99 
 *Mo-99, Tc-99m 
x Z = 100 (6.28%);  t1/2 too short 
x Z = 101 (5.18%);  t1/2 too short 
x Z = 102 (4.29%);  t1/2 too short 
Z = 103 (3.03%);  t1/2 too short until Ru-103 -> (~100%) Rh-103m -> Rh-103 
 *Ru-103 
x Z = 104 (1.88%) low abundance, therefore unlikely;  t1/2 too short 
Z = 105 (0.96%) low abundance, therefore unlikely;  t1/2 too short until Ru-105 -> (28%) 
Rh-105m & (72%) Rh-105 -> Pd-105 
 *Rh-105, Ru-105 keyline at 724.3 keV may be hidden behind multiplet peaks 
from 722.25 keV to 727.4 keV 
x Z = 106 - 128; abundance percentages very low (<0.5%), therefore unlikely 
x Z = 129 (0.75%);  t1/2 too short until I-129 which has long t1/2 (1.6E7 a)  
x Z = 130 (1.81%);  t1/2 too short until Te-130 which has long t1/2 (1E21 a) 
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Z = 131 (2.89%);  t1/2 too short until Sb-131 (t1/2 too short) -> (6.8%) Te131m & 
(93.2%) Te-131 -> I-131 -> Xe-131 
 *Te-131, Te-131m, I-131 
Z = 132 (4.31%);  t1/2 too short until Te-132 -> I-132 -> Xe-132 
 *Te-132, I-132 
Z = 133 (6.69%);  I-133 -> (2.88%) Xe-133m (most abundant gamma line within energy 
range of interest at 233.22 keV may be hidden under multiplet peaks from 228.33 
keV to 253.71 keV) & (97.12%) Xe-133 -> Cs-133 
 *I-133, Xe-133m, Xe-133 
x Z = 134 (7.87%);  t1/2 too short 
Z = 135 (6.54%);  t1/2 too short until I-135 -> (15.5%) Xe-135m (keyline at 526.56 keV 
may be hidden under multiplet peaks from 507.66 keV to 537.37 keV) & (84.5%) 
Xe-135 -> Cs-135 -> Ba-135  
 *I-135, Xe-135m, Xe-135  
x Z = 136 (6.32%);  t1/2 too short, I expected to see Cs-136 but did not 
x Z = 137 (6.19%);  t1/2 too short until Cs-137 which has long t1/2 (30a) 
x Z = 138 (6.71%);  t1/2 too short 
x Z = 139 (6.4%);  t1/2 too short 
Z = 140 (6.21%);  t1/2 too short until Ba-140 -> La-140 -> Ce-140 
 *Ba-140, La-140 
Z = 141 (5.8%);  t1/2 too short until Ce-141 -> Pr-141 which has long t1/2 (2E16 a) 
 *Ce-141 
x Z = 142 (5.84%);  t1/2 too short until Ce-142 which has long t1/2 (5E16 a) 
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Z = 143 (5.95%);  t1/2 too short until Ce-143 -> Pr-143 -> Nd-143 
 *Ce-143 
x Z = 144 (5.50%);  t1/2 too short until Ce-144 which has long t1/2 (285.8 d) 
x Z = 145 (3.93%);  t1/2 too short until Pr-145 which emits gammas of low abundance -> 
Nd-145 which has long t1/2 (1E17 a) 
x Z = 146 (3.00%);  t1/2 too short 
Z = 147 (2.25%);  t1/2 too short until Nd-147 (keyline at 531.02 keV may be hidden 
under multiplet peaks from 507.66 keV to 537.37 keV) -> Pm-147 (low 
abundance gammas only) -> Sm-147 which has long t1/2 (1.06E11 a) 
 *Nd-147 
x Z = 148 (1.67%);  t1/2 too short  until Nd-148 which has long t1/2 (~1E18 a) 
Z = 149 (1.08%);  t1/2 too short until Pm-149 (keyline at 285.95 keV may exist as Type 
II within multiplet peaks from 288.08 keV to 305.84 keV) -> Sm-149 
 *Pm-149 
x Z = 150 (0.653%);  t1/2 too short until Nd-150 which has long t1/2 (>1.3E19 a) 
Z = 151 (0.147%);  t1/2 too short until Pm-151 -> Sm-151 which has long t1/2 (90 a) 
 *Pm-151 
x Z = 152 (0.268%);  t1/2 too short 
Z = 153 (0.158%);  t1/2 too short until Sm-153 -> Eu-153 
 *Sm-153 
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